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Abstract
This dissertation examines changing community-company relationships within 
northern British Columbia’s (BC) forestry sector over time. The process of economic 
restructuring in the forestry sector has had dramatic impacts on forestry-dependent 
communities in BC. Economic restructuring has occurred alongside a shift in the 
provincial policy environment and the global adoption of a neoliberal ideological 
framework. There has been a discemable shift in BC away from state-centred Fordist- 
Keynesianism towards Post-Fordist neoliberalism. Neoliberalization of forestry has been 
aimed at ‘freeing up’ restrictions on markets, forest tenure, and processing activities. 
These processes have effectively allowed forestry companies to determine where and 
when production occurs. This has been mirrored by a shift within companies towards 
lean, flexible production. These shifts have weakened the formal and informal 
relationships between companies and communities and forced communities to adopt the 
neoliberal ethos of ‘doing more with less’.
A qualitative case study of Mackenzie, Houston, and Quesnel was conducted to 
examine 1) the types of relationships forestry companies adopted when engaging 
forestry-dependent communities, 2) drivers of change, and 3) the role of place in shaping 
global and local forces. Key informant interviews and focus groups and analysis of 
historical data allowed for a rich understanding of contexts, processes, and outcomes at 
the community level. Analysis showed that companies have withdrawn from community 
involvement as they shifted from ‘managerialism’ to ‘entrepreneurialism’. Analysis 
indicated that significant changes included retrenchment of company involvement,
changed relationships with municipal government, weakening of local business sectors, 
and fewer resources. The results showed that changes in relationships were driven by 
globalization of forestry, consolidation of the Interior sector, corporate restructuring, and 
changing forest policy.
These findings suggest that the search for flexibility by forestry companies and 
the provincial government have left communities in the northern Interior with 
increasingly uncertain futures. Transition from resource-dependence towards ‘new rural 
economies’ will require the involvement of companies, communities, and the provincial 
government. This study has shown that increasing detachment by companies and lack of 
vision for regional development planning has further entrenched longstanding issues of 
dependence and vulnerability within the region.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Research context
This dissertation examines community-company relationships within northern 
British Columbia’s (BC) forestry sector over time. I focus on “relationships” to assess 
how communities and companies were connected, how they regarded one another, and 
how they interacted in a local setting over a time when formal and informal ties and 
obligations were being (re)defined. This is rooted in a greater interest in understanding 
how global economic processes impact everyday life. Economic restructuring in the 
forestry sector has stimulated a shift where community ties to forestry companies remain 
vital, yet company ties to communities appear to be weakening (Marchak et al., 1999). 
As Marchak (1990, p. 95) states, “the economic survival of [forest-dependent] towns can 
be tied to a company, but the company may have no such ties to the town”. These issues 
are increasingly important when addressing the future of forestry-dependent communities 
in northern BC.
The process of economic restructuring in the forestry sector has had dramatic 
impacts on BC’s forestry-dependent communities (Barnes, 2005; Hak, 2007; Hayter, 
2003), and has fundamentally changed the relationship between companies and 
communities (Hayter, 2000a). While literature on forestry sector restructuring and the 
resulting community impacts has grown since the 1980s (Bowles, 1982), there has been
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little focus on: (1) the changing nature of community-company relationships (Beckley & 
Reimer, 1999); and (2) resource peripheries in geographic theory (Hayter et al., 2003). 
This dissertation addresses these gaps by highlighting how changes in company 
engagement and involvement within resource-dependent communities have occurred 
alongside restructuring of production and governance systems. These shifts have had 
profound implications within the northern Interior where resource firms continue to 
dominate local economies and exert influence over community governance. Company 
withdrawal and redefinition of roles and responsibilities are occurring at a period when 
communities are pressed for development and leadership to address an increasingly 
uncertain future.
Economic restructuring has occurred alongside a shift in provincial policy and the 
global adoption of a neoliberal ideological framework (Harvey, 2005; Peck & Tickell,
2002). There has been a discemable shift in BC away from state-centred Fordist- 
Keynesianism towards a decentralized Post-Fordist neoliberalism (McCarthy, 2006)'. 
Neoliberalization of the BC forestry sector has been broadly aimed at ‘freeing up’ 
restrictions on markets, forest tenure, and processing activities (Young & Matthews, 
2007). These processes have effectively allowed forestry companies to determine where 
and when production occurs. This has been mirrored by a shift within companies towards 
lean, flexible production (Barnes, 2005). These shifts have weakened the formal and
1 Fordist-Keynsianism refers, in general, to a regime of accumulation that is based around mass production 
that is regulated by a central welfare state. Regional development policy frameworks were aimed at 
equalizing regional disparities through top-down planning focused on large-scale megaprojects and 
mitigating boom-bust cycles through the provision of social safety nets. Post-Fordist Neoliberalism refers 
to a movement towards a decentralized state focused on eliminating market restrictions through 
deregulation. Regional development is encouraged through increased emphasis on achieving self- 
sufficiency and direct engagement in the global economy (Breathnach, 2010; Peet, 2007).
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informal relationships between companies and communities and forced communities to 
adopt the neoliberal ethos of ‘doing more with less’.
Currently, there are several bodies of research that address different aspects of 
community-company relationships. The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) literature 
focuses primarily on corporate actions (Prieto-Carron et al., 2006). However, only a 
small component of the CSR literature addresses issues such as community-company 
collaboration, the role of the company within the community, ethical business practices, 
and societal accountability of business (Boehm, 2002; Newell, 2005). Community 
Economic Development (CED) addresses issues related to community participation, 
community capacity, sustainable development, community assets, and self-reliance 
(Markey et al., 2005), but has little to no focus on the role of the company within these 
processes. As such, my research links across this gap by addressing the roles that the 
community and company can each play in contributing to a vital local economy and 
community.
12 . Purpose for the research
A review of the literature identified that the current nature and evolution of 
community-company relationships have not been adequately addressed. While there is 
research on the nature and implications of the past ‘paternalistic’ company relationships 
in resource-dependent communities (Lucas, 1971; Porteous 1970a; 1970b; Rollwagen, 
2006, 2007; Schulman, 1999; Solecki, 1996; White, 2004), little is known about the 
nature of current corporate approaches (Hoppe et al., 2007) and how this shift affects 
long standing issues of community viability, stability, and dependence. My research
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addresses this gap and enhances our current understanding of community-company 
relationships in forestry-dependent communities. The key contributions highlight the 
changing roles and responsibilities of local management and its implications for planning, 
service provision, and leadership pools; the markedly different corporate views of 
communities within production associated neoliberalism and the reshaping of local 
demands upon industry; the mismatch between the requirements of ‘entrepreneurial’ 
governance and the capacities, resources, and unique local economic structures in 
resource-dependent communities; and the responses of communities to the discourse of 
forestry companies to create suitable local conditions for capital which have further 
exacerbated longstanding issues of vulnerability and dependence.
The purpose of my research is to explore how and why community-company 
relationships have changed over time. The goal is to gain an understanding of the 
global and local processes affecting both communities and companies. An understanding 
of how both local and global processes work to shape community-company ties will help 
to inform community planning and forestry policy in novel ways. A rich understanding of 
the political, economic, social, and environmental processes shaping the forestry sector in 
northern BC will also contribute to the rural and regional development literature.
13 . Research questions
To identify the factors influencing the evolution of community-company 
relationships, the following research questions are addressed:
4
1. What types o f relationships have forestry companies adopted when engaging 
forestry-dependent communities?
This question addresses the changing role of the company within the community. It has 
been argued that the process of globalization has moved forestry corporations into 
different global arenas in search of profitability. This shift has driven the process of 
economic restructuring throughout the BC forestry sector - from Fordism to Flexible 
Production (Barnes & Hayter, 1994; Hayter, 2000a) - a process that has also changed 
how companies interact with forestry-dependent communities. For instance, companies 
have changed the ways they address matters of: local government (Beckley, 1996), 
community infrastructure (Solecki, 1996), community services (Schulman & Anderson, 
1999), organization of labour (Beckley, 1998), local leadership (Russell & Harris, 2001), 
community activities (Rollwagen, 2006), and involvement in the housing market 
(Pinfield & Etherington, 1985; Porteous, 1970a). Companies were originally engaged in 
these activities to appease labour and address company interests.
While one may be inclined to view this change as part of an inevitable global 
process, companies still have an important connection to forestry-dependent communities 
in the form of labour, natural resource requirements, and institutional linkages (Hayter, 
2004a). Further, while capital may be perceived as being increasingly ‘footloose’ and 
‘placeless’ as a result of economic restructuring (Mitchell, 1997), capital still has 
requirements that must be met at the community level in order to engage in resource 
extraction (Hoppe et al., 2007). The purpose of my research is to trace the evolution of 
community-company relationships in northern BC’s forestry sector through in-depth
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studies of the evolution of both the community and company. Drawing from the 
academic literature, local, provincial, and national archives, as well as 
community/regional newspapers, company reports, union reports, trade journals, and 
census data, detailed chronologies of community-company relationships were 
constructed.
2. Have community-company relationships changed over time, and i f  so what 
processes have driven these changes?
The second research questions address the processes that have prompted change in 
community-company relationships over time. The purpose is to link shifts in community- 
company interactions at the local level to broad trends in economic, political, social, and 
technologic systems.
By outlining the evolution of community-company relationships, a better sense of 
how companies and communities have engaged with one another over time is garnered. 
These findings are juxtaposed with broad shifts occurring at regional, national, and global 
scales. This helps isolate some of the processes driving changes in community-company 
relationships, as well as identifies interconnections within and between processes and 
scales. Data from key informant interviews is used to identify drivers of change 
originating from within the community and region.
3. Can community-company relationships be viewed as a product o f global and 
local forces?
6
Little is known about the current nature of community-company relationships within the 
forestry sector, and the applicability of different theories to relationships in forestry- 
dependent communities is ambiguous. Findings from the case studies are used to 
determine whether community-company relationships can be viewed as products of 
global-local interdependencies. Findings are also assessed to determine how local 
peculiarities are involved in mediating global processes (Massey, 1997a).
Also, other theoretical frameworks relating to resource towns are assessed to see 
if they are representative of forestry-dependent communities in BC. Addressing forestry- 
dependent communities from a unique perspective allows me to assess the applicability 
of past theories and build upon existing bodies of theory. For instance, past frameworks 
of community transition implied that a ‘hands-off approach by companies set the stage 
where communities progressed through a number of stages resulting in economic 
maturity (Lucas, 1971). It was also theorized that by disengaging companies from 
community affairs it would build community capacity, develop local leaders, encourage 
local responsibility, and build a sense of community. My research examines whether this 
is the case.
1.4. Conceptual approach
To address the various aspects of community-company relationships, my research 
also draws on theoretical approaches from locality studies (Curry, 1996; Massey & Allen, 
1984), new regionalism (MacLeod & Jones, 2001), and globalization research (Perrons,
2005). A synthesis of approaches allows for communities to be viewed as places where
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global and local forces collide (Chang, 1999). This conceptual framework allows 
corporate decision-making and community stability to be situated within a broader global 
framework while asserting the importance of the unique elements of place that influence 
both corporate and community stability (Barnes & Hayter, 2005; Hayter, 2004a; 
Troughton, 1995; Wilson, 2004).
Within a global-local framework, communities are viewed as a fulcrum point 
where local place both experiences and actively contributes to global processes 
(Swyngedouw, 1997) while companies are viewed as being both tied to communities 
(because of labour and natural resource requirements) and being simultaneously tied to 
the goals of distant shareholders and volatile international commodity markets (Hayter, 
2000a; Hoppe et al., 2007). Therefore, the challenge for my dissertation is to balance the 
unique elements of place with broad global processes to gain a better understanding of 
how community-company relationships are shaped.
15 . Outline of thesis
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into 8 chapters; Chapter 2 
establishes the theoretical framework for understanding the different processes 
influencing community-company relationships. A number of theoretical approaches 
including, locality studies, institutional economic geography, and new regionalism are 
drawn upon to highlight the relationship between the global and the local. The case for 
treating resource communities as unique is also outlined.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed outline of the case study area. It examines how the 
northern Interior region of BC plays an integral role in this study because much of the
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research on the community impacts of economic restructuring in the forestry sector has 
tended to focus on the southern Coastal region (Hayter, 2000a). As such, some of these 
findings are not applicable to forestry-dependent communities in the Interior (Hak, 2007). 
This chapter also highlights the importance of the research problem to economic and 
rural geography.
In Chapter 4, the research approach, case study selection framework, research 
instruments, ethical considerations, and the method of analysis are outlined. This research 
uses a qualitative case study approach to support an in-depth analysis of community- 
company relationships. The case study approach allowed me to address locally embedded 
institutions and was well suited to studying these phenomena in their local setting.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are comprised of the research findings. In each chapter the 
research findings are articulated, supported by exemplary quotes and secondary data, and 
linked to existing research and theory. Chapter 5 focuses on the nature of relationships 
from the perspective of companies and communities. Chapter 6 examines how these 
relationships have changed as economic restructuring reworked rigid Fordist institutions 
in search of flexibility. Chapter 7 highlights the processes driving these relationship 
changes.
Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the research findings in relation to the research 
questions. The majority of the chapter focuses on the contributions of my research to the 
literature and geographic theory.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by outlining the importance of the research 
findings and drawing final policy implications. The study’s limitations and opportunities 
for future research are also summarized, and conclusions are drawn.
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework used to explore relationships 
between companies and communities. The dissertation draws upon institutional 
approaches in economic geography to examine how history, institutions, and geography 
influence community-company relationships in resource-dependent communities. 
Geographers adopted the institutional approach in the 1970s and 1980s as a way to 
understand local relationships because it balanced structure and agency, emphasised the 
importance of global and local networks, considered the linkages between past and 
present economic activity, and sought a middle ground between the pursuit of general 
theory and empirical studies.
Second, the unique nature of resource peripheries is explored by examining 
theoretical contributions from locality studies, new regionalism, and the globalization 
literatures. Particular attention is given to the interdependencies between local and global 
institutions in shaping regional economies. Finally, I examine the staples approach, a 
uniquely Canadian institutional approach, to regional development.
10
2.1. Institutional economic geography
Institutional economics is described as a ‘third way’ or ‘middle range’ approach 
to the economy (Hudson, 2006; Peck, 2000a). Prior to the economic restructuring of the 
1980s, economic geographers commonly approached the economy using either 
neoclassical or Marxist theory (Cumbers et al., 2003). The neoclassical approach adopted 
in regional science assumed that economic activity is rational, maximizing, and atomistic, 
while ignoring complex arrangements of social and political forces, space, and people at 
work (Leyshon, 2011; Martin, 2000). Marxist approaches emphasise the importance of 
social structures while placing little emphasis on individual and collective agency, or the 
role of culture (Cumbers et al., 2003; Hudson, 2006). Both approaches are under- 
contextualized in that the peculiarities of place and society are not addressed (Martin, 
1994). The institutional approach gained favour within economic geography (and other 
social sciences, most notably sociology) because it accounts for the social and cultural 
conditions of “everyday life” (Cumbers et al., 2003, p. 325) and “real-world behaviours” 
(Hayter 2004, p. 96). Institutionalists have focused on how past and present arrangements 
of individuals, institutions, culture, and politics within different places work to shape 
economic development (Barnes & Gertler, 1999; Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Peet, 2007).
Economic behaviour is viewed being inseparable from the social, political, and 
cultural contexts within which it is situated (Hayter, 2004a; Peck, 1996; 2000a; Sheppard, 
2011). Economic activity does not occur in a vacuum; activities, behaviours and goals 
can be motivated by economic and non-economic goals (Peck, 2005; Velthuis, 1999). 
Therefore, in order to understand the economic landscape, research must examine 
“institutional norms, expectations and conventions, all of which are historically and
11
geographically relative” (Barnes, 1996, p. 214), to develop an understanding of the 
economy rooted in social and cultural processes (Martin, 2003). While early work by 
geographers focused heavily on formal organizations, the cultural turn in economic 
geography prompted a greater consideration of how society, politics, and culture promote 
or inhibit local and regional economic development (Mackinnon, 2009).
Institutions are socially constructed and include formal regulations and 
organizations and informal practices, routines, and habits that shape the behaviour of 
actors. Formal regulation includes laws, policies, standards, and rules. Informal or tacit 
practices can include local networks, habits, norms, routine patterns of behaviour, and 
customs (Nee, 2005; Streek & Thelen, 2005; Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992). The role of 
institutions is to shape, constrain, and prescribe the expectations, activity, and roles of 
various actors and organizations (Gertler, 2010). Institutions are also designed to reduce 
risk and uncertainty inherent to economic activity (Sheppard, 2011). Configurations of 
intuitions arise alongside new industries and often become firmly established if these 
industries are successful (Boschma & Frenken, 2009). As such, the makeup and mix of 
informal and formal institutions are rooted within place, and tend to vary across space 
(Boschma & Martin, 2010; Hayter, 2004a). The strength of this approach for studying 
community economies is that it takes a broad view of economic activity, where different 
actors (firms, governments, organizations, and individuals) cannot be divorced from local 
culture, history, or society (Hodgson, 1994; MacLeod, 2001a). In short, idealized 
conceptions of markets, actors, and motivations following universal rules are rejected in 
favour of messier conceptualizations that are better suited to explaining uneven
12
development and differences within and between states, regions, and landscapes (Jessop, 
2001).
By utilizing this theoretical lens, regions take on a new prominence in
understanding economies because context and culture play important roles in influencing
economic activity (Amin, 1998; Paasi, 2009). Regions are understood to be meeting
places for a variety of global and local institutions and the conflicts, relations, and
discourses that shape, constrain, or transform the economy, society, and culture. This
conceptualization is grounded firmly in the notion that regions are not fixed, concrete,
predetermined entities (Lee, 2002). Rather, regional economies and boundaries are
perpetually fluid  due to the changing nature of resources, markets, technology, policy,
and relationships over time (Essletzbichler & Rigby, 2007; Paasi, 2002). This is an
important distinction because it raises the role of space, scale, and time in shaping the
particularities of different regional economies (Page, 1996). Variation across regions is
related, in part, to socially constructed institutions that are interconnected, embedded,
evolving, and unique:
The fact is, however, that all economic action is a form of social action and cannot 
be separated from questions of status, sociability and power. In other words, 
economic activity is socially and institutionally situated: it cannot be explained by 
reference to atomistic individual motives alone, but has to be understood as 
enmeshed in wider structures of social, economic, and political rules, procedures, 
and conventions. It is the role of these systems of rules, procedures, and 
conventions, both of a formal and informal nature, that is the focus of an 
institutionalist approach to economic geography (Martin, 2000, p. 79).
Institutional frameworks are best understood by unpacking the various factors, 
unique to a particular space and time, which contributed to their formation and success 
(Barnes et al., 2001). Enduring institutional frameworks temporarily contribute to
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unstable ‘spatiotemporal’ fixes to crises of capitalism in different spaces at different 
times (Hudson, 2004; Jessop, 1999; 2001). This has important implications. Universal 
understandings of industrialisation or restructuring will be limited in usefulness as local 
institutions and history are often discounted or overlooked (Tonts, 2010). Further, the 
practice of attempting to recreate the success of leading regions by replicating policies 
and industries should be discarded as it ignores geography and the economic 
opportunities arising in space and time (e.g. unique arrangements of actors, institutions, 
resources, norms, rules, and infrastructure) (Malmberg & Maskell, 2010; Sayer, 1985; 
Sheppard, 2011; Walker, 2000). Rather, understandings of national and global economies 
and planning need to be based upon strong case studies of local and regional economies 
(Hayter, 2004a). As Martin (2006; p. 171) notes “policies rarely travel well” .
Economies are also embedded within places and ongoing processes. Economic 
activity occurs because of interactions between social and economic systems that are 
spatially differentiated and context specific (Bathelt & Gliickler, 2003; Cumbers et al.,
2003). The main thrust of embeddedness is that social and economic systems are not 
separate, discrete entities, but are entangled (Granovetter, 1985). As Harvey (2005b, p. 
60) notes, “capitalist activity is always grounded somewhere”. Embeddedness implies 
that economic activity cannot be fully understood without accounting for localized 
network relations, social structures, and culture (Yeung, 2007). Place can then be thought 
of as playing a key role in creating economic opportunities. With regards to economic 
restructuring, embeddedness helps to explain how different contexts and existing 
institutions, practices, and policies shape responses (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The 
interaction of local networks of actors embedded within a region creates unique norms,
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conventions, trust, relationships, and behaviours that influence regional performance 
(Simmie, 2005). This helps to explain why development capacities, abilities, orientations, 
and approaches vary within and between regions.
Regional development also follows an evolutionary trajectory shaped in part by 
the history of past decisions. History matters in shaping (though not determining) 
economic trajectories because habits are slowly defined over time, becoming normalized 
(Peck, 2005; Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992). New institutions are built, or layered, upon 
existing institutional arrangements. In this regard, a region’s history is key to adequately 
understanding current economic development issues (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Tonts, 
2010). Local histories play a prominent role in any analysis of regional economies 
because choices made in the past work to influence and shape current and future choices 
and decisions as well as economic development patterns and structures. This ‘path 
dependence’ underscores the importance of past decisions - regarding technology, labour, 
policy, industry, etc. - in facilitating or constraining future choices, strategies, and 
practices (Martin, 2006; Walker, 2000).
Locally contingent institutions become the ‘carriers of history’ and influence 
economic development trajectories and regional stability over time (Belussi et al., 2008; 
Martin, 2000). Decisions regarding technology and industrial organization can have 
important implications in shaping the trajectory or path of development. In some cases, 
regions can become ‘locked-in’ to certain paths despite apparent drawbacks. Lock-in 
occurs when institutional structures are rigid and local cultures are resistant to change, 
which inhibits adjustment during crises (Hassink, 2010; MacLeod, 2001b). The inertia of 
existing arrangements can hinder the evolution and renewal of existing industrial
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structures and curbs the ability of regions to capitalize on emerging opportunities. 
Institutions that fail to adjust quickly enough to changing economic conditions risk 
becoming dysfunctional (Gerter, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). The dissolution of 
institutional structures and development paths are brought about by crises or shocks that 
destabilize established systems (Martin & Sunley, 2010); path creation plays a key role in 
renewal (Tonts, 2010). Change creates economic opportunities in some industries, while 
rendering others obsolete. Routines, rules, and organizations can be a source of strength 
or ‘friction’ during times of change as regional economies struggle to adapt (Hodgson, 
1994).
2 2 . An institutional economic geography of resource communities
In order to examine community-company relationships within BC’s forestry 
sector, this case study focuses on forestry companies, community organizations, and 
provincial government agencies. I construct a ‘local model’ of BC’s forestry sector to 
better understand the changes and challenges facing companies and communities 
(Chapter 3). To conceptualize the place of community within the global economy, I drew 
upon theoretical contributions from localities studies, globalization, and the nature 
global-local connectivity. To account for the unique aspects of BC’s forestry sector and 
resource development in the Canadian context, I drew upon Innis’s staples theory.
New regionalism and institutional economic geography advocate thinking of the 
global economy as comprised of a number of “local models” that are interconnected 
(Barnes & Hayter, 2005, p. 454). As such, to understand economic activity one must 
scrutinize the interaction between global and local institutions. Recall that institutional
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approaches view regional economies as meeting places or fulcrum points where global 
and local forces converge. Resource peripheries are unique in this respect because “[they 
are] not simply creations of global capital but [are] shaped to a significant extent by the 
local dynamics of formal and informal resident negotiation with the industrial hegemon” 
(White, 2004, p. 45). Further, local models are well suited to the examination of 
community-company relationships in resource-dependent communities because they 
allow us to consider environmental, economic, social, technologic, and political factors 
influencing both community and company.
Within human geography the study of the ‘local’ in the face of global economic, 
political, and social change has its origins in locality studies. Locality studies arose 
among economic geographers in response to industrial restructuring in the United 
Kingdom (UK) throughout the 1980s (Benko & Scott, 2004) as a means to explore how 
different places (namely cities, regions, and communities) influenced restructuring and 
how the roles of different places were changing (Haldrup, 2009). Locality studies sought 
to explore the connection between spatial restructuring of manufacturing economies and 
social and economic change in different localities (Cooke, 1987; Massey, 1997; 
Schoenberger, 1999). It became increasingly apparent that the effects of economic 
restructuring were geographically differentiated, that is, different places were 
experiencing “highly contrasting shifts, and trajectories of change” (Massey, 1991, p. 
318) and responding to them in different ways (Scott, 2000). This geographic 
differentiation was thought to be a result of the interplay between ‘bottom up’ (local 
characteristics) and ‘top down’ forces (uneven investment over time and economic 
activities associated with that investment) (Chang, 1996). A lasting contribution of
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locality studies was enhancing understanding of the organization of economic activity 
across space and the social relations between places which work to create inequalities and 
uneven development within peripheral areas (Cloke et al., 1991; Dale, 2002; Painter, 
1994).
Locality studies were one response to positivist geography of the 1950s and 1960s 
that discounted the uniqueness of place and time specificity (Chang, 1999; Fik, 1997). 
Positivist research focused on the identification of general processes and the construction 
of general laws (Massey, 1984a; 1993). But when recognition of “uniqueness and 
difference... turned into points of analytic interest rather than mere background noise, 
and with the affirmation of their investigative significance, any notion of theoretical 
totalisation became correspondingly anathema” (Scott, 2000, p. 491). In an era 
characterized by increased global interconnectivity, coupled with a catastrophic shift 
away from a centralized system of Fordist mass production, some aspects of economic 
activity and change were best understood by examining change at the local level (Curry, 
1996). It also challenged Marxist approaches of the 1970s, which were seen as 
discounting individual and collective agency by placing emphasis on structure (Hudson,
2006). As such, uniqueness, peculiarity, and specificity of place were lost when 
explaining spatial phenomena (Massey & Allen, 1984). Locality studies played an 
important role in reasserting the role of place and local struggles in shaping economic 
restructuring (Barnes et al., 2007; Thrift, 1994; Winson & Leach, 2002). Indeed, 
localities studies helped reassert the role of the region as an object of theoretical and 
analytical focus (Barnes, 2011).
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Locality studies quickly prompted debate within human geography. Two
prominent criticisms centred on the focus of the research and a retreat from theory in
favour of empirical description (Cloke et al., 1991; Massey, 1993). The first criticism
argued that localities research was too narrow in focus making it parochial (Cloke et al.,
1991). Smith (1987, quoted in Barnes et al., 2007, pp. 62, 66) felt that the focus on
locality marked a dangerous return to empirical regional geography:
.. .if the unique is back on the agenda, then it is difficult to see how we can avoid 
fighting the crude Hartshornian battle between the ideographic and nomothetic... 
Should this debate emerge again.. .it will be tantamount to admitting that we have 
learned nothing since the 1950s.
Critics also argued that producing a number of small, disconnected studies of political, 
economic, and social processes at the ‘local’ scale would inevitably lead to a neglect of 
the broader system (Cloke et al., 1991). The second criticism of locality studies relates to 
the tendency to favour empirical description over theory (Barnes et al., 2007; Cochrane, 
1987; Scott, 2000). There was increasing concern that as locality studies progressed, 
“research became increasingly atheoretical in favour of a focus on the primacy of 
empirical context and data in geographical analysis” (Benko & Scott, 2004, p. 60). This 
was one of the primary reasons why locality studies lacked longevity within economic 
geography (Scott, 2000).
However, locality studies made a number of important contributions to 
geographic theory and research methodology. Of particular importance to understanding 
the economic geographies of communities is recognition that, “intrinsically two-way 
connections between large-scale processes of economic and social restructuring and 
localised practices, political struggles and outcomes [exist]” (Barnes & Gregory, 1997, p.
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509). The established notion that general forces influenced passive local areas in an 
unmediated fashion was challenged (Cooke, 1996) because different characteristics of 
localities were found to play an integral role in affecting how global forces worked 
themselves out in places (Chang, 1996; 1999; Thrift, 1994). To gain a better 
understanding of regional variation, greater attention was paid to history and local 
peculiarity because “general processes never work themselves out in pure form. There are 
always specific circumstances, a particular history, a particular place or location” 
(Massey, 1984a, p. 9). For community-based research this represents a critical 
contribution to understanding how local culture, knowledge, institutions, and history play 
a prominent role in shaping the lives of people in different places.
To avoid divorcing local occurrences from broader systems, I also draw upon 
globalization to examine the different connections between global economic activity and 
to couch restructuring within broader economic processes (Amin & Thrift, 1997; Conti, 
1997; Dicken et al., 1997; Winson & Leach, 2002). Globalization helps to highlight the 
roles that resource communities fulfil in contributing to international circuits of 
resources, capital, information, and technology. Although various theories and empirical 
studies related to the nature of globalization have resulted in numerous 
conceptualizations of the economy, discussions surrounding the nature and extent of 
change are contentious (Amin & Thrift 1997). Dicken et al. (1997, p. 159) point out that 
globalization is often characterized, “on the one hand by a ‘booster’ line in which 
globalization tendencies are seen as being all-encompassing, all powerful and -  literally -  
everywhere and on the other, a ‘hypercritical’ line in which the very existence of these 
same tendencies is questioned or denied, and their historical significance trivialized”.
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Geographers, in particular, have focused on the importance of space and time in shaping: 
(1) the nature of the transformation of the global economy; (2) impacts on the power of 
the state and the mobility of capital; and (3) the different implications of globalization for 
cores and peripheries (Hayter et al., 2003). Specific attention is given to the critique of 
unilinear, one-sided, and often contradictory conceptualizations of globalization and the 
presumed opportunities and barriers posed for regional development (Brenner, 1998; 
Wade, 2009). This is explored by highlighting how various political projects have used 
these conceptualizations or narratives of globalization to drive economic restructuring 
(Peck, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2000).
Neoliberal globalization is underpinned by a broader political project that focuses 
on maximizing benefits to society by increasing the scope, scale, and autonomy of 
markets (Harvey, 2005a; Mitchell, 2001; Peet, 2007; Watts, 2000). It is assumed that to 
achieve a fix to the crisis of Fordism, a number of principles must be embraced to 
enhance deregulation and flexibility (Peck, 1998). First, in order to maximize societal 
benefits associated with capitalism, markets need to be uninhibited by regulation. 
Unfettered markets are seen as encouraging competition where the strong and efficient 
will survive (Dumenil & Levy, 2004). It is assumed that the unregulated market place is 
the best arena for encouraging competition. It is also assumed that increased competition 
will in turn drive increases in efficiency and profitability.
Second, focus is shifted towards individualism, consumerism, and 
entrepreneurialism to bolster market activity (Harvey, 2005a; McCarthy, 2006). 
Autonomous individuals and groups are viewed as being able to quickly and effectively 
identify needs and work to capitalize on emerging market opportunities. Concurrently,
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there is greater emphasis on individuals taking responsibility for successes and failures 
(Brodie, 2007). Chouinard and Crooks (2008, p. 175) refer to independence of 
individuals from the state as the “neoliberal mode of citizenship”. The assumption is that 
once entrepreneurial individuals or private organizations are allowed to maximize their 
interests through unfettered competition, the benefits of their actions will ‘spill over’ or 
‘trickle down’ to other individuals within society (Martin, 2006; McChesney, 1999).
Finally, the role of the state should be limited to creating an institutional 
framework that is conductive to the operation of free markets, trade, and capital (Brodie, 
2007; French & Leyshon, 2010; Peet, 2007); protecting the operations of the market 
(Harvey, 2006); and encouraging and monitoring performance (Chouinard & Crooks, 
2008). The role of states was reoriented where intervention is deemed permissible when 
creating markets through restructuring (Peck et al., 2009). McBride and McNutt (2007, p. 
183) note that the role of the state has, “shiftfed] from decommodification to 
marketization and, therefore, recommodification.” Changing modes of intervention are 
justified because the state is viewed as being incapable of addressing market signals 
because of its position outside of the market, its limited information regarding the market, 
and because it carries inherent biases created by the presence of powerful interest groups 
motivated by self-interests (Harvey, 2006). These inadequacies have been used as 
justifications for shifting responsibilities for the regulation of economic and social 
functions from public to private actors and arenas. In practice, this has resulted in shifting 
some responsibilities to the community level. In many instances the state has retained the 
power, expertise, and resources required to provide services effectively (Leach & 
Winson, 1995; Rankin, 2003; Young & Matthews, 2007).
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The work of social scientists in critiquing the claims and possibilities of neoliberal 
globalization - the dominant form/strategy for economic globalization - and the 
disjuncture between ideology and practice is instructive in understanding changes 
occurring in post-Fordist economies (Washboume, 2005). Indeed, many have pointed out 
that the globalization discourse has been an effective tool in reshaping institutions in an 
attempt to create various fixes for economic crises (Piven, 1995). Three prominent 
criticisms of neoliberal ideology and the apparent forms and necessities of globalization 
are worth considering here (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). First, this conceptualization is 
decidedly narrow and views globalization as a new transformation where the world is 
becoming borderless, homogenised, and disconnected from place (Chang, 1999; Kelly, 
1998; Smith, 2005; Yeung, 1998). The power of the state over social and economic 
systems, and the importance of geography are seen as being less relevant. As such, the 
world is viewed as increasingly ‘placeless’ (Dicken et al., 1997; Yeung, 1998) or 
‘deterritorialized’ (Storper, 1997) where the role of culture, society, and national political 
institutions are thought to be less relevant to economies.
Some enthusiastic advocates of economic globalization have even claimed that it 
has heralded the ‘death’ or ‘end’ of geography (MacLeod, 2001b). For regions and 
communities, it is felt that uneven development and social and economic inequalities will 
eventually be eliminated by market forces (Agnew, 2000; Smith, 2005). Proponents point 
to an increasingly ‘borderless world’, where the balance of power is shifting from the 
state to corporations and international markets. However, while borders are opening up 
for some activities (economic trade) they remain closely regulated for others 
(immigration) (Paasi, 2009). For Peck (1998, p. 96) the discourse of globalization is
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being used to leverage changes to institutions and structures established during Fordism
by framing changes as being imposed upon society by exogenous forces:
One is a story of globalization [that] asserts that the economy has changed 
irrevocably, the second that the inherited pattern of regulation is undermining 
both competitiveness and the work ethic. In political rhetoric, globalization is 
presented as the universal causal agent, the ubiquitous “explanation” for plant 
closures, corporate downsizing, and “realistic” pay deals. Rather more subtly, it is 
also mobilized by corporate and political elites in their pleas for economic 
“modernization,” “new” unionism, more “flexible” working practices, and so on. 
Likewise, globalization ... is used to justify the continuing roll-back of welfarist 
institutions and social entitlements.
Globalization is also thought to have instigated a significant shift in the balance of 
power between global and local institutions. This ‘re-scaling’ of power is viewed as 
placing individuals and places at the mercy of global capital, struggling to retain 
autonomy and identity. As Taylor and Conti (1997, p. 4) state, “the notion of power 
relations expressed in this [viewpoint] is very much a caricature of the powerful, 
empowered global versus the powerless victim local” . This is rooted in the idea that 
globalization has eroded the state’s ability to effectively govern and regulate economies. 
The state has been ‘hollowed out’ to some degree as the responsibilities for governance 
have shifted up and down to global and local/regional institutions, respectively (Tickell & 
Peck, 1995; Swyngedouw, 2000). However, this shift should be thought of as a 
reorganization of governance structures or a rearticulation of state power to capitalize on 
emerging economic opportunities, rather than a decline of the importance of the state 
(Brenner, 1998; Hudson, 2004; MacLeod, 2001b; Warf, 2008). The state continues to 
play a critical role in regulating regional economies and directing how power is exercised 
through institutional and regulatory structures (Martin, 2006).
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Second, in terms of economics, capital, and information have become 
deterritorialized as they are less constrained by strong ties to place. With regards to the 
firm, globalization frames transnational corporations (TNC) as being increasingly mobile 
and placeless due to new opportunities that allow for easier relocation of production 
across the globe (Piven, 1995). Indeed, capital (especially financial capital) is viewed as 
being increasingly ‘footloose’ and hyper-mobile with the ability to expediently transcend 
borders (Cox, 2005; Mitchell, 1997). As Dicken et al. (1997, p. 160) point out, “in this 
scenario, capital would be infinitely mobile and completely footloose, shaking off all 
forms of local and national allegiance or dependence; the principal agents of change 
would be the all-powerful transnational corporations, the epitome of ‘placeless’ capital”. 
However, location, place, and space remain critically important to how the economy 
operates (Garresten et al., 2009; Hudson, 2002). For countries, regions, and communities 
the discourse of hyper-mobility has resulted in the formation of policy focused on the 
necessity of striking favourable bargains with industry to compete for capital (Glasmeier, 
2000; Warf, 2008).
It is also thought that globalization will eventually lead to homogenization of 
culture because: (1) national policies are increasingly unable to contain investment or 
constrain markets (Fine, 2004); (2) innovations in communication and transportation 
technology allow corporations to coordinate vast global production systems with ease 
(Cox, 1997; Gertler, 1997); (3) corporations have the ability to act freely without 
consideration for national or local consequences; (4) production of ‘global products’ for 
the global marketplace is uncontested as consumers are viewed as having global tastes 
(Taylor & Conti, 1997; Yeung, 1998); and (5) agency amongst individuals and
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corporations within the global economy is driven by the market (Dicken et al., 1997). 
However, these factors fail to consider the resilience and resistance of local cultures. 
Rather than being obliterated or homogenised, many local cultures are able to incorporate 
various components of globalization leading to the rise of hybrid cultures (Featherstone, 
1990).
Human geographers have been critical of this view, noting that globalization is in 
fact, not an entirely new phenomenon, but rather, it has existed in various forms since the 
birth of capitalism. Also, the depth of changes and the presupposed advantages 
accompanying neoliberal globalization have been overstated and are linked to chosen 
economic strategies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Amin & Thrift, 1997; Piven 1995; 
Wade, 1999). As Smith (2005, p. 895) points out “The question is not whether such 
[trends are] happening, for some people in some places, but what else is happening 
alongside and in blatant contradiction with it?” In terms of connectivity, today the world 
is simply experiencing a different variation of globalization than it has in the past. The 
world economy has been connected, to varying degrees, and in varying ways, for 
centuries (Hirst & Thompson, 1996). Regarding the strength of these connections, some 
have argued that national economies were more interdependent prior to 1913 than they 
were during Fordism (Cox, 2005; Jessop, 1999; Laxer, 1995). Swyngedouw (2000, p. 
543) notes that, “only in recent years [have] parts of the world economy begun to 
approach again (at least in relative terms) the conditions of integration that characterized 
the world economy at the turn of the present century”. As such, many have debated that 
the representation of globalization as a quantitative rather than qualitative change is “little 
more than a mirage” (Dicken et al., 1997, p. 159). The important task for theory and
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research is to identify how globalization represents new forms, speeds, directions, and 
patterns of connections (and inequalities) rather than processes of homogenization, and 
alternative responses and resistances to economic globalization (Massey, 1994; Peck, 
1998; Thrift, 1994).
Despite the processes of globalization, the region remains integral to
understanding things such as innovation and the various changes associated with
restructuring. Restructuring has led to the resurgence of the region as an analytical focus
for understanding the increasingly complex and fluid nature of the global economy
(Paasi, 2009). This research - termed ‘new regionalism’ - found that regional cultures and
institutions shaped economic growth and development. Regional development was
successful in places because of the ability of local and state governments to foster
institutional landscapes that encouraged reconfiguration of existing industries and
entrepreneurship, which helped to maximise the benefits of investment (Agnew, 2000).
Regional economies and institutions do not only react to changing global economies;
their collective responses also contribute to global trends (Lee, 2002; MacLeod, 2001a;
Warf, 2008). Hayter (2005, p. 193) describes how:
Global-local dynamics are explicitly interpreted as interdependent instituted 
processes in which the local and the global affect each other. Indeed, the one 
cannot be understood without reference to the other. Even the most insistent 
globalizing institutions require local presence becoming a part of local habits and 
customs. Even the most insistent local institutions cannot ignore global forces. 
Moreover, this role is not limited to a few ‘leading edge’ regions but applies 
generally, including to what are termed, not without ambiguity, ‘new economic 
spaces’.
The interdependence of inseparability of the global-local is referred to as 
‘glocalization’. Global and local processes are interdependent and relational and should
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not be thought of as separate but as occurring simultaneously. There are numerous local 
and global factors that influence decisions and choices within the global economy making 
it unproductive to think of these scales in a simplistic binary relationship (Belussi et al., 
1998; Massey, 1994). As Thrift (1990; quoted in Tickell, 2000, p. 235) observes, “there is 
not a global financial structure ‘out there’, as a deus ex machina, but rather a spatially 
distributed network of money/social power which encompasses the globe... [The] local 
and the global intermesh, running into one another in all manner of ways”. Seemingly all 
prevalent ‘global’ processes are comprised of different best practices, each of which 
emerged at a specific time and place (Jessop, 1999). This emphasises the need to tease 
out the nature of the global and local linkages across different scales and the importance 
of constructing various ‘local models’ (Barnes, 1987; Sparke & Lawson, 2003).
If the key to understanding regions and localities is by mapping out their 
connections and interdependences across space (Peet, 2007), studying change within 
resource peripheries is important to understanding globalization because it yields 
important insights into regional changes and processes (Hayter et al., 2003, Pike, 1997). 
Many of the processes associated with globalization have long been examined in studies 
of resource towns. The stretching out of networks - time-space distantation - across space 
linking distant cores with the capital and power to coordinate and control production is 
nothing new. Reliance on volatile international markets has long been the cornerstone of 
staples production in Canada. The primacy of large, foreign, multi-national companies for 
the capital, expertise, and technology necessary for coordinating production is not new 
either. Time-space compression, driven by improvements to transportation infrastructures 
and communication technologies, has allowed companies to control and coordinate far
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flung operations through the acceleration and intensification of relations, movement of 
capital, movement of skilled labour, and rapid communications. But resource peripheries 
remain isolated; space has not been annihilated, it remains quite critical (Thrift, 1994). 
For resource towns, these processes contribute to uneven development and inequality. 
Within the hierarchy of the global economy, resource peripheries continue to be 
marginalized.
A relational view of ‘the local’ as a meeting place is critical to the understanding 
of community-company relationships as it stresses the importance of endogenous and 
exogenous forces. This varies from traditional economic geography approaches, which 
focused primarily on the decision-making processes firms where resource-dependent 
communities were thought of as temporary creations to facilitate production to satisfy the 
needs of capital (White, 2004). As a result, little consideration was given to the role of 
regions or communities in shaping activities occurring within its borders or the impacts 
of economic change on the everyday lives of residents. Despite the processes of 
globalization, capital still requires connections to different places to circulate and create 
surplus value:
No matter how rapidly turnover times are accelerated, the movement of 
territorialisation remains endemic to capital, a basic structural feature of its 
circulation process. Capital remains dependent as ever upon relatively fixed, 
place-bound technological-institutional ensembles in which technology, the 
means of production, forms of industrial organization and labour power are 
productively combined to create and extract surplus value. The processes of 
apparent deterritorialization associated with globalization and the massive growth 
of finance capital since the early 1980s are therefore only one dimension of a 
more complex, unevenly articulated process of global sociospatial restructuring in 
which the reterritorialization of both cities and states played a constitutive role. 
(Brenner, 1997; quoted in Jessop, 1999, p. 29)
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In my research, for example, emphasis is given to constructing a contextual
understanding of the regional forestry sector, embedded within a rapidly changing global
economy (outlined in Chapter 3). A conceptual framework combining the study of
institutions, the importance of place, and the nature of global-local relationships is well
suited to elucidating the unique nature of community-company relationships within a
resource periphery because:
... forest industrial areas of [countries] are made of complex webs of towns and 
mills that are geographically and historically distinct. Each location has a history 
of its own, discernible in the daily life of the community and often present in the 
physical landscape and in the minds and memories of the elderly people who have 
lived through the stages of industrialization. The forest communities are both 
products of and tools for industrial change that has been international by its 
character from the beginning. (Lethinen et al., 2004, p. 6)
This perspective reasserts the importance of both place and space, across multiple scales
when considering relationships within and beyond regions (Amin & Thrift, 1997). It also
opens the door, so to speak, to a variety of future possibilities for places and economies
(Lee, 2002). For Cox (1997, p. 5), balancing different global and local forces and the ties
that capital and people have to various places are essential to understanding the nature of
change and future possibilities:
Any assessment of the globalization debate has to take into account not just the 
deterritorializing forces, the emergence of a world of enhanced locational 
substitutability, but also the territorializing: those conditions, those social relations 
that result in enduring commitments to particular places, which can in turn be a 
source of competitive advantage and so serve to reinforce those commitments.
These characteristics create unique openings for studying how capitalism operates, 
changes, creates, and breaks down (Cheshire, 2010; Winson & Leach, 2002).
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2 3 . Staples theory: an institutional approach to Canadian resource development
To understand the position of BC’s forest communities in the global economy, 
one must examine the unique nature of resource development in Canada (Markey et al.,
2000). Resource development has profound implications for the geographic location and 
primary function of resource communities (Hayter & Barnes 2001) and carries with it 
several implications for local economies and internal community structures. As Stamps 
(1995; quoted in Watkins, 2007, p. 222) notes, “a staple was not simply a commodity: it 
had more than quantity and price. It had special qualities that gave rise to a distinctive set 
of institutions”. While British and American scholars have developed a number of 
theories addressing resource development and extraction, their translation into the 
Canadian context is problematic because of our unique history and geographies (Hayter 
& Barnes, 2001; Marchak, 1983). The following section reviews the staples approach to 
development in Canada (Weaver & Gunton, 1986) and the resulting core-periphery 
relations and structural rigidities (Bradbury, 1979b; Drache, 1991; Reed, 2003b). Each of 
these themes will be related to the nature of, and implications for, forestry-dependent 
communities.
Harold Innis (1933) developed staples theory to describe the social, political, and 
economic implications of Canadian resource development (Markey et al., 2000). More 
specifically, staples theory described and explained uneven development and the 
peripheral role Canada assumed within the global economy (Weaver & Gunton, 1986; 
Reed, 2003b). Innis posited that Canadian economic development centred around the 
extraction and export of minimally processed natural resources, termed staples {e.g. fish, 
fur, wheat, timber, and minerals) for the benefit of foreign metropoles -  urban cores
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(Hayter, 2000a; Marchak, 1983). While many economic theories predicted that staples 
extraction would propel economies towards maturation brought about by development of 
higher-order industries and independence - a neoclassical interpretation of the theory - 
Innis countered that diversification and maturity was neither automatic, nor assured 
(Marchak, 1983). Indeed, Innis’s brand of staples theory has been labelled pessimistic 
because he saw the institutional framework associated with staples production as posing 
long-term barriers to development (Drache, 1991).
Staples economies are precarious because the spatial and temporal relationships 
within them are fragile. With regards to regional development, staples theory warns 
“resources are soft sands on which to build an economy unless developed with 
extraordinary care” (Clement & Williams, 1997, p. 51). Successive federal and provincial 
governments have subscribed to a neoclassical interpretation of the staples approach in 
designing policies and programs that hold fast to the assumption that, “if a mill, mine, or 
other large project [was] established, it [would] eventually spin off all kinds of economic 
benefits, the population [would] grow, new industries [would] be attracted to the region, 
and the area [would] become a stable community” (Marchak, 1990, p. 95).
Through staples theory, the economic history and geography of Canada is viewed 
as being shaped by the export of natural resources to meet the needs of continental and 
international markets (Weaver & Gunton, 1986). Given the abundance of natural 
resources, it is not surprising that national and provincial governments have long based 
economic development strategies on resource extraction (Marchak, 1983). Innis (1933) 
argued that throughout history Canada’s place in the global economy was determined by 
the export of minimally processed natural resources to external markets. From the cod
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fisheries in the Atlantic to grain farming on the Prairies, to forestry in BC, resource 
development linked different regions to the global economy in unique ways. The nature 
of geography and the structure of staples economies have adverse implications for 
Canadian society and regional economies (Gale & Gale, 2006; Reed, 2003b). The staples 
approach argues that these regional economies are typified by: (1) periods of instability 
and crisis; (2) truncated economic development; and (3) dependency and vulnerability.
Highly specialized economies that are based upon staples production are 
inherently unstable and are susceptible to business and resource cycles, which make them 
vulnerable. Within the context of Canadian staples industries, instability is entrenched 
because of the predominance of exogenous interests and powers. For the periphery, 
development is propelled by foreign firms and markets (Hayter & Barnes, 2001). Foreign 
firms invest in low-cost resource extraction to fulfil production needs in other places 
(Robinson, 1984). As a result, Canadian operations are often only small pieces of 
geographically expansive enterprises subject to the decisions and strategies of distant 
corporate managers (Barnes, 2005).
With regards to markets, the primary export orientation closely links the success 
and failure of resource regions to international commodity prices (Hayter & Barnes, 
2001). Reliance on external markets to set commodity prices have made staples regions 
susceptible to the vagaries of the international marketplace (Bradbury, 1980). In 1996, for 
example, BC exported approximately 91% of its forestry products to international 
markets (Hayter, 2000a). International commodity markets are volatile due to the 
influence of supply and demand over commodity prices, something over which local
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economies have no control. Reliance on international markets creates a situation where 
staples economies are ‘price takers’ not ‘price setters’2 (Clapp, 1998).
Instability is also rooted in the process of globalization, which has increasingly 
placed Canadian resource industries in direct competition with international staples 
producers (Hutton, 1997). This process has further propelled resource-based communities 
into the global marketplace. As mentioned, forestry-dependent communities are a 
meeting point for social, economic, and environmental forces from local, regional, 
national, and international scales (Hayter, 2003). Community instability can also be 
triggered by changes in technology, institutional changes within forestry corporations, 
corporate bankruptcy, or labour disputes (Barnes et al., 2001; Hak, 2007). In forestry- 
dependent communities these periods of stability and instability are commonly referred to 
as ‘boom-bust cycles’. These oscillations have important implications for the social and 
economic well-being of residents (Halseth & Sullivan, 2002; Nelsen et al., 2010; 
Robinson, 1984). Referring to the relationship between business and community, 
Schneider (1969, p. 402) states “the economic life of the community, its periods of 
prosperity and depression, reflects the rhythm of its industries”. It is also important to 
note that not all communities recover from economic downturns.
Prior to globalization and restructuring in the 1980s, it was proclaimed that 
resource towns had overcome instability. In his seminal model, Rex Lucas (1971) 
hypothesized that communities had transitioned through different stages to reach
2 Refers to a situation where export dependent regions and communities have no control over commodity 
prices.
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maturity3. Mature communities were characterized by stable economies, labour markets, 
community structures, and demographic profiles. However, as predicted by staples 
theory, any stability achieved in resource economies is constantly being undermined by 
various local and extra-local forces (Barnes et al. 1999). As a result, a number of non­
linear community transition models were updated to envision numbers of possible 
‘alternative futures’ for the (under)development of resource towns (Figure 1). Most 
recently, companies have looked to the past and moved to make settlements contingent 
upon the needs of industry by eschewing the development of permanent town sites in 
favour of temporary fly-in/fly-out settlements (Markey, 2010).
5 Lucas (1971) identified four stages: construction, recruitment, transition, and maturity. Others like Riffel 
(1975) identified seven stages: pre-discovery, prospecting, construction, industrial operation and 
community improvement, industrial and community operation, community diversification, and community 
maturity.
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Figure 1:
Life-cycle model of growth in resource towns
Town
Management Stage
Demographic/Migration
Characteristics Source
Company CONSTRUCTION high pop. turnover 
high % young men
RECRUITMENT large % young families 
strong ethnic mix t- 1cO
Community TRANSITON
MATURITY
Stable workforce
lack of job mobility 
youth outmigration
Company WINDING DOWN Job losses W55 3
Caretaker CLOSURE Outmigraton
. » e
3.3
s
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: 
Restructuring
A range of possibilities
X
o
Stability
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Source: Modified from Halseth, 1999b, p. 366
The final point raised by staples theory is that limited incentives for 
diversification exist, contributing to continued economic specialization and concentration 
(Table 1). Residents are reluctant to seek diversification because when times are good 
there is little need for change (Bradbury, 1980). The long period from World War II until 
the mid-1970s was one of economic prosperity (Hak, 2007). As such, entrenched 
corporate interests raised few questions about the long-term stability of resource 
development or alternative forms of production (Rutherdale, 1994). Provincial and 
municipal governments as well as regulatory agencies are also dependent upon staples 
extraction because of the revenue generated from resource rents, taxes, and the
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employment created (Halseth, 2005). This dependence, coupled with close ties between 
politicians and business elites (and the exchange between these groups), removes many 
of the political and economic incentives to engaging in alternative development strategies 
(Clapp, 1998; Wilson, 1998). As a result, many local economies became ‘trapped’, as the 
structure of staples economies, which Innis referred to as rigidities, discouraged 
maturation ensuring that development is only ever partial (Hayter, 2000a). The staples 
trap is unique to resource peripheries. Whereas cores have been able to use crises to 
reorganize or restructure their economies to address uneven development, peripheries 
have not (Drache, 1991).
Table 1:
Impacts of staples development on CED
Type of Impact Specific Impact
Economic Economic base 
Export focus 
Specialization 
Commodity Production 
Environmental degradation
Government Corporate/government alliances 
Dependency
Inertia with respect to change 
Megaproject scale 
Centralization
Attitudinal Economic dependency 
Low entrepreneurial activity 
Limited planning 
Marginalization
Source: Markey et al., 2005, p. 55
Truncated economic development is also linked to the predominance of foreign 
corporate ownership in Canada (Britton & Gilmour, 1978). As Hayter (2000b, p. 302) 
notes the branch-plant structure has resulted in “connections [that] are global and internal
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rather than local and external.” During Fordism, the majority of the forestry corporations 
within BC were foreign owned (Barnes et al., 1999). As a result, there was little incentive 
for companies to re-invest in the local economy. The majority of the capital generated 
from industrial activity leaves the community and the region contributing to uneven 
development (Marchak, 1983; Massey, 1994). Within the periphery, specialization in 
extraction and primary manufacturing results in weak forward, backward, and final 
demand linkages4 as these activities (especially forward and backward linkages) tend to 
be concentrated within urban cores (Hayter, 2000a). Over time, economic growth does 
not automatically result in development (Drache, 1991). Research and development 
activities involving the creation of new technologies and products happen in other places. 
This economic leakage limits the amount of capital available within the community for 
economic diversification. As a result, local development efforts are usually centred on 
supporting the existing resource sector.
Innis astutely pointed out that within Canada, staples-dependent economies rarely 
develop into mature, diversified economies. This is related to the growth of resource 
sectors being based on the principle of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage 
refers, “to the ability of a region to produce a good more efficiently than another” 
(Marchak, 1983, p. 16). As comparative advantage is rooted in orthodox economic 
theory, it is profitable for regions endowed with an abundance of a particular resource to 
specialize economies, rather than diversify. It also means that for resource industries to
4 Within the context o f a staples economy forward linkages refer to the development of other industries that 
use the staple as an input (e.g. secondary manufacturing plants, sawmills). Backward linkages are 
businesses that provide inputs for staples production (e.g. machinery, chemicals, specialized producer 
services). Final demand linkages refer to the demand consumer goods and services arising incomes and 
profits generated from staples activity (e.g. retail services, entertainment) (Auty, 2002; Hayter, 2000a, pp. 
26-28).
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persist, their pricing has to be competitive on world markets. Established infrastructures, 
settlement geographies, and trade relationships all work against economic diversification, 
leaving staples regions with truncated economic development structures.
Staples economies are also subject to resource cycles that impact the availability 
of resources and costs of production. Clapp (1998) finds that resource production moves 
through three stages as economies move from growth to decline. These stages are 
applicable to both renewable and non-renewable resources. The discovery of resources is 
accompanied by an economic boom and frantic activity to develop resource stocks and 
bring them to market. After this there is a period of stability as local operations gradually 
increase intensity of operations with capital and technology to maintain profitability. As 
the highest quality reserves are exploited first, and processing facilities are located 
adjacent to these reserves, the costs of production rise as economic rent falls (cost-price 
squeeze). The final stage involves collapse or decline as the resource stocks are depleted 
production or replaced by lower cost producers in other regions or by other products.
Staples development has played an important role in shaping the spatial 
organization and power relations between rural hinterlands (resource peripheries) and the 
metropolis (urban cores) (Watkins, 2007). Resource development in BC occurs in a series 
of dispersed resource-dependent communities designed as extraction centres. These 
resource towns tend to be located in northern, rural, and remote areas close to resource 
stocks (Robinson, 1962). Extraction activities are financed and coordinated from a small 
number of metropolitan centres (the core). These metropolitan centres are responsible for 
organizing production, exporting staples to international markets, and housing corporate 
offices and decision-makers (Hayter et al., 2003). The power of corporate decision­
39
makers also extends into the periphery to influence municipal politics, housing 
arrangements, economic vision, and community identity (White, 2004; Rollwagen, 2006; 
2007).
The core-periphery relations resulting from this approach had important 
implications for resource communities. Most notably, decision-making and power are 
concentrated in the metropolitan core (Barnes etal., 2001; Marchak, 1983; Massey, 1994; 
Robinson, 1984). In BC, the political institutions responsible for regional development 
and resource management policy decision-making are concentrated in the Vancouver- 
Victoria metropolitan region (Halseth, 2005; Marchak, 1983). The core-periphery 
relationships underpinning staples development have left resource communities both 
geographically and politically marginalized (Hayter & Barnes, 2001; Robbins, 1998).
The export of minimally processed goods also create and foster dependence upon 
the core that hindered economic development within the periphery (Barnes et al., 2001). 
While many economic development models assume that staples development would be 
followed by an evolution of local and regional economies, resource communities 
throughout Canada have experienced limited economic development (Bowles, 1992). 
Instead, it has been limited as producers are export oriented, production is dominated by 
foreign owned multinational corporations, and the forestry sector is characterized by a 
branch-plant system with limited higher-order production (Barnes et al., 2002; Bradbury, 
1979b). Innis argued that the nature of staples development creates a situation where 
staples regions become part of the margin, with limited opportunities for change. Core- 
periphery relationships have contributed to uneven development characterized by 
physical dispersal, skewed power relations, low levels of human capital, low levels of
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financial capital, and poor infrastructure in resource communities (Bradbury, 1979b; 
Marchak, 1993).
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter has outlined a framework for understanding the different factors and 
contexts influencing community-company relationships. In doing so, a number of 
literatures were drawn upon to highlight the relationship between the global and the local. 
First, institutional economic geography was reviewed to examine the nature of economic 
activity. By using an institutional approach, we must account for both social and 
economic institutions. Within the context of community-company relationships this helps 
to identify how both the company and community negotiate relationships. Also, the 
historical specificity of local economic development must be addressed to determine how 
the economy has evolved over time. This is important when looking at community- 
company relationships because it helps us to understand how and why current 
relationships were formed.
Second, a framework for studying resource towns was constructed by drawing 
upon contributions from locality studies, globalization, and new regional geography. 
These bodies of research emphasize the importance of place when interpreting economic 
activity and how the peculiarities of place play an integral role in shaping and mediating 
global forces. When considering community-company relationships, these literatures 
outline the importance of examining the characteristics of place. Different 
conceptualizations of globalization were reviewed to outline the nature of global-local 
connectivity. It is argued that the global-local conceptualization of globalization is
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particularly relevant to resource-dependent communities as they are a meeting place for 
capital, markets, technology, information, and production. This global-local perspective 
builds on the importance of place by asserting that the interaction of both global and local 
factors need to be considered by social scientists when addressing resource-dependent 
communities and community-company relationships.
Finally, staples theory was drawn upon to emphasise the unique nature of 
resource development in the Canadian context. Drawing from the work of Innis, staples 
development is seen as creating a set of institutions that have important implications for 
development in the periphery. For resource peripheries, this has resulted in distinct 
geographies characterized by uneven power relations, partial economic development, and 
systemic vulnerability and dependence.
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Chapter 3: An Institutional Economic Geography of BC’s Interior
Forestry Sector
Perhaps the best entry point for discussing the processes shaping community- 
company relationships is through an overview of forestry-dependent communities and the 
forest industry. The study of forestry-dependent communities is particularly difficult as 
they are at the intersection of a number of micro and macro social, economic, political, 
and environmental forces (Barnes et al., 2001). As such, any research examining the 
dynamics of a forestry community will have to address embedded and complex global 
and local institutions (Hayter, 2003; Wilson, 2004). The forest industry is equally 
complex as it is integrated into the global economy and must respond to both national and 
international demands (Hayter, 2000a). The forestry sector is also influenced by resource 
cycles and the stochastic nature of complex natural systems (Clapp, 1998). As a result, 
those interested in assessing different aspects of community-company relationships will 
have to account for social, economic, political, technological, and environmental systems 
(Hayter, 2004a). Furthermore, a number of local characteristics such as remoteness, size, 
company structure, resource availability, and history must be examined (Tonts et al., 
2011).
This chapter outlines the development of the forestry sector in the northern 
Interior. In order to situate Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel within broader global and
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regional trends, important events within each of the study communities are highlighted 
throughout the chapter. The chapter is organized into two sections outlining periods 
referred to as Fordism, roughly spanning the period from the Second World War to the 
1970s, and post-Fordism, beginning with the 1980s recessions until present.
3.1. BC’s forestry regions
The province of British Columbia is approximately 95 million hectares in size, 
two-thirds (approximately 65 million hectares) of which is covered by forest. The area 
available for timber harvesting is approximately 24 million hectares (MoFR, 2006b). Ten 
percent of BC’s forests have been classified as protected areas. Ninety-five percent of 
forest land is public and management is overseen by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations while forest extraction, processing, and management 
activities are undertaken by private companies.
The forest industry is divided into two distinct regions: the Interior and the Coast. 
The Coastal region spans the area west of the Cascade and Coast Mountain Ranges from 
Prince Rupert to Vancouver; an area approximately 16.5 million hectares in size (Pearse,
2001). The total coastal harvest was 21 million cubic metres in 2003. Lumber and pulp 
mills on the Coast export mainly to markets in the US, Japan, and Europe. In terms of 
direct employment, logging contributes 10,400 jobs, sawmills and manufacturing 
contributing 22,200 direct jobs (Edgington, 2004b).
The Interior forestry sector is further divided into the northern and southern 
regions due to distinct species mix, topographies, and harvest volumes. The southern 
interior is approximately 24 million hectares, from the US border north to Quesnel. The
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region’s total harvest in 2004 was 29 million cubic metres of timber, supporting 168 mills 
and contributing 37.5% of provincial stumpage revenue. The northern Interior is the 
largest forest region, approximately 55 million hectares or 58% of the province. The 
northern Interior spans the area north of Quesnel to the Yukon border and the area west 
of the Alberta border to Terrace. The region’s total harvest in 2004 was 26 million cubic 
metres of timber, supporting 57 mills and contributing 36% of provincial stumpage 
revenues (COFI, 2007). Eighty-five percent of the province’s productive forest is within 
the Interior (Delcourt & Wilson, 1998). Ninety-one percent of all exports from the region 
are to the US. The total employment for the Interior in 2003 was approximately 17,000 
direct jobs in logging and 39,700 direct jobs in sawmills and manufacturing (Edgington, 
2004b).
The Coastal and Interior regions have distinct geographies and histories of 
development. The early development of the Coastal region was driven by access to 
seawater for the cheap transportation of logs to mills and commodities to markets 
(Hayter, 2000b). Sawmills were established in the mid-1800s to serve European and 
global markets (Marchak, 1995). In contrast, the southern Interior developed after the 
1890s with the coming of the Canadian Pacific Railway, allowing access to North 
American markets (Farley, 1972). Growth of the Interior forestry sector before World 
War II was sporadic, particularly in the north, expanding and contracting with market 
demand for lumber.
The physical geography of each region has shaped the development of the forest 
industry due to a different mix of tree species, growing seasons, and topography. In terms 
of species mix, the Coastal region is dominated by larger tree species. Longer, wetter
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growing seasons contribute to rapid forest growth. The major species in the Coastal 
region include Douglas-fir, western hemlock, red cedar, and Sitka spruce (Farley, 1979). 
These species are suitable for producing higher-value decorative and value-added 
products. The Interior is characterized by a shorter, drier growing season, producing 
smaller trees at lower volumes per acre than on the Coast (Farley, 1972). The major tree 
species include spruces, lodgepole pine, and fir that are suitable for the production of 
commodity grade lumber and pulp. The southern Interior has a greater range of species 
than the northern Interior, with the latter dominated by fir and spruces (Farley, 1972).
3.2. Fordism: World War II -  1970s
Fordism5 refers to an organizational framework of industrial production and 
consumption relations that shapes technology, economy, society, and culture (Peet, 
2007). In terms of production, Fordism is most commonly related to the mass production 
of a limited number of standardized products and supported by economies of scale, 
corporate organizations, Taylorisation of work, and unionization of labour (Barnes et a l., 
1999; Hak, 2007). In the BC forestry sector, Fordism was prevalent from the mid-1940s 
to the mid-1970s. This period of time was associated with high levels of productivity, low 
levels of unemployment, high wages, and the prominence of government, corporations, 
and unions.
Throughout this period, forestry communities enjoyed relative stability and 
prosperity. Many policy makers and academics theorized that resource communities had 
reached maturity (Lucas, 1971). Economic downturns during this period were temporary
5 Fordism gets its name from Henry Ford, who pioneered the use of assembly line production techniques 
and the application of Taylorism of work tasks to revolutionize automobile manufacturing while providing 
high wages to workers, which in tum created consumers for goods.
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and offset by collective bargaining agreements and government programs (Hayter, 
2000a). This stability, coupled with corporatization of the forestry sector, played a large 
role in limiting economic development at the local scale. Prosperity meant that 
communities were heavily reliant on companies. This inhibited the maturation and 
diversification of community economies.
Regional development initiatives throughout this time, known as the province 
building era, were focused on developing resource ‘megaprojects’ (Weaver & Gunton, 
1986), particularly within the Interior (Resnick, 1985). In BC, large-scale transportation, 
communication, and hydroelectric projects were developed to access remote natural 
resource reserves (Black, 1989; Isitt, 2011; Williston & Keller, 1997). A key assumption 
underpinning regional development throughout Fordism was that resource development 
would be an engine of growth for the provincial economy. Halseth (2005) notes that this 
era marked a turning point for resource extraction within the province. After the mid- 
1940s, resource extraction became a highly industrialized process, rooted in top-down 
managerialism and was coordinated by large, vertically integrated, multi-national firms.
The provincial government also assumed that free enterprise was the appropriate 
vehicle for driving provincial development (Black, 1989; Hak, 2007; Halseth, 2005; 
Rosenberg, 1993) and alleviating regional disparities (Markey etal., 2006; Savoie, 1986). 
Therefore, the province building framework was carried out through a number of large- 
scale resource development projects in support of private industry. This framework laid 
the foundation for the cooperative relationship between the provincial government and 
forestry corporations, which is still prevalent today.
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Furthermore, the provincial government understood that for industrial resource 
development to be successful it had to be driven by large corporations (Bradbury, 1979b; 
Hak, 2007). The rationale was that large corporations were well equipped to pull together 
the large amounts of capital required for resource extraction (Hayter, 2001). The 
provincial government was supportive, as it was believed that resource megaprojects 
would generate local employment, provincial tax revenue, and opportunities for spin-off 
industrial development. It was also believed that large corporations would be able to 
stabilize provincial revenues by establishing long-term, large-scale development projects 
(Halseth, 2005).
The province building era envisaged northern BC as an untapped, inexhaustible 
bank of resources waiting to be developed (Markey et al., 2005). Halseth (2005, p. 330) 
asserts that, “in many respects, rural BC was imagined by policy makers as a vacant 
resource bank ready to be brought into productive use”. Stelter and Artibise (1978) 
suggest that many of these assumptions were embraced because of the general optimism 
held by government and society in the post-World War II era. During this period it was 
believed that effective management of resources and stable economies could be achieved 
through sound scientific management (Hak, 2007).
Expansion and consolidation underscores the development of the forestry sector 
in the northern Interior following World War II. The provincial government adopted a 
regional development model focused on expansion that drove growth throughout the 
Interior. Mills produced commodities for export and companies relied heavily upon the 
American market where pulp, paper, and lumber were not subject to tariffs. New tenure 
arrangements were designed to grant long-term access to large areas of forest to
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companies. These tenures were designed to entice investment from large, multinational
corporations. The assumption was that these large companies were best suited to provide
the investment needed for large production facilities and steady employment, withstand
market fluctuations leading to a stabilization of provincial revenues, and to provide the
capital and expertise required to manage forests. Policies during this period were largely
successful in meeting these goals.
The provincial government also invested in the infrastructures necessary to
facilitate successful staples extraction (Edgington, 2004b). Transportation,
communication, and power infrastructures were all developed to drive expansion of
resource industries (Bradbury, 1978; Porteous, 1987). Infrastructure provided incentives
by lowering risk and increasing profits for capital while transferring risk to the public
sector (Gunton, 2003). The provincial government also assumed responsibilities in the
creation of new communities dedicated to resource extraction. These policies contributed
to the rapid growth of the provincial annual cut from 22 million cubic metres in 1950 to
55 million cubic metres in 1970 (Rajala, 2006). Most of this increase came from the
Interior. Wilson (1988, pp. 21-22) describes the factors that opened up the northern
Interior to industrial forestry during this period:
The 1950-70 period witnessed rapid expansion of markets, long periods of 
buoyant prices, large private sector investment in manufacturing capacity, major 
public investment in infrastructure, and rapid advances in technologies of logging, 
transportation, and utilization. These factors helped to open vast new areas of the 
province to large-scale industrial forestry while transforming the perception of 
timber previously thought unusable... The problems of the coastal industry... 
were rendered less significant by the industry’s rapid advance into the interior.
The geography of production in the Interior was unique. In the 1950s, most 
lumber production was carried out by the bushmill-planer system where rough lumber
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was cut in small, portable bushmills and processed at a centralized planer mill (Drushka, 
1998). It was common to have hundreds of bushmills feeding rough lumber to a few 
centralized planer mills located in settlements along rail lines (McRoberts, 1988). 
Portable mills processed timber into rough, green lumber of varying sizes and 
dimensions. The largest sawmills followed the Canadian National Railway’s (CN) line 
running east to west across central BC. Many of these smaller mills produced between
2.000 and 3,000 board feet of rough lumber per day while large mills could produce
85.000 board feet per day (Hak, 2007). Portable mills were suited to the geography and 
timber resources of the region because they could be easily moved to remote timber 
stands. Further, bushmills required small amounts of capital investment. External capital 
had yet to express interest in the region and local people with a little money could quickly 
form a lumber company and go into business for themselves (Hak, 2007).
For northern BC, the ‘roads to resources’ policy played a significant role in 
shaping the development of resource-dependent communities. The premise of the policy 
was to make the north accessible through provision of basic infrastructure (Markey et al., 
2006). Williston and Keller (1997, p. 169) noted that, “it was W.A.C. Bennett’s firm 
belief that if he could make BC’s road and rail services efficient, organize effective 
resource management and provide relatively cheap energy sources, it would be possible 
for his government to step back and let free enterprise develop to its full economic 
potential” .
The development of road and rail networks played a key role in alleviating 
barriers to markets and opening up resources for development (Rajala, 2010; Wedley,
1998). Expanding road networks and the introduction of diesel trucks also drove spatial
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separation between mills and logging operations (Byron, 1976). As roads improved, and 
logging and transport technology developed, logging operations were no longer confined 
to the narrow strip of timber adjacent to the CN rail line. The ability to move logs instead 
of lumber contributed to agglomeration and growth of processing facilities in existing 
centres such as Prince George, Bums Lake, Smithers, Williams Lake, and Quesnel 
(Farley, 1972; Vance, 1981). The geographic expansion of lumber production also 
followed PGE railway extensions5 and the Hart Highway into the hinterland. The 
provincial government also set reduced freight rates on the PGE for lumber, pulp, and 
paper to stimulate industry (Zimmerman, 1997).
High prices for lumber from the mid-1950s to 1960s drove the numerical and 
aerial expansion of sawmilling throughout the region. The geography of production 
changed as the number of mills grew in established centres. Production also expanded 
north as the PGE railway arrived in Prince George in 1952 and was later extended to Fort 
St. John and Fort Nelson. In the Prince George Forest District, the number of sawmills 
increased from 43 to 687 between 1939 and 1956. Similar trends were present in Houston 
and Quesnel. Between 1940 and 1954, the number of sawmills in Quesnel grew from 33 
mills to 180 (Byron, 1976). In Houston, the number of mills increased from two to 84. 
Planer mills in the region followed the same pattern, growing from approximately six 
before World War II to almost 100 by 1954 (Bernsohn, 1982).
In terms of employment, the lumber industry was characterized by high degrees 
of instability until the end of the 1950s because most logging operations and sawmills
6 Notable dates in regarding the PGE railway for the development of the northern Interior include: 1912- 
1921 Squamish to Quesnel; 1949-1952 Quesnel to Prince George; 1952-1958 Prince George to Dawson 
Creek & Fort St. John; 1966 Mackenzie extension; 1963-1968 Fort St. James extension; 1968-1969 Takla 
Landing extension; 1968-1971 Fort St. John to Fort Nelson.
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were seasonal (McRoberts, 1988; Rutherdale, 1994) and operators lacked the capital or 
access to markets required to weather market downswings. For instance, Mullins (1989) 
found that between 1940 and 1950 the market price for spruce closely followed the 
number of active sawmills in the region. In terms of manufacturing, the Forest Service 
estimated that prior to the 1960s most mills operated one shift for eight to ten months a 
year (F.L.C. Reed & Associates, 1975). Further, most operations lacked the capital 
necessary to keep mills running when weather conditions inhibited logging (Cottell, 
1974).
Local entrepreneurs dominated ownership of the regional lumber sector. Until this 
point, Coastal companies expressed little interest in the Interior for two reasons. First, 
foreign capital was dissuaded from investing in the region because of instabilities 
associated with lumber prices and timber supplies (Mullins, 1989). Second, the unique 
geography and resource base also dissuaded investment by Coastal companies because 
established technologies and practices were incongruent with the fiber available within 
the Interior (Vance, 1981).
The evolution of Quesnel’s forestry sector followed patterns seen throughout the 
central and northern Interior. Prior to the implementation of sustained yield, sawmilling 
in Quesnel was primarily a seasonal activity run by ranchers (McRoberts, 1988). 
Growing demand for construction grade lumber from the US stimulated investment in the 
region and led to an increased number of permanent and temporary mills throughout the 
1950s. By the mid-1950s there were several planer mills processing rough lumber from 
150 portable mills. Quesnel became an important forestry centre in the Interior because of
52
its central location in a large timber supply area and access to markets via the PGE rail 
line.
Despite the numerical dominance of local entrepreneurs, large mills were 
generally owned by extra-local capital. In Quesnel, Vancouver businessman John Bene 
established the Western Plywood mill, the region’s largest employer. Leslie Kerr 
operated large sawmills in Quesnel and Williams Lake to supply his Vancouver-based 
lumber export business. Similarly, John Enrst, the Brownmillers, and the Ketchams all 
moved to Quesnel to establish sawmills and oversee operations. Houston was different as 
Buck River Lumber Company, operated by local entrepreneur Harry Hagman, held the 
majority of the local timber quota prior to 1965.
The bushmill-planer system was highly inefficient in terms of logging practices 
and lumber recovery factors. Inaccuracy of equipment and poor operator skill left large 
amounts of waste in the bush and at planer mills. Sloan (1945, p. 60) singled out portable 
mills as being, “itinerant and irresponsible despoilers of good wood”. By the mid-1950s 
it was estimated that in the northern Interior only 25% of a timber stand ended up as 
lumber, the rest was either burnt, left behind as waste, damaged during logging, or ended 
up as sawmill waste (Parminter, 2001). In sawmills, it was estimated that between 36 and 
54% of timber entering a mill would end up as trimmings, edgings, or slabs (Williston & 
Keller, 1997).
Following the 1947 Sloan Commission, BC embarked on industrialization and 
expansion of the forestry sector, predicated on the principles of sustained yield. 
Development of the Interior was an integral part of the Social Credit government’s 
expansionist policies. With regards to forestry, policy was primarily concerned with
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driving regional development through resource exploitation (Cashore et al., 2001). This 
policy envisaged large corporations as the best vehicle for securing stable rural 
economies (Prudham, 2008b). The Social Credit government tied regional development 
and expansion to pulp mills, particularly in the Interior, and by creating new types of 
tenure that facilitated the transition from small, undercapitalised mills to large, complex, 
integrated industrial operations (Bradbury, 1977).
The goals of sustained yield were pursued by creating two types of tenure: private 
working circles, later known as tree farm licenses (TFLs), and public working circles, 
later known as public sustained yield units (PSYUs) (Hayter, 2000a). Public working 
circles were envisaged as large geographic areas supplying timber to a number of small 
companies while private working circles were designed for large operators. Companies 
holding TFLs were responsible for management responsibilities in exchange for 
exclusive cutting rights. In PSYUs, the Forest Service was responsible for forest 
management as small companies were seen as being unwilling or unable to accept 
management costs and responsibilities (Farley, 1979). Companies usually obtained access 
to stands in specified areas by bidding on timber sales. In the Interior, tenure was 
primarily granted through short-term timber sales in PSYUs.
Large companies began to appear in the Interior in the 1960s due to the large 
capital investments required for mining and forestry megaprojects. In the forestry sector, 
the entrance of large American and Japanese corporations was linked to the establishment 
of the pulp and paper sector (Hak, 2007). This period was marked by the displacement of 
local mill owners by a few large non-local companies (Porteous, 1987). As companies 
became larger and vertically integrated, they began moving managerial functions from
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the periphery to Vancouver to coordinate increasingly complex operations across the 
hinterland (Nelson & MacKinnon, 2004). Being located in Vancouver allowed managers 
access to higher-order services and facilitated quick interaction between other managers 
and government officials (Hutton & Ley, 1987).
The provincial government actively courted foreign direct investment, seeing it as 
a vehicle to facilitate rapid development of the forest sector and the region (Bradbury, 
1977; Hayter, 2000a). Forestry became increasingly complex as multi-national 
corporations entered the region and a series of partnerships, mergers, and takeovers 
ensued. Relationships stretched out across the globe as companies coordinated extraction, 
production, and marketing from a web of offices and boardrooms within and outside the 
province.
The growth of the Interior forestry sector during this period was rapid. Farley 
(1972, p. 96) noted that change “that took place on the coast over a span of 100 years 
have been repeated in the interior within the space of 25” . By the 1960s the forces of 
centralization, consolidation, and integration, which had been implemented by the Royal 
Commissions, took hold. Interior sawmills became more productive and efficient, driven 
by mechanization, to achieve economies of scale, and an emerging chip market that 
helped them sustain production when lumber prices dropped (Apsey, 2006; Edgell, 1987; 
Marchak, 1983). By 1972, the total harvest in the Interior exceeded the Coast.
The government saw an opportunity to utilize sawmill waste to form the basis for 
the Interior pulp sector. This solution was unique because Coastal operators produced 
pulp from chipping whole logs, waste was burned in beehive burners or used it to heat 
boilers. An early study by MacMillan Bloedel had indicated pulp mills in the Interior
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were not economically feasible. However, a small government study by the Prince 
George Board of Trade concluded that there were enough sawmill residues throughout 
the region to support pulp mills. Once it was determined that it was technically possible 
to support a pulp mill with sawmill waste, the government needed to establish a fiber 
source because utilizing sawmill waste alone was too risky to secure investment, as chip 
prices would be subject to the market. The key obstacle facing industry and government 
was that much of the wood within PSYUs was already allocated to sawmills (Pearse, 
1976). The government sought to encourage investment by designing tenure 
arrangements that would create a cheap, secure source of sawmill waste coupled with 
long-term access to vast amounts of pulpwood (Parminter, 2000).
Establishment of the pulp sector significantly changed tenure arrangements, the 
structure of sawmilling, and forestry-dependent communities. Pulpwood Harvesting Area 
agreements (PHA) were designed by industry and government to secure access to timber 
that was too small to be utilized by sawmills at reduced stumpage rates for 21 years 
(Drushka, 1998; Rajala, 2010). Pearse (1976, p. A 18) noted that this type of tenure 
designed to “superimpos[e] a complementary pulp industry over the established 
sawmilling sector” . For instance, licensees were required to build a pulp mill and 
purchase sawmill residues within a specified geographic area. Pulp mills were also 
required to sell any saw logs harvested to regional sawmills, and the sawmills were 
required to sell chips to the pulp mill.
Castlegar had the first operating pulp mill in the Interior. By the mid-1960s, three 
pulp mills were established in the northern Interior in Prince George by Noranda and 
Mead Corporation (Northwood Pulp), Canfor and Feldemuhle (Intercontinental Pulp),
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and Canfor and Reed Paper (Prince George Pulp and Paper). By 1975, there were nine 
pulp mills in the Interior. Foreign companies owned stakes in 23 of 25 pulp mills in the 
province by the end of the 1970s. The entrance of foreign capital into the pulp sector also 
changed the ownership structure and size of sawmills because companies needed chips to 
supply mills (Bemsohn, 1982). The pulp and paper sector played an important role in 
reinforcing the primacy of American capital, technology, and markets as “mills were built 
by American capital, tooled with American machinery, reliant on American replacement 
parts, their semi-processed products destined for American markets, with value to be 
added by American workers” (Isitt, 2011, p. 33).
Solid wood tenures were also changing by the 1960s because of over-cutting and 
increased competition. In PSYUs the government sought to enhance the stability of 
established operators to secure investment in larger mills by moving away from short­
term timber sale auctions7. Regional timber supplies in some areas were becoming an 
issue as logging exceeded allowable annual cut (AAC) levels8. The quota system was 
devised as a way to distribute the right to cut a percentage of the AAC amongst 
established operators in an area. Quota levels were distributed amongst established 
operators based on their previous cut levels (Drushka, 1998). This system did not have 
legal standing but would remain an integral form of tenure until the 1978 Forest Act 
(Pearse, 1992).
In terms of consolidation of sawmills, a key aspect of the quota system was the 
protection and privileges it afforded established operators. First, bidding was no longer
7 In the Interior prior to the 1960s, it was common for the Forest Service to issue timber sales ranging from 
one to ten years.
8 AAC refers to the annual volume of timber in cubic metres that can be harvested for a given area.
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conducted via public auction but occurred through sealed bids. Established operators 
were only required to match the highest bid. Second, new entrants were charged a non- 
refundable bidding fee that was forfeited if they did not win. These changes meant 
established operators “virtually owned perpetual licences” as competition for timber was 
effectively eliminated (Marchak et al., 1999, p. 61).
The quota policy changed the geography of production because it contributed to 
consolidation and centralization of mills. In order to compensate established operators for 
their role in developing the region, government made quotas transferrable. The only way 
to enter the sector was to purchase quota from established operators because bidding 
systems restricted new entrants (Haley & Luckert, 1995). This was beneficial for 
established operators as most sawmills (especially portable mills) had little value without 
timber. Quota became an increasingly valuable asset that had cost little to obtain 
(Bemsohn, 1982; Zimmerman, 1997).
The success of government policies aimed at encouraging consolidation and 
investment were apparent in Quesnel. As competition for timber supplies increased and 
the quota system was established, local entrepreneurs with capital purchased bushmills to 
secure quota and invested in integrated mills. The community’s population grew rapidly 
between 1951 and 1956 as it became a processing centre and large mills provided stable 
employment. After the 1950s the local forestry sector consolidated as larger companies 
like Western Plywood, Lignum, and West Fraser purchased local mills to fully utilize 
timber and to secure tenure.
The growth of the pulp sector and increased revenue opportunities from chip 
markets also drove consolidation of sawmills. The original PHA agreements prohibited
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holders from competing with established sawmill operators for saw logs, which drove 
many pulp companies to purchase sawmills. To ensure acceptable chip costs, companies 
either built new sawmills or acquired quota to consolidate timber holdings and minimize 
completion for fiber (Bemsohn, 1982; Rajala, 2010). A report compiled by F.L.C. Reed 
& Associates (1975, p. 41) found that, “by 1973 pulp mills owned or controlled 34 
percent of total sawmilling capacity in the over 40 million board feet per year capacity 
class” . For example, after Northwood established a pulp mill in Prince George it 
purchased Eagle Lake Sawmills, Bulkley Valley Forest Industries, Fichtner Lumber, and 
sawmills in Okanagan Falls and Princeton (Zimmerman, 1997).
There was a rapid decrease in the number of mills throughout the region as 
stationary mills replaced bushmills. Larger, mechanized mills strove to achieve 
economies of scale by mass-producing a narrow range of commodities for export (Hayter 
et al., 1994). Sawmills with capital also purchased debarking and chipping equipment in 
order to gain access to regional chip markets (Edgell, 1987). Chip markets allowed 
sawmills to utilize 80% to 85% of fiber from timber stands. Between 1956 and 1970, the 
number of sawmills in the Interior declined from 2,140 to 620 (F.L.C. Reed & 
Associates, 1975). By 1975, 179 companies operated 248 sawmills in the Interior, with 
18 companies controlling 50% of production capacity (Pearse, 1976).
Increasing concentration of cutting rights became a contentious issue within the 
region and the province. Since the early 1950s the percentage of the provincial AAC 
allocated to the top ten companies has become increasingly concentrated, increasing from 
37% to 58.7% between 1954 and 1975 (Marchak, 1983). By 1974, in the north central 
Interior, six companies controlled 50% of the regional cut (Byron, 1976). The
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concentration of cutting rights within each Forest Districts was increasing due to the 
declining number of licensees in PSYUs. Harvesting rights allocated to the ten largest 
companies in each Forest District exceeded 80%; in the Cariboo and Prince George 
Forest Districts concentrations were 93.3% and 81.3%, respectively (Pearse, 1976). 
Similar patterns of concentration were present within the study communities (Table 2).
Table 2:
Concentration of AAC: % harvest by largest firms by 1974
1 Firm 2 Firms 4 Firms
Houston 64% 76% 85%
Mackenzie 60% 100% -
Quesnel 40% 68% 94%
Source: Byron, 1976, p. 81
The provincial government also provided incentives to encourage investment in 
logging and mill technology capable of utilizing small logs. Under the quota system, 
companies were allotted timber suitable for lumber production under ‘intermediate 
utilization’ standards (Pearse, 1976). As mill technology progressed the government 
encouraged the efficient use of small trees under the ‘close utilization standard’9. Mills 
that invested in technology had their annual harvest rates increased by 1/3 and were 
charged a low flat stumpage rate on all wood between the intermediate and close 
utilization standard10 (F.L.C. Reed & Associates, 1975). Due to the size and types of trees 
available in the Interior, ‘close utilization standards’ significantly increased merchantable 
timber in PSYUs (Hak, 2007). These tenure arrangements and technologies helped
g
Close utilization standards in the Interior required logging all trees down to 7.1 inches in diameter at 
breast height (4.5 feet from the ground) from a 12-inch stump to a 4-inch top (Stanbury & McLeod, 1973).
10 Reduced stumpage for Close Utilization standards was $0.20 per thousand board feet where regular 
stumpage rates could be as high as $7.00. As further incentive for industry to invest in small wood 
technologies, the low stumpage was waived for 12 years (Williston & Keller, 1997).
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increase the provincial cut from 22 million cubic metres in 1950 to 70 million cubic
metres in 1970 (Vyse, 2001).
Despite increasing companies’ quotas with the adoption of close utilization, there
were still large amounts of unallocated AAC referred to as ‘third band’ timber. Bidding
for third band timber commenced in 1969 and was restricted to quota holders with
barking and chipping equipment that had a demonstrated need for greater volumes of
timber. If a licensee applied for third band timber within a PHA, they were required to
sell their chips to that pulp mill. Pearse (1976, p. A 21) noted that the creation of third
band licenses was important for the growth of the region:
Because Interior “quota” increases amounted to only one-third, and because of the 
abundance of small diameter and decadent timber in that part of the province, 
“third band” sales are much more significant in the Interior than on the Coast. In 
1975 they accounted for over half the harvest in some Interior regions, while on 
the Coast, with its larger timber and larger “quota” increases, their contribution 
was almost negligible.
Consolidation of tenure for sawmills was aided by the creation of the timber sale 
harvesting licence (TSHL) that allowed licensees to consolidate separate timber sales into 
a single holding for a period of 10 years11 (Stanbury & McLeod, 1973). TSHLs secured 
access to a broader range of fiber for companies establishing pulp mills and sawmills 
within the same PS YU (Bradbury, 1977). TSHLs gave licensees the right to harvest a 
specific volume of timber within an informal area (known as a chart area) inside a PS YU, 
rather than cutting rights in a specified area (Pearse, 1992). This made planning more 
efficient as calculating the volume of timber harvested in a single area was less expensive
11 Although Forest Service annual reports state the Timber Sale Harvesting Licence was officially created 
in 1967, both Alexandra Forest Industries (later BCFP) and Cattermole Timber (later FFI) were awarded 
these tenures in 1965 (Baptie, 1975; Bradbury, 1977; Veemes, 1985). Confusion arises because these 
tenures were sometimes referred to as “Tree Sale Harvesting Licences” in early publications (Marchak, 
1983, p. 309; Trade Union Research Bureau, 1974, pp. 14-15) or 21-year timber sales in local news media.
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and more accurate than calculating timber estimates on numerous area-based timber sales 
(Marchak etal., 1999).
Under TSHLs, companies were responsible for road construction, fire protection, 
and reforestation. There were two important management responsibilities aimed at 
addressing community and employment stability. First, appurtenance clauses required 
companies to operate a mill within a specified area, usually a PSYU. Second, companies 
had to meet various management obligations. While this formally meant assuming a 
number of responsibilities, emphasis was placed on meeting minimum annual cut 
requirements (Marchak et al., 1999). Under the Forest Act, if companies did not meet 
their annual cut levels they could lose quota (M’Gonigle, 1999).
In 1965, the first TSHL was awarded to Alexandra Forest Industries (later BCFP) 
in the newly created Finlay PSYU12. BCFP applied for a TFL but was rejected as this 
form of tenure was increasingly unpopular and there was competition for timber in 
PSYU13. Cattermole’s application for a PHA was rejected because the PSYU had not yet 
been established and it was incompatible with BCFP’s plans for a pulp mill. The timber 
could not be allocated by a conventional timber sale as both companies needed to secure 
long-term access to a large timber supply to construct the Mackenzie townsite and 
integrated mill complexes. In response, Minister Ray Williston created the TSHL as a 
way to secure fiber for both companies under the Forest Act in a timely fashion. The
12 The Finlay PSYU was approximately 50,000 square kilometres or 12 million acres.
13 TFLs were unpopular because of the high degrees of control transferred to companies over vast areas. 
Many local loggers and sawmill operators opposed BCFP’s application for a TFL on this basis.
62
TSHLs granted BCFP and Cattermole Timber an annual cut of 60 and 40 million cubic 
feet of timber, respectively, for a period of 21 years14 (Baptie, 1975).
Consolidation and rationalization15 of the sawmilling sector and the emergence of 
pulp mills transformed the structure of the logging sector. During the bushmill-planer era, 
logging and sawmill operations were intermeshed. Typically, mill owners logged the 
timber that supplied their sawmills (Byron, 1976). As sawmills consolidated in the 1960s, 
many mill owners sold their quota because they could not afford the technology to adopt 
close utilization standards or produce chips. Many reinvested this capital in logging 
equipment and became contractors. This resulted in the unique structure of logging in the 
Interior where almost 100% of logging is conducted by contractors compared to 48% on 
the Coast (Schwindt & Heaps, 1996; Sunderman & Associates, 1998). Further, due to the 
flat topography through much of the Interior, there was greater use of machinery allowing 
operators to lower costs and increase volumes (Wilson, 1998).
Investments in technology allowed mills to increase productivity, utilize timber 
that had previously been unmerchantable, run all year, increase lumber quality, and 
withstand market fluctuations (Bemsohn, 1982; Mullins, 1989). To increase lumber 
recovery factors from small-diameter wood, companies invested in technology such as 
narrow kerf saws and Chip-n-Saw units. Chip-n-Saws cut logs into two-inch thick lumber 
of varying widths while turning the remainder of the log into chips (Taylor, 1975). When 
machines were calibrated and logs were sorted by size, mills increased throughput, 
reduced waste, increased lumber recovery, and required fewer operators than traditional
14 TSHL were usually granted on ten-year terms. These THSLs were granted on a 21-year term, renewable 
for another 21 years, to secure capital investment (Baptie, 1975).
15 In forestry, rationalization efforts have primarily focused on creating large, highly efficient mills that 
require fewer employees (Collins, 1998).
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gang and carriage saws (Drushka, 1998). The extensive use of Chip-n-Saws throughout 
the Interior followed their successful application in Quesnel by West Fraser and Ernst 
Forest Products.
The adoption of skidders and fallers by the end of the 1960s had fully mechanized 
logging and increased the amount of capital required to establish a logging operation. 
High capital costs related to mechanization and automation limited entry of new 
operators (Drushka, 1998)16. However, the amount of capital required by Interior loggers 
was still less than on the Coast. These factors, coupled with a history of allocating tenure 
through small timber sales and owner-operator logging, contributed to the predominance 
of logging contractors in the region (Patterson, 2008). Until the 1950s, horses were still 
being used throughout much of the Interior (Hak, 2007). By the mid-1960s, skidders and 
mechanized fallers were used extensively, allowing operators employing a small number 
of loggers to cut and move large amounts of timber quickly. The flat terrain and uniform 
size of trees, relative to the Coast, was conducive to the push towards mechanization 
(Wilson, 1998).
During Fordism, sustained yield policies helped to create the illusion of
community stability within the periphery. For resource towns, this period was
characterized by growth, expansion, and prosperity. Booms and busts still occurred but
tended not to be as deep and were viewed as being cyclical. Many of the issues associated
with resource dependence were not debated or questioned within communities because
wages were high. Indeed, wages were amongst the highest in the province and country
(Marchak, 1995). Sustained yield forestry was assumed to address long-term community
16 The basic equipment required for a logging contractor (tree shears, forwarding machine, skidder, loader, 
and trucks) was estimated to cost a minimum of $270,000 (Department of Industrial Development, Trade, 
and Commerce, 1970).
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stability as science governed a seemingly perpetual flow of timber. The rapid adoption of 
technology was increasing the amount of merchantable timber as mills utilized smaller 
trees and wasted less.
Large, technologically complex operations required large, stable, and skilled 
labour forces (Mullins, 1989). As such, companies established, developed, and invested 
in communities to attract and retain labour. For communities, the entrance of global 
capital changed the nature of local economies where external factors took on new 
prominence:
Communities such as Quesnel, Kamloops, and Castlegar were nodes in the global 
capitalist economy, and links with international capital were clear and direct. 
External firms were key in making decisions about production and marketing, and 
about the fates of the forest communities. Economic development in the Interior 
had catapulted to a new stage (Hak, 2007, p. 40).
While the decline of local entrepreneurs was contentious and resisted, 
consolidation and the construction of large, integrated mills were responsible for 
stabilizing local employment and economies. The expansion of the industry stabilized 
employment and production as the increased size of operations resulted in year round 
production, the logging season was extended, and working conditions and wages were 
improved and standardized with the growth of unions (Bemsohn, 1982; Cottell, 1974). 
For forestry dependent communities, this marked the beginning of Fordist style 
production. Fordism radically altered local economies in terms of (1) the size of the 
labour force engaged in forestry; (2) the prominence of a few large, predominantly 
multinational forestry companies; (3) the regulation and standardization of work through 
collective bargaining; and (4) increased employment stability in terms of the number of 
months worked. However, this growth and stability was generally found in communities
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that had large forestry sectors; for others this period was marked by decline and 
disappearance.
Houston is illustrative of the impact of mechanization and automation on 
employment and population levels. In 1969, Bulkley Valley Forest Industries (BVFI), a 
joint effort by Bathurst of Montreal and Bowater Paper of London, began construction of 
a large integrated forestry complex that was to include a lumber, plywood, and pulp mill 
(Drushka, 1998). The $24 million lumber mill was operational by 1970 and initially 
employed 800 workers. The community faced housing shortages as the population 
boomed, growing from 699 to 2,232 between 1969 and 1971. However, the mill 
experienced production problems related to mill design, the lack of skilled labour, 
inexperienced management, and low commodity prices (Hols, 1999) contributing to $30 
million in losses (Bemsohn, 1982). Northwood purchased the mill in 1972 and 
immediately rationalized production. The company focused on the production of 
dimension lumber and abandoned plans for the plywood and pulp mills. Production jobs 
were immediately cut and businesses closed as it became clear the community would not 
reach the projected population of 6,000. Houston subsequently experienced successive 
employment losses associated with rounds of capital investment while labour 
productivity and lumber outputs increased to amongst the highest in the province and the 
world.
Community planning, development, and administration were also redefined to 
facilitate production and attract investment (Pressman & Lauder, 1978). Government and 
the public were keen to address power imbalances, social and economic problems, and 
poor living conditions within company towns. Further, government was working to
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accommodate the changing needs of foreign capital and to promote permanent, stable
communities (Bradbury, 1979). This was accomplished by underwriting the construction
of new resource towns through the Instant Town Act (Barnes, 2005). Companies were
eager to transfer the responsibilities, costs, and problems associated with running
communities to local residents while being able to attract and retain skilled labour forces
to isolated production facilities (Zimmerman, 1997).
While issues such as planning, home ownership, and creation of municipal
councils were addressed, the longstanding issues of dependence, vulnerability, and
truncated development remained intact. The assumption was that local government,
amenities, and planning could address social and economic issues found in resource
towns. For communities there were few options available to pursue a different type of
economy. Corporate requirements and demands trumped planning initiatives put forth by
the provincial government. For example, townsite location was often chosen for optimal
mill location to minimize transportation costs of logs to the mill and shipment of pulp,
paper and lumber to markets. Porteous (1987, p. 391) explains the contradictions within
the Instant Town legislation:
Homeownership, incorporation, a wide range of services, and well-regulated 
planning are techniques of instant town development, which takes place through 
contractual collaboration between a company and the provincial government. The 
overall goal is to encourage population stability by providing a well appointed 
town with at least an appearance of permanence and evidence of both corporate 
and government commitment. The time was ripe for this development, for by the 
1960s many local companies had sold out to transnationals which no longer 
wished to continue with the onerous burden of providing and managing resource 
towns. This burden has now been involuntarily undertaken by the taxpayer and 
the instant town resident.
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Mackenzie was created by, and for, industrial forestry in the 1960s to exploit 
timber supplies north of Prince George (Baptie, 1975). The costs of creating the 
community were justified because of the savings associated with transporting finished 
lumber rather than logs to processing centres like Prince George (Byron, 1976). With 
regards to government investment in infrastructure, the Mackenzie operations gained 
access to cheap power from the newly created WAC Bennett Dam (Halseth & Sullivan, 
2004). The Williston Reservoir also provided forestry companies with cheap 
transportation of logs from logging sites to mills. The land for the townsite construction 
was sold to BCFP by the PGE railway and a railway spur was completed in 1966 
(Wedley, 1998). Responsibilities for planning and developing Mackenzie were 
undertaken by BCFP.
The community has always been part of the global market place and has been 
vulnerable to market fluctuations and corporate decisions made elsewhere. The two large 
companies that built and operated within the community throughout this period were 
BCFP17 and FFI. By 1977 BCFP and FFI employed 61% of the town’s total labour force, 
an additional 10% were employed in contracting firms and another small sawmill 
(Marchak, 1983, p. 310). However, in 1979 BCFP purchased FFI essentially making it 
the only employer in the community.
One of the key obstacles facing resource dependent communities has been
establishment of a local entrepreneurial class. The command-and-control structure
adopted by government and companies meant that community problems were addressed
by outside expertise. The mills and the service sector were made up of branch-plants
17 At this time BCFP was controlled by the Argus Corporation, the American Mead and Brunswick 
corporations and Noranda Mines. FFI was a partnership between Cattermole Timber and the Japanese firms 
Sujimoto Forestry Co. and Jujo Paper Manufacturing Co.
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meaning local entrepreneurs were only able to play small roles in the economy. Many 
local contractors were highly dependent upon the forestry companies and have not 
challenged the status-quo. This has hindered the development of a local entrepreneurial 
class that has curbed local development and economic diversification efforts. The 
‘branch-plant’ economy is also important because much of the capital generated locally is 
fleeting.
3 3 . Restructuring and post-Fordism: 1980s to present
Flexible mass production refers to an organizational framework for industrial 
production based on flexible production. Flexible production relates to the ability of a 
firm to manufacture a range of diverse, specialized products. The BC forestry sector 
underwent transition from Fordism to flexibility starting in the mid-1970s (Hayter, 
2000a). The shift away from Fordist production was influenced by international 
economic conditions and changing market demands. The recession in the 1980s forced 
corporations to deal with rapid inflation, increasing unemployment, reduced profitability, 
and increased global competition (Barnes et al., 1999; Rees & Hayter, 1996). This period 
also marked a change in the relationship between government, business, and labour. The 
election of governments in favour of free market initiatives moved policy away from 
industry subsidization (Barnes etal., 1999).
These shifts had several impacts on resource-dependent communities. First, 
flexible production methods drastically reduced the amount of labour required for 
production. Flexibility has taken on different forms with regards to labour. The use of 
contract workers, increased use of part-time workers, and temporary workers designed to
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have the labour force mirror a firm’s needs is referred to as numerical flexibility 
(Holmes, 1997). Functional flexibility refers to increasing the array of tasks that can be 
preformed by an individual worker allowing management to use core workers more 
effectively. Financial flexibility refers to linking employee pay to mill performance, 
usually through a series of bonuses, payments, or profit-sharing arrangements. Tasks 
were mechanized and computerized to increase efficiency and flexibility, having a drastic 
impact on the amount of labour required for production. For example, from the mid- 
1970s to the 1980s, the mill in Chemainus reduced its labour force from 650 to 145 
people (Barnes et al„ 1999). Second, restructuring changed the way companies 
conducted business within communities (Markey et al., 2005). This change resulted in 
fewer donations to community organizations, fewer part-time and summer jobs for 
students, and reduced municipal taxes (Ostry, 1999).
As industrial restructuring exposed the inherent weaknesses within resource- 
dependent economies, and marked a shift in the relationship between communities and 
companies, flexibility left communities scrambling for an economic future. The shift also 
meant that, for the first time, many communities were left in control of their own destiny, 
a task for which many were ill equipped.
Recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s instigated restructuring of the provincial 
forestry sector. Increasingly prolonged downturns and volatile market oscillations marked 
an end to the Fordist long boom and signalled structural change (Munro, 2004). 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the forestry sector faced a number of global and local 
pressures. Across BC the rigid institutional arrangements of Fordism became obstacles to 
capital accumulation that needed to be dismantled or redefined. As established
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institutional arrangements unravelled, communities, companies, and the provincial 
government entered a “new reality” characterized by the challenges to traditional 
institutions and the rise of new actors (Hak, 2007, p. 3).
A number of global pressures challenged forestry. New technology enabled other 
regions to compete in markets on which BC’s forest companies were highly dependent 
(Marchak, 1995). There was increasing volatility as demands for commodities shrunk and 
companies fluctuated between posting profits and losses. Market access was also 
threatened as increasing American protectionism restricted lumber exports through a 
series of disputes (Zhang, 2007). These softwood lumber disputes contributed increased 
operating costs as the provincial government increased stumpage fees to avoid an export 
tax and recover greater resource rents (Hayter, 2003). The rise of Japanese markets, 
which helped to offset contraction of American markets, collapsed with the Asian 
economic crisis in the late 1990s. At the local level, old growth forests were depleted and 
timber quality and quantity decreased as industry faced ‘falldown’18 (Pearse, 1992).
New actors disrupted production by challenging established forestry institutions 
and policy frameworks. Changing public attitudes associated with the rise of 
environmentalism also challenged resource usage. Concerns over environmental 
degradation, management practices, and depletion of the resource base lead to a series of 
localized protests and threats of international boycotts of forest products (Hoberg, 1996; 
Stanbury, 2000) that threatened “both ends of the timber commodity chain” (McCarthy, 
2006, p. 91).
18 Falldown refers to the difference between the current AAC and the Long Term Harvesting Level 
(LTHL). As high-volume old-growth forests are converted to lower-volume second growth stands, cut 
levels must ‘fall down’ to coincide with the LTHL because of lower inventory volumes (Pedersen, 1995).
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These factors contributed to increasing volatility as industry experienced 
accentuated booms and busts. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the industry oscillated 
sharply between record losses and profits, as forestry companies faced volatile markets 
and increased completion. In response, industry underwent numerous rounds of 
restructuring in search of flexibility. Government reconfigured management practices in 
an effort to assuage conflict and instability with varying degrees of success. The search 
for flexibility has put communities and industry in a state of unrest as established 
methods of production, industrial organization, types of products produced, labour 
arrangements, and markets have changed (Lawson, 2010). For communities, this change 
has been painful and contested as the future is marked by “entrenched instability” (Ostry 
& Davis, 2009, p. 22).
Increased concern over environmental and community sustainability shaped 
changes to forestry policy (Hoberg, 1996). Members of the public, at the local and global 
scales, not represented by industry or unions, challenged the close-knit industry - 
govemment relationship (Barnes, 2005; Hoberg, 2001). Environmental activists and 
organizations challenged the assumption that forests were merely waiting to be converted 
to lumber, pulp, and paper. Many felt that forestry policy was too narrowly focused on 
maintaining the health of industry, not forest ecosystems (Rayner et al., 2001). The 
public called for greater consideration of non-timber values and the inclusion of non­
forestry groups within policy making.
Protests by environmentalists and First Nations represented dissatisfaction with 
the established industrial regime that had long dominated forestry in the province. The 
interests of both groups had been ignored under sustained yield forestry and power
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relationships and policy-making structures excluded them from participating in decision­
making. Ownership of the resource base was threatened as First Nations instigated a 
series of land claims (CMHC, 2000; Wallace & Shields, 1997). Additionally, First 
Nations have been largely excluded from the employment and the economic benefits 
associated with resource exploitation (Braun, 2002; Hessing & Howlett, 1997; Willems- 
Braun, 1997). As such, the tenor of debate regarding forestry fundamentally changed. 
During Fordism, environmental concerns over logging and pollution rarely questioned 
industry’s right to utilize the forest base. Further, scientific experts began challenging 
assumptions that technological innovations and management practices were adequate to 
sustain forest ecosystems (Hak, 2007).
While environmental protests largely focused on clear-cut logging in Coastal old 
growth forests (Bentley, 2012; Bridge & McManus, 2000; McManus, 2002), there were 
issues in the Interior that garnered international attention (Drushka, 1998). One example 
was the clear-cut in the Bowron Lakes area between Quesnel and Prince George. In the 
mid-1970s, an infestation of spruce bark beetles grew in large areas of dead timber 
created by windstorms. In an effort to salvage the dead timber, eliminate fire hazards, and 
to contain the insect outbreak, large-scale salvage operations were conducted (CMHC, 
2000). A single 125,000-acre clear-cut gained international attention (Apsey, 2006).
Protests contributed to a growing disconnect, or divergence, between rural 
resource communities in the periphery and a large contingent of the urbanites located in 
Vancouver and the Lower Mainland (Hutton, 1997). Restructuring has worked to create 
post-staples economies characterized by ‘new’ and creative economies producing high 
value goods and services (Barnes & Hutton, 2009; Hutton, 2002). Many urban residents
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did not recognize the linkages between resource extraction in rural communities and the 
health of urban economies (Baxter & Ramlo, 2002; Bridge & McManus, 2000; Bronson,
1999).
For the provincial government, forestry companies, and forestry communities 
these challenges were markedly different than the conflicts predominant during Fordism. 
During Fordism, disputes focused on wages, rents, and how to best distribute access to 
timber. Similarly, local environmental concerns were usually limited to air quality issues 
stemming from beehive burners and pulp mills (Bemsohn, 1982). However, restructuring 
challenged the validity of industrial forestry as an acceptable and desirable activity within 
public lands (Hayter, 2003). These challenges represented a “crisis of legitimacy” and 
questioned whether industrial forestry should be permitted at all (Markey et al., 2000, p. 
493).
By the end of the 1970s it was apparent that sustained yield forestry was not 
adequate for sustaining forests or employment. Many of the assumptions of sustained 
yield, which had been readily accepted with little public debate following the Sloan 
Commissions, were questioned. To address these concerns, the NDP government 
appointed the Pearse Royal Commission in 1975. The Forest Act was ratified in 1978 to 
address the main areas identified by the Commission: improved forest management that 
addressed environmental concerns and the need for a diversity of forest products, 
concerns about increasing concentration of tenure and processing capacity amongst a few 
companies, and the nature of informal regulations (Haley & Luckert, 1995).
In terms of tenure, the Pearse Commission recommended that the existing system 
be streamlined (Vyse, 2001). By this point the tenure system, especially the informal
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quota system in the Interior, was arcane as it had been created ‘on the fly’ to drive 
regional development. Throughout Fordism, Ray Williston preferred to change 
regulations rather than legislation as it allowed him to quickly accommodate 
circumstances as they arose without changing the Forest Act (Drushka, 1998). Therefore, 
contract arrangements varied significantly between different licensees holding the same 
type of tenure (Schwindt, 1979). By the late 1970s, the tenure system had evolved to a 
point where, “[the] quota system [was] understood by few other than the minister who 
operated it” (Wilson, 1998, p. 90).
The first change involved streamlining. The informal quota system was replaced 
with Forest Licences (FL) that standardized companies’ management responsibilities. 
FLs were long-term, 20 years replaceable for an additional 15, and secured large annual 
cut volumes for licensees. FLs required companies to submit working plans every five 
years outlining reforestation and silviculture plans (Marchak et al., 1999). However, until 
1987 the costs of silviculture were deducted from stumpage payments. Contrary to 
recommendations by Pearse, FLs strengthened the position of licensees and maintained 
corporate concentration (Haley & Luckert, 1995). The second change involved the 
creation of the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP), which allocated 
timber to small firms. Timber was made available by assigning unallocated cut and by 
reducing the AAC of existing licence holders by 5% (Schwindt & Heaps, 1996). Small 
firms secured TSLs through competitive bidding. Finally, for the first time environmental 
values were recognized in forestry legislation.
In the early 1980s, government sought to reinvigorate the Fordist model by 
allocating funds for infrastructure and resource megaprojects and creating a ‘business
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friendly’ atmosphere (Howlett & Brownsey, 1988; Larsen, 2008). In terms of forestry, 
Mike Apsey, then Deputy Minister of Forests under the Social Credit government, 
instructed staff to adopt “sympathetic administration” in order to assist forestry 
companies through the recession by lowering operating costs (Apsey, 2006, p. 164). 
Environmental and harvesting regulations were relaxed resulting in highgrading and 
increased cut levels (May, 1998; Wilson, 1998; Young, 2008). Protests and conflicts were 
enflamed when the public learned of this approach. Despite annual increases in AAC 
levels, the contribution of forestry towards the provincial GDP steadily declined (Travers, 
1993).
Between 1991-2001 the NDP government instituted important regulatory changes 
in an attempt to maintain access to international markets, minimize conflict, and promote 
diversification by instituting comprehensive land-use planning, stringent forest 
management practices, and increased stumpage (Halseth, 2005; Wilson, 1997). The 
government sought to address valley-by-valley conflicts by promoting comprehensive, 
participatory land-use planning. The Commission on Resources and Environment 
(CORE) was initiated in 1992, creating a hierarchy of land use plans across the province. 
CORE was later continued by sub-regional Land and Resource Management Plans 
(LRMP). A Timber Supply Review (TSR) was also instigated to establish baseline 
information regarding current and future timber supplies, and to set AACs for each TSA 
(Pedersen, 1995). Second, in 1995 a new Forest Practices Code (FPC) was introduced to 
strengthen environmental regulation and management practices. Third, increased 
stumpage was adopted in response to trade disputes with the US and to promote the 
development of value-added production. Stumpage increases came during high lumber
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prices and it was assumed this represented a structural change in the lumber market 
(Schwindt & Heaps, 1996).
The FPC was an attempt to incorporate the ideals of sustainable development into 
forestry management and practice (Markey et al., 2005). Harvest regulations and 
environmental protection were strengthened by limiting the use of clearcuts in sensitive 
areas, setting maximum clear cut size, introducing protection of non-timber values, 
instituting protective measures for riparian areas, and accounting for recreational and 
tourism values in areas adjacent to logging areas (Reed, 2003a). Enforcement was 
addressed by increasing monitoring efforts and penalties for non-compliance. Regulations 
were highly prescriptive, backed by fines and penalties that could reach millions of 
dollars, and legal sanction.
The FPC failed to institute meaningful change or stability because of the need to 
compromise (Markey et al., 2005). Heightened regulation and increased operating costs 
came at a time when industry was facing a downturn. To alleviate stress to the industry 
the FPC was never fully implemented and regulations were streamlined (McCarthy, 
2006; Tollefson, 1999). More specifically, new parks were not established on prime 
forest land, frameworks for delineating ‘special resource development zones’ were 
developed but not implemented, new standards were delayed in certain areas or poorly 
defined, regulations were weakened to minimize their impact on the industry, and 
ministers retained high degrees of discretionary power (M’Gonigle, 1999). The 
government sought to appease industry and unions by capping logging reductions at 6%, 
regardless of what was required by new regulations (Boyd, 2003, May, 1998). As a
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result, the FPC failed to reduce conflict as environmental groups and industry remained 
unsatisfied (Lawson, 2010).
Despite changes to policy, tenure reform was not pursued in a meaningful way, 
although it has long been identified as an important element to structural change (Cashore 
et al., 2001; M ’Gonigle, 1999; McManus, 2002). The tenure system designed for 
industrial forestry essentially remains intact (Marchak et al., 1999). While tenure names 
and conditions were changed, the system remains capital intensive and volume oriented 
(Rayner et al., 2001; Tollefson, 1999). By 1995, 81% of the AAC came from TFLs and 
FLs. As such, a shift towards a different type of forestry with greater emphasis on value- 
added and diversification was thwarted (Binkley, 1997). It has been argued that change 
was not pursued because governments could ill afford, in terms of political or financial 
capital, to disrupt industrial forestry (Burda et al., 1998; McManus, 2002).
Most recently, the BC Liberal Party (BCLP) instituted a decidedly neoliberal 
version of flexibility. In 2003, the British Columbia Heartlands Economic Strategy was 
an effort to further advance market-based flexibility of the forestry sector (Haley & 
Nelson, 2006). First, the Forestry Revitalization Plan (FRP) freed industry of many 
requirements and restrictions on production (Markey et al., 2005). Prescriptive 
regulations were abandoned in favour of ‘results-based’ regulations that evaluated 
management on achieving desired results rather than adhering to established practices. 
Second, policies aimed at stabilizing local employment such as minimum annual cut 
levels and appurtenancy requirements were removed to allow industry to maximize 
efficiency. Flexibility was increased by allowing companies to temporarily suspend 
production when necessary, close inefficient mills without public review, and redirect
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logs to desired mills for processing. Third, restrictions on tenures were relaxed, allowing 
companies to trade and divide tenure without review. Fourth, BC Timber Sales was 
created to institute market-based stumpage where the value of timber auctioned on the 
log market determines provincial stumpage rates (Young & Matthews, 2007). Finally, 
limits on company outsourcing were removed leading to a rapid expansion in the number 
of contractors and subcontractors on cutblocks and the complexity of contractual 
arrangements (Lawson, 2010).
These policies have focused on maintaining industrial forestry and the primacy of 
economic values in forest management and policy (Boyd, 2003; Nelson, 2007). 
Regulation has been privatized, with companies setting and conducting environmental 
regulations with less oversight from the province (Marchak & Allen, 2003). With regards 
to communities, Prudham (2008a) characterizes these changes as an un-tethering of 
capital from community. Interestingly, these polices represent an ideological shift where 
some communities were viewed as obstacles to successful forestry operations rather than 
a necessary asset for production (Young, 2006).
Flexibility has taken different forms within individual mills and has varied 
between the Coast and the Interior (Rees & Hayter, 1996). Flexible production has 
entailed investment in automation and computerization of machinery, new labour 
arrangements involving permanent labour shedding and increased employment 
flexibility, and different relationships with forestry-dependent communities (Barnes & 
Hayter, 1994; Bronson, 1999; Hayter, 2004). In the Interior it appears that flexibility has 
retained many of the characteristics of Fordist production.
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On the whole, the provincial forestry sector remains oriented towards commodity 
production. In 1995, approximately 75% of the provincial timber harvest was directed to 
creating low-value commodities - lumber, pulp, and paper. Less than 10% was converted 
into shakes and shingles, plywood, panel board, and poles (Burda & Gale, 1998). Within 
the Interior, there has not been a large-scale move towards flexible specialization. These 
developments have been concentrated on the Coast (Rees & Hayter, 1996). Within the 
solid wood sector, companies have worked to reduce costs by rationalizing assembly-line 
production through computerized automation (Ostry et al., 2000).
The impacts of the recessions in the 1980s and 1990s were regionally 
differentiated because of different histories and geographies. The recession was 
particularly disruptive for Coastal communities where older and smaller plants faced high 
costs of production, a depleted resource base, and intense conflict over resource usage. 
Coastal firms responded by diversifying their product mix, moving away from low-value 
commodities, pursuing horizontal integration, and diversifying export markets (Ernst & 
Young, 1998; Hayter & Barnes, 2001; Sweeney, 2010). Coastal communities faced 
disruptive mill closures or in situ restructuring that resulted in drastic and permanent job 
loss.
In the Interior, operations were highly capitalized by the 1970s and were geared 
towards utilizing the region’s still abundant small trees efficiently. The region developed 
later and on the margins of the provincial forestry sector. Operators had to be efficient to 
obtain tenure, utilize small trees, and to make a profit by selling low-value commodities. 
Mills were also ‘state-of the-art’ at the onset of the recession. In the Interior, flexibility 
has focused on cost minimization and increased throughput, continued reliance on
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economies of scale, vertical integration, and continued specialization in a narrow range of 
low-value commodities (BCCC, 2006; Bowles et al., 2002; Ernst & Young, 1998; 
Markey et al., 2009). Indeed, this strategy continues to characterize the region’s business 
model:
Lumber recovery factors are among the highest in the world. Volume output per 
person hour, assisted by intensive capital spending, is also among the best 
available. This is the core of most of the business models in the region—highly 
automated, large scale, highly productive processing of roundwood into wood 
products. (BCCC, 2006, p. 59)
With regards to the Interior, flexibility may be interpreted as a “roundabout back towards 
Fordism” (Hayter, 2004b, p. 403). Interior sawmills became leaner following the 1980s 
recession (CMHC, 2000; Marchak, 1991; Ostry, 1999). Investments in computerized 
technology have eliminated unskilled, labour intensive jobs within mills. In logging, the 
adoption of computerized technology also resulted in decreased employment. The use of 
GPS systems in timber cruising and pre-harvest planning has eliminated field technicians 
while improving efficiency (Bowles et al., 2002).
The 1980s marked the end of expansion of the provincial forestry sector and 
approximately 27,000 jobs were permanently lost between 1979 and 1991 (Wilson,
1998). The Interior experienced smaller reductions in employment across sawmills, 
plywood mills, and pulp mills relative to the Coast (Grass 1987; Grass & Hayter, 1989). 
For instance, employment in lumber mills fell by 5.8% compared to 29.8% on the Coast 
between 1981 and 1985 (Hayter, Grass, & Barnes, 1994). A study by Delcourt and 
Wilson (1998) found that between 1979 and 1992 the Interior forest sector experienced a 
17% reduction in employment compared to 30% on the Coast. Ostry (2000) found that
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the impact of the recession on hiring rates19 in Interior sawmills were negative, but not as 
severe as on the Coast. This contributed to inter-regional migration patterns as workers 
followed jobs into the region, particularly the northern Interior (Halseth, 1999b; Nelson 
& MacKinnon, 2004).
However, the impacts of the recession also varied across the Interior. Some 
centres, such as Prince George, experienced employment growth between 1981 and 1985. 
Demand and commodity prices in the 1990s fluctuated, contributing to periodic 
employment growth as mills ramped up production (Halseth et al., 2004). Communities 
in the southern Interior experienced higher unemployment rates than the northern Interior 
(Nelson & MacKinnon, 2004). Referring to the varied impact of restructuring across the 
province, Bronson (1999, p. 97) indicated, “while the overall impression of the forest 
industry is of unionized jobs under threat by restructuring, in the North there has been, 
until recent years at least, a sense of immunity to these conditions”.
For the Interior, household and community instability was related to “consistent, 
long-term employment attrition” associated with permanent labour shedding (Prudham, 
2008a, p. 186). Between 1980 and 1993 it was estimated that in the Cariboo region 1,200 
forestry jobs were lost to increased labour productivity (Savage and Associates, 1993). 
Community populations expanded and contracted with commodity prices and market 
demands. However, each downturn eroded local employment as communities 
experienced ‘jobless recoveries’ (Hanlon et al., 2007). The region began to experience 
population declines for the first time since World War II (Markey et al., 2008); resource 
communities were the hardest hit (Travers, 1993). Following the recession, production in
19 Hiring rate was defined as (New Hires-Active Terminations)/Number of workers.
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the Interior was primarily disrupted by short-term strikes or temporary curtailments, not 
mill closures. Within Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel, job loss were characterized by 
continuous rather than sharp reductions. For instance, in Quesnel between 1979 and 
1987,400 jobs were lost to labour shedding (Marchak, 1995).
One strategy used by forestry corporations throughout restructuring was the sale 
of individual operations. While many mills within the Interior remained in production 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, instability arose from the entrance and exit of 
companies from the province, from bankruptcies, and from mergers. These activities 
were related to: decreasing resource availability and aging mills, contributing to 
increasing costs; new technology that increased competition from other regions, 
particularly in the pulp sector; and cash-flow shortages (Collins, 1998; Marchak, 1995; 
Wagner, 2001).
Mackenzie is illustrative of instability associated with mergers, bankruptcies, and 
sales beginning in the 1980s. In 1979, BCFP purchased controlling shares in FFI, 
effectively making Mackenzie a company town. Throughout the 1980s to present the 
BCFP pulp mill changed hands from Fletcher Challenge to Norske Skog, to Pope and 
Talbot, to Worthington Properties, to the Province of BC, to Paper Excellence. The 
sawmills changed hands from Fletcher Challenge to TimberWest to Slocan Forest 
Products to Canfor. The FFI sawmills and newsprint mill were sold by Fletcher 
Challenge to The Royal Bank of Canada to Slocan Forest Products and Donohue to 
Donohue to Abitibi-Consolidated to AbitibiBowater, to Conifex.
Beginning in 2001, a number of communities in the Interior faced mill closures as 
consolidation and rationalization concentrated production in specific centres. In general,
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production was concentrated in centres where companies operated large mills. This trend 
has been aided by neoliberal policies aimed at increasing autonomy of capital and the 
need to immediately extract economic value from MPB threatened timber stands (Nelson, 
2007; Prudham, 2008b; Young & Matthews, 2007). Between 2001 and 2004, the study 
communities experienced a brief boom as production levels increased by more than 50% 
(Young, 2008).
For the Interior, specialization in high volume commodity production meant that 
efficient mills had to maintain production levels (Woodbridge, Reed & Associates, 1984). 
Consolidation and rationalization led to the closure of small inefficient mills, usually 
located in small communities (Nelson etal., 2006; Young, 2008). While restructuring has 
buffeted communities like Gold River, Port Alice, Sayward, Slocan, Tahsis, and Zeballos 
(Gale & Gale, 2006), “it has also largely entrenched business-as-usual globalist forestry” 
in others (Prudham, 2008b, p. 97). Today, despite low prices, many Interior mills 
continue to produce lumber and pulp for export.
A number of greenfield mills were constructed to produce higher-value 
commodity products (Hayter, 2000a). Pulp mills were constructed in Quesnel (1971, 
1981), Taylor (1986), and Chetwynd (1985) and OSB (oriented strand board) mills were 
built in Dawson Creek (1985), Fort St. John (2005), and Fort Nelson (1996). It is 
important to note that while investment in OSB, fiberboard, and pulp mills represented 
product diversification, it did not represent a movement from the ‘commodity box’ (Ernst 
& Young, 1998; Prudham, 2007). For instance, Eurocan Pulp and Paper and Weldwood 
also built a large sawmill in Houston (1978) to produce dimension lumber and supply 
chips to the pulp mill in Kitimat. In Quesnel, West Fraser sought to gain access to the
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Japanese market for pulp by entering a joint venture with Daishowa (1979) to form 
Quesnel River Pulp. Expanding into pulp also gave West Fraser a market for wood chips 
from their sawmills and allowed them to utilize pulpwood within their timber holdings. 
Expansion during this time offered limited assistance to communities, as new production 
jobs did not offset losses and did little to address vulnerability associated with 
dependence (Halseth, 1999b).
Over 82% of logs harvested in the Interior are processed in lumber mills, 
compared to 42% on the Coast (MoF, 2008). In 2004, the Interior produced 84% of the 
volume and 74% of the value of provincial softwood lumber (BCCC, 2006). Investment 
has focused on securing existing markets or developing new commodity markets, namely 
solid wood products for mainland China. Companies invested in, or constructed, mills to 
produce higher value commodities such as machine stress-rated (MSR) lumber, OSB, or 
medium-density fiberboard (MDF). However, most sawmills produce spruce-pine-fir 
(SPF) lumber for North American markets (Wood Markets, 2007; West Fraser, 1999). 
This varies from strategies on the Coast where companies sought to diversify export 
markets and products (Bronson, 1999). Coastal mills produced different types of higher 
value products in an effort to access European and Japanese markets. Companies also 
adopted flexible manufacturing systems which allowed mills to quickly and easily 
produce a range of products and control for quality.
Communities in the Interior were not immune to mill closures. Consolidation in 
the Interior has led to the closure of small mills and contraction of many rural 
communities (Ostry & Davis, 2009). This was aided by the FRP that removed 
appurtenancy clauses allowing companies to direct logs to the most efficient mills and
85
concentrated investment in a limited number of centres. This has contributed to 
rationalization and consolidation within the Interior to the detriment of many 
communities housing small and medium sized mills.
Beginning in 1999, there were a number of mergers and acquisitions that 
contributed to increasing regional consolidation. Canfor acquired North wood in 1999, 
doubling pulp production and increasing lumber capacity by 1/3. In 2004, Canfor 
acquired Slocan Forest Products, West Fraser Timber acquired Weldwood of Canada, 
and Tolko acquired Riverside Forest Products (after Riverside acquired Lignum) (Bull & 
Williams, 2006; Sanderson, 2006). These mergers, coupled with mill expansions, 
contributed to West Fraser and Canfor becoming first and third in softwood sawmill 
capacity in Canada and the United States, respectively (Spelter et al., 2007, p.2), and 
dominating production in the northern Interior. Mergers were motivated by the cost 
advantages and savings associated with increasing company size (Bull & Williams, 2006) 
and the need to increase capacity, particularly sawmill capacity (Bentley, 2012).
Companies have also sought to address issues associated with market access and 
declining resource availability by purchasing mills outside of BC (MacDonald, 2011). 
For instance, in 2007 West Fraser purchased 13 American sawmills from International 
Paper and in 2006-2007 Canfor purchased a number of mills in North and South 
Carolina. At the regional level, mergers increased flexibility as companies remained 
vertically integrated and could maintain production by redirecting timber to their efficient 
facilities during downturns, close ‘redundant’ mills without disrupting production, and 
specialize production within individual mills (Roberts et al., 2004; Sweeney, 2010).
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Although each of the study communities has been impacted by consolidation, they 
were most apparent in Quesnel. When West Fraser purchased Weldwood it became the 
single largest employer within the community. The purchase also gained West Fraser a 
sawmill, plywood mill, and part ownership in Cariboo Pulp and Paper in Quesnel (West 
Fraser Timber Co. Ltd., 2004). During my research, West Fraser owned three of five 
sawmills, two pulp mills, a plywood plant, and an MDF plant in Quesnel. The other 
major employers in the local forestry sector are Canfor and Tolko, each operating smaller 
sawmills.
Consolidation within many Interior TSAs has adversely impacted the small 
business sectors of small communities as it has reduced the number of companies 
operating within TSAs. Contractors face a situation where there are a decreasing number 
of contracts and fewer opportunities for recourse when terms of contracts are not 
satisfactory (Stirling, 2004). This is particularly evident when examining logging 
companies. Transportation costs geographically limit the market for logs because as 
shipping costs rise with distance, competition for logs decreases. As the number of mills 
within the region has decreased, so has competition for logs (Sanderson, 2006).
Recent economic recessions reinforced Interior companies’ focus on the US 
market for construction lumber, namely 2x4s and 2x6s. Beginning in 1986, American 
protectionism restricted market access for Canadian commodity producers. Companies 
were able to offset reductions in American markets with increased exports of pulp, 
lumber, and wood chips to Japan (Hayter, 2000a; Marchak 1991). Under the 1996 
Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA), Canada received 14.7 billion board feet lumber 
quota exempt from tax, 59% of which was allocated to BC mills. Within BC, US market
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quotas were established for each mill exporting softwood lumber. Interior firms were 
allocated more quota because Coastal producers exported more lumber to Japan (Hayter, 
2000a). The US remains the Interior’s largest market accounting for 89% and 91% of 
lumber exports by volume in 1995 and 2003, respectively (CFPA, 2010).
Although Interior mills had a smaller share of total shipments by volume than the 
Coast, the growth of the Japanese market was important in offsetting restrictions to the 
US market (Hayter & Edgington, 1997). The Japanese market became more important for 
BC mills after the 1980s recession and the rise of US protectionism highlighted the need 
to increase market diversification (Reiffenstein et al., 2002). Beginning in 1990, the 
volume of lumber shipments from the Interior to Japan rose steadily, peaking in 1996 
(Edgington, 2004b). However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 significantly 
reduced Japanese demand for lumber and initiated further restructuring, particularly on 
the Coast (Pearse, 2001). This was particularly difficult for Coastal mills that had limited 
access to the US market because of quotas imposed by the SLA (Zhang, 2007).
Similar strategies are currently being undertaken to expand Chinese market shares 
in lumber. Industry and government efforts in China have revolved around trying to 
foster the use of lumber in residential and commercial housing construction (Ebner, 
2010). These efforts have focused on addressing reduced demand within the US market, 
not a fundamental shift away from the ‘commodity box’; in 2009 87% BC’s of wood 
exports to China were softwood lumber, 10% were logs, with pulp comprising the 
remainder (BC Stats, 2010). Several mills in northern BC reopened as the volume of 
lumber shipped to China doubled in 2009 (Canfor, 2010). Six mills in BC are now
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dedicating production to the Chinese market, including the Tolko and Canfor sawmills in 
Quesnel (Bentley, 2012).
During this period, companies in the Interior began to enjoy lower input costs 
than on the Coast. Increasing distance between mills and logging sites on the Coast 
pushed logging costs higher than the Interior for the first time (Hayter et al., 1994). The 
cost of production at Coastal mills is almost twice as high as in the Interior (Edgington, 
2004b; Pearse, 2001). Mills in each region faced increased costs as logging moved farther 
from mills into terrain that was less accessible. However, Interior mills were able to 
address shortages by utilizing lower value trees that were previously ignored (Griffin, 
1999; Marchak, 1995).
Uncertainty was also associated with excessive production capacities of mills 
within many TSAs. The capacity of many mills exceeded regional timber supplies 
because they were designed to rapidly convert old growth stands that were now coming 
back as second growth forests (Marchak, 1991). It is estimated that in the Interior, the 
capacity of mills exceeds AAC levels by 30% (May, 1998). Despite knowing that 
falldown had been expected under sustained yield, companies and communities seemed 
unprepared for the necessary harvest reductions and the associated job losses. Further, 
long regeneration times, poor reforestation efforts, natural disturbances, overcutting, and 
highgrading all contributed to declining timber quality and quantity.
However, the evolution of the tenure system in the Interior helped companies and 
communities temporarily avoid production disruptions related to timber shortages. Most 
of the tenure in the Interior was allocated in PSYUs managed by the Forest Service. The 
Forest Service has a mandate to support operations to stabilize employment and revenues.
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When regional timber shortages arose, the Forest Service was able to work with small 
timber sales to direct fiber to mills facing shortages so as to maintain production and 
employment (Griffin, 1999).
There were also local events that allowed communities to avoid hard decisions 
regarding the perils of resource dependence. In the mid-1980s, Quesnel faced a pine 
beetle outbreak resulting in increases to the A AC of approximately 40%. This resulted in 
a five year boom as companies worked to salvage wood and prevent a large-scale 
outbreak. As Marchak (1995, p. 97) stated, “the beetle had allowed the town to pretend 
that it could go on acting as if it were still in the 1970s”. The current mountain pine 
beetle outbreak, beginning in the mid-1990s, had similar impacts on many forestry 
dependent communities, including Houston and Quesnel (Nelson, 2007).
The recent MPB outbreak also highlights an unwavering focus on commodity 
production. However, the hard decisions regarding the future of local mills remain as 
AAC reductions loom (Patriquin et al., 2007). AAC uplifts to salvage beetle kill wood 
and prevent the spread of beetles have resulted in investment in massive ‘supermills’20 
between 2002 and 2005 (Nelson et al., 2009; Ostry & Davis, 2009). These factors 
resulted in record lumber production in 2005 and 2006 of 17.38 and 17.40 billion bf, 
respectively; of which 14.5 and 15.1 billion bf were produced by Interior mills (Wood 
Markets, 2007). These mills are highly automated to extract the maximum value, grade, 
and volume from beetle killed wood. High speed debarkers, canters, stacker lines, 
planers, and lumber sorters all contribute to maximizing production volumes and
throughput. For example, at Canfor’s Houston sawmill, $26.4 million in upgrades
20 While no widely accepted definition exists, a ‘supermill’ generally refers to a high capacity, high 
efficiency, technology and capital-intensive forest products mill designed to operate at optimum efficiency 
and reduce costs when running at full capacity.
90
increased annual capacity from 450 to 600 million metric board feet while reducing 
production costs by 24%. These efficiency gains were so great Canfor’s total production 
costs were reduced by $4.51 per thousand board feet (Parfitt, 2005). However, the 
upgrades resulted in the permanent loss of 35 jobs (Stirling, 2003). Similarly, Canfor and 
West Fraser invested approximately $100 million each in supermills in Vanderhoof and 
Quesnel, respectively.
The impacts of restructuring were also mediated by unique labour relations within 
the Interior. In general, the operating environment within mills was more flexible than on 
the Coast (BCCC, 2006). This has been attributed to the growth of sawmills from smaller 
companies running single plant operations. As such, managers were able to work with 
labour to implement changes effectively. Grass (1987, p. 47) found that management and 
labour worked to maintain markets during the 1980s by employing the ‘team concept’ 
and ‘participative management’. This allowed mills to maintain fast levels of service and 
reduce prices. The atmosphere of cooperation is also explained by production stability 
(relative to the Coast) within the region. During periods of decline and deep restructuring, 
cooperation amongst labour and management is difficult to maintain (Woodbridge & 
Associates, 2009).
Labour arrangements established throughout the Fordist era were characterized by 
strong unions and collective bargaining. In terms of age, younger production workers 
with less seniority were disproportionately impacted by layoffs contributing to aging of 
the workforce (Ostry et al., 2000). In terms of sex, women in the forestry sector and 
communities were more vulnerable to job losses than men as they have been 
marginalized within forestry unions and forestry related employment (Egan & Klausen,
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1998; Grass & Hayter, 1989; Reed, 2003a; 2003b). Seniority principles meant that 
women were usually laid off early in the restructuring process as they have only been 
recently hired in large numbers (McLeod & Hovorka, 2008). For youth, summer 
employment opportunities have reduced or disappeared, and entry into employment 
generally requires training and education (Behrisch et al., 2003).
Many new employment opportunities within forestry after restructuring were less 
desirable in terms of wages and security (Robbins, 2008). However, as production and 
harvest volumes reached all time highs, communities lost unionized production jobs. 
Successive rounds of investment in automation increased labour productivity and 
eliminated jobs (Travers, 1993). For instance, expansion and automation projects at 
Northwood’s Houston sawmill made it one of the largest and most productive in the 
world while eliminating over 100 jobs.
Companies in the Interior have also pursued ‘financial flexibility’ where worker 
pay is tied to the mill’s performance, profit, and productivity (Preston et al., 1997). In 
2010, Canfor reached an agreement with the United Steelworkers that will be utilized as a 
basic pattern agreement for most mills in the Interior. Under the new agreement there are 
a number of performance incentives for hourly employees along with seniority and 
severance protection in the case of permanent closures. From a company perspective this 
type of contract is desirable as it increases flexibility by providing “cost relief during 
periods of low lumber prices” (Canfor, 2010, p. 11).
Corporate hierarchies have become smaller, more flexible, and flattened (Hayter, 
2000a). Research indicates that decision-making in forestry corporations has actually 
decentralized, shifting various decision-making powers out to the periphery. Paternalism
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became too costly (Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983). Marchak (1983) found that local mill 
manager autonomy regarding day-to-day operations and profitability actually increased 
during this period. This shift in the command-and-control structure made local managers 
increasingly responsible for the profitability of local operations. However, decisions 
regarding finance and purchasing were made within corporate frameworks established by 
head-offices. Local managers actually have more autonomy than under Fordist vertical 
corporate command-and-control structures.
Provincial cores were also impacted as companies sought to reduce costs by 
curtailing middle management and head-office employees (Hutton & Ley, 1987). A vivid 
example of this trend is the decline of MacMillan-Bloedel head-office staff from 
approximately 1000 to 80 between 1983 and 1999 (Barnes & Hutton, 2009). Vancouver’s 
role as the administrative control centre for the forestry sector has weakened, relative to 
the past, as companies have downsized head-offices and moved them out of the province 
to places like New Zealand, the US, and Toronto (Bentley, 2012; Hutton, 1997).
While the impacts of restructuring have varied from community to community, 
common themes include increased instability and vulnerability (Barnes, 2005). The long- 
held assumption that a sustaining timber supply would equal community stability and that 
resource communities would eventually reach ‘maturity’ was dashed. While some 
communities have been weakened by the reorganization or closure of old mills, changing 
relationships with companies and the provincial government have impacted rural BC. 
Communities have been ‘hollowed-out’ as government and companies withdrew from 
previously held responsibilities contributing to the loss of services, jobs, funding, and 
support structures.
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Since the 1980s, the provincial government has lacked a strong, sustained vision 
for regional development backed by strategic investment (Edgington, 2004a; Hutton, 
2002). Regional development programs have been short-term, lacking focus and 
continuity (Markey et al., 2008). There needs to be a better understanding of rural 
dynamics and development by government. The loss of health, educational, and social 
services or key community infrastructures in rural places has different implications than 
in urban centres. The ability of a community to attract and retain residents and businesses 
is heavily tied to services and infrastructure.
Various government initiatives following the 1980s recessions have resulted in 
the retrenchment of rural community services. The withdrawal of the federal government 
in the early 1980s reduced the availability and level of service provision. Various 
provincial governments instigated regionalization initiatives beginning in the late 1980s, 
contributing to the loss or downsizing of services, privatization, and centralization of 
decision-making functions (Howlett & Brownsey, 1988; Illsley et al., 2010; Reed, 
2003a). Further, some services have been ‘off-loaded’ onto local governments increasing 
demands on local leaders and the municipal tax base (Hanlon & Halseth, 2005). In terms 
of forestry, cuts to staff and the closure of three regional offices and 29 district offices 
had impeded the Ministry of Forests ability to effectively undertake management 
responsibilities and contributed to declining local employment opportunities (Drushka, 
1998; Wilson, 1997).
For resource-dependent communities there was a shift in local governance from 
‘managerialism’ to ‘entrepreneurialism’ (Barnes et al., 2001). Under managerialism, 
local governments were responsible for administering and planning local services.
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Higher-order planning and administrative services where coordinated in a command-and- 
control structure. External corporate and government actors provided the vision, funding, 
and expertise for local and regional development. Under entrepreneurialism, governments 
have off-loaded responsibilities for directing local development initiatives on to local 
governments (Markey, 2010). These conditions, coupled with varied geographies of 
investment, distances to market, and isolation have made the outcomes of local 
development highly varied, or ‘unruly’ (Hayter, 2000a; Leach & Winson, 1995; Markey 
etal., 2005).
The shift towards entrepreneurialism was instituted in the early 1980s during the 
“period of restraint” where the provincial government worked to reduce expenditures by 
withdrawing from public services, increasing the use of contracting, encouraging 
privatization, and weakening organized labour (Barnes, 1996; 2005; Reimer, 1994). 
Government has been less willing, or able, to play a direct role in local development and 
has offloaded associated responsibilities and costs onto communities (Barnes et al., 2001; 
Markey et al., 2008; Young & Matthews, 2007). Government has instituted programs 
aimed at ‘rolling-back’ social and administrative services from communities. In terms of 
forestry, ministry staff was cut by approximately 1/3 and combining several ranger 
districts into forest districts (May, 1998). Entrepreneurialism has been furthered by 
‘rolling-out’ a series of programs to foster ‘bottom-up’ local development.
Restructuring has also eroded local human capital, hindering communities’ ability 
to adequately undertake new local development responsibilities. Throughout Fordism, 
institutional and structural forces created local environments that were not conducive to 
the development of local leaders or entrepreneurs (Polese & Shearmur, 2006).
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Restructuring also worked to erode local populations and services while increasing 
volatility. These factors have worked to discourage local investment and hampered local 
development (Markey et al., 2008). Many communities inherited new responsibilities 
they were ill equipped to undertake at a time when they were least prepared to accept 
them.
In response to restructuring, many communities struggled to maintain highly 
specialized, industrial economies. This is due, in part, to conflicting messages from the 
provincial government regarding diversification due to continued reliance on the Interior 
as a ‘resource bank’ (Halseth, 2005). Periodic booms in forestry and mining have also 
worked to curb local urgency surrounding local economic development. Growth in the oil 
and gas sector in northern BC and the promise of new mining projects has buoyed 
optimism in many small towns (Edgington, 2004a; Nelsen et al., 2010). The promise of 
growth in Chinese lumber markets has encouraged many mill workers and community 
leaders to ‘sit tight’ and wait out the recession.
Communities were forced to modify established relationships with industry 
contributing to instability. However, the nature of restructuring between the Interior and 
the Coast varied due to access to markets, local histories, and local geographies (Hayter 
& Barnes, 1992, p. 345). More specifically, Hayter et al. (1994, p. 26) find that 
restructuring varied between communities because of local factors enhancing mill 
competitiveness: costs of new technology; the costs of retraining the labour force; 
strategic importance of the mill to the company; transportation costs; and the local 
resource base.
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The search for flexibility and lean production by companies and the withdrawal of 
the provincial government has resulted in vulnerable, flexible communities. Restructuring 
has weakened communities by reducing the number of high-paying, secure jobs, 
decreasing job stability, increasing youth outmigration, contributing to aging in place or 
‘greying’ of communities and increasing the need for services, diminishing tax bases, and 
increasing service costs (Hanlon & Halseth, 2005; Ostry, 1999; Preston etal., 1997).
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter outlined the evolution of BC’s northern Interior forestry sector 
following World War II to present. The chapter focused on two broad periods referred to 
as Fordism and post-Fordism. During Fordism there were a number of internal and 
external factors that led to the establishment of a unique industry within the Interior of 
the province. Historical development, coupled with a unique resource base and 
geography, would differentiate the Interior from the Coast in terms of production, 
markets, harvest, and labour arrangements. Further, the nature of staples development 
contributed to unique economic structures characterized by dependence, vulnerability, 
and instability. These factors contributed to different responses to the recession(s) 
throughout the Interior that had important implications for communities, companies, and 
the resource base. In the results chapters I outline how these institutions, policies, and 
corporate and economic restructuring responses are important in shaping community 
capacities in the face of ongoing change.
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Chapter 4: Research Design
This chapter outlines the research design utilized when conducting my case 
studies. This chapter addresses (1) the research approach and rationale, (2) case study 
design and methods, (3) primary and secondary data collection, (4) the ethical 
considerations related to researching human subjects, (5) data analysis, and (6) checks to 
ensure validity and rigour.
4.1. Research approach
The dissertation is an in-depth analysis of three communities in northern BC 
(Figure 2). This approach was adopted to gain a deep and thorough understanding of the 
‘local’ factors influencing community-company relationships and local responses to 
global trends (Creswell, 1998; Hammersley & Gomm, 2000; Wilson, 2004). As Barnes 
(1987, p. 307) notes, “the task of economic geography is to understand how place makes 
a difference to the economic process” . To gain a deep understanding, I employed the case 
study approach to examine how social, political, environmental, and economic systems 
operating at multiple scales, came together ‘on the ground’ to influence past and 
contemporary community-company relationships in a limited number of communities, 
hereafter referred to as ‘cases’ (Neuman, 1997; Sayer & Morgan, 1985).
98
Figure 2:
Study Communities: Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel
n o r t h w e s t  t e r r i t o r i e s
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Source: Author
The case study approach I employed was intensive and qualitative, rather than 
extensive and quantitative, because I wanted to analyze how different processes operating 
across different scales worked themselves out in specified settings -  i.e. forest industry 
dependent communities (Eisenhardt, 1999; Markusen, 1994; Robinson, 1998; 
Schoenberger, 1991). Referring to the appropriateness of the case study approach for 
intensive, qualitative research, Merriam (1998, p. 19) states, “a case study design is 
employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those 
involved. The interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than a specific 
variable, in discovery rather than confirmation”. In other words, this case study approach 
allowed me to gain a detailed view of how and why different forces, actors, and 
institutions influenced community-company relationships (Bennett & Shurmer-Smith, 
2003; Massey & Meegan, 1985).
The purpose of intensive qualitative research is not to make statistical 
generalizations to a larger population (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Rather, it is to contribute 
to the literature by making analytical generalizations to theory (Bronson, 1999). 
Therefore, generalizations are made on the basis of thoughtful informed logic. 
Theoretical contributions from analytical generalizations were made through constant 
juxtaposition of a variety of data collected throughout the research process (Eisenhardt,
1999). With regards to my findings, “significance is ‘societal’ rather than statistical, and 
the explanations produced are genetic (having to do with roots or origins), rather than 
generic (having to do with typification)” (Collins & Quark, 2006, p. 289).
The intensive case study approach is well suited to research on community- 
company relationships as it allows for a rich understanding of context (Babbie, 2004;
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Barnes & Hayter, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1999; Stake, 2000). When considering why one 
would use the case study approach, Yin (1994, p. 13) explains, “you would use the case 
study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions -  believing 
that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study”. Achieving a ‘rich’ or 
‘in-depth’ understanding is related to focusing closely on the relationships between 
context, processes, and outcomes (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hammersley & Gomm, 2000; 
Merriam, 1998). Limiting the number of cases allowed me to conduct a detailed 
examination of each case.
The case study approach was also chosen because it is well suited to focusing on 
the unique and peculiar rather than the pervasive and general (Bennett & Shurmer-Smith, 
2003; Stake, 2000). The unique and peculiar were particularly important to my research 
because I examined different systems and processes in real world settings (Babbie, 2004; 
Orum et al., 1991) and the importance of geography (Barnes & Hayter, 1992). Referring 
to the advantage of conducting research within the local context, with specific reference 
to case studies of business relationships, Gertler (2004; quoted in Barnes et al., 2007, p. 
11) states:
I would argue that, from a methodological standpoint, there is considerable value 
in taking the time to immerse oneself in the different local contexts that ground 
business relationships in today’s global economy. There is also real value in 
following the evolution of relationships and practices over time... [There is no 
alternative to the] hard work of detailed, finely textured case studies: there is 
really no substitute for ‘being there’.
The opportunity to get out into the field was also a strong motivating factor for choosing 
the intensive, qualitative case study approach. While there is real value in gleaning
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insight from statistics and archives, I agree with Gertler (2004, p. x) that there is no 
substitute for immersing yourself in a research topic by ‘being there’.
4.2. Case study selection framework and communities
Selection of the case study sites was conducted in two stages. The first stage 
finalized criteria for the sampling framework, establishing definitions for each criterion, 
and determining how each criterion would be measured. A review of the resource town, 
restructuring, CED, and CSR literatures helped me construct a sampling rationale and 
select criteria appropriate for identifying communities with historical relationships with 
forestry companies and a high degree of dependence on those relationships. Further, 
content analysis of government, union, and industry reports were used to identify 
important aspects of community-company relationships within BC’s forestry sector. 
These reports related to the general region as well as specifically within the potential 
sample sites. The criteria from the broad literature review and the context-specific 
content analysis were combined to construct the sampling framework for selecting study 
sites.
The second stage involved using a sampling framework to select the cases. This 
was completed in two steps. First, the 10 most suitable communities, as determined by 
the sampling framework criteria, were selected for further analysis. This allowed me to 
narrow potential cases to a manageable number to determine which would be the most 
appropriate for my research. I then constructed a detailed profile of each community. 
Community profiles were based on data gathered from: (1) BC Stats; (2) Statistics 
Canada; (3) local and regional newspapers; (4) British Columbia Ministry of Forests
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reports and data; (5) local government publications; (6) corporate publications; and (7) 
union publications.
To be eligible for selection, communities had to: (1) be located within the 
‘northern Interior’; (2) have a forestry-dependent economy; (3) be small enough to make 
the importance of the local forestry sector to the community pronounced; (4) be home to 
large forestry companies over time; and (5) have a degree of mountain pine beetle (MPB) 
stress. Based on these criteria the communities of Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel were 
selected for my research.
The first criterion for case selection was that communities had to be located 
within the northern Interior. While there is no formal delineation of the region, for the 
purposes of my study, I used Markey et al.'s (2006; 2008; 2009) ‘northern BC’ 
boundaries for case study selection. Therefore, communities had to be located within the 
area from 100 Mile House to the Yukon border and from the Alberta border to the Pacific 
Ocean (see Figure 2). I limited case selection to this region because its geography, and 
communities, are characterized by: an historic dependence on resource extraction and 
processing and limited local economic diversification, particularly forestry; rural, small 
town, and remote settlement; and uneven development and power dynamics with respect 
to the ‘core’ metropolitan regions of Vancouver and Victoria (Markey et al., 2009).
The northern Interior is particularly well suited to research focusing on issues 
pertaining to resource extraction and processing, as the provincial government has long 
envisaged and designated it as a ‘resource development’ or ‘productive’ space (Black, 
1989; Halseth, 2005; Hutton, 2002). This regional development strategy has ensured the 
prominence of natural resources in the regional economy. As a result, the region is
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comprised of communities that grew or were constructed around natural resources 
(Bradbury, 1979). This strategy has left the region with a number of thriving and failed 
communities, with the shared history of having their economic fortunes tied to exporting 
minimally processed staples products for foreign markets.
The northern Interior was also chosen as a study region because most of the 
research on forestry-dependent communities in BC focuses on the Coastal region (see 
Barnes & Hayter 1994; 1992; and Hayter and Barnes, 1997). My research addresses this 
gap through its focus on the northern Interior. Research on communities of the northern 
Interior is important because the geography, conditions, and resource base are different 
than those on the Coast (Black, 1989; Edgington, 2004b; McRoberts, 1988). While there 
are numerous differences between the two regions, perhaps the most readily apparent is 
the importance of space. Communities in the northern Interior are often separated from 
each other by hundreds of kilometres. As such, geography plays an integral role in 
shaping the types of economic development and diversification opportunities available to 
these resource communities. With respect to development histories and trajectories and 
future economic opportunities, place matters.
The second criterion used for case selection was that the communities had to be 
‘forestry-dependent’. While definitions of ‘forest-dependence’ and ‘community’ abound 
in the literature, for the purposes of case selection I utilized statistical interpretations. The 
Census Subdivision (CSD) was used to represent each community, as it is the statistical 
unit of data that is often equated with community or community-level impacts21. While
there are many definitions, criteria, and mathematical models for determining forest-
21A Census Subdivision (CSD) is a classification used by Statistics Canada for a geographic area that 
encompasses a municipality or an equivalent area such as an Indian reserve or unorganized territory 
(Statistics Canada, 2010).
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dependence, I was interested in selecting communities with high degrees of forestry 
employment and high degrees of dependence on those jobs. Forest employment was 
chosen as the measure of dependence because research utilizing this method was readily 
available; it allows for comparison across communities; it allows for longitudinal 
analysis; often aligns with communities’ perception of their own dependence (Force et 
al., 2000; Reed, 2003b); and influences social networks and class hierarchies within 
communities (Parkins et al., 2003).
I used Home and Robson (1993) and Home’s (2004; 2009b) economic 
dependency and impact ratios because these data allow me to analyze changes to income 
dependency, vulnerability, and diversity throughout the northern Interior over time. 
Home’s (2009b) analysis indicated that Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel22 have ‘high’ 
(between 30% and 49%) levels of dependence on forestry and wood processing (Table 3), 
‘high’ (> 45%) levels of forest sector vulnerability, and are among the ‘least’ diversified 
local economies in the province (Appendix B).
Table 3:
Percent income dependency on forestry by local area
1991 1996 2001 2006
Houston-Smithers 26 36 34 31
Prince George 30 33 31 28
Quesnel 39 45 43 45
Source: Home, 2009b
To gain a clearer picture of forest-dependence at the CSD level, I consulted 
research by White and Watson (1997) who calculated the primary sector dependency 
indices of 5,243 CSDs in Canada, based on 1996 census data. A community was
22 It is important to note that the method used in these reports uses ‘local area’ as the unit of analysis.
“Local area” refers to a combination of several CSDs designed to represent a ‘community’ and its 
catchment area (Home, 2009, p. 3).
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considered forestry-dependent if its index value was greater than 50%. These data 
indicate that Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel are amongst the 20 most forestry- 
dependent CSDs across Canada. Mackenzie had the highest forestry dependency index of 
any community in BC at 100%, a value shared by two other communities in Canada. 
Houston and Quesnel followed with index values of 98% and 95%, respectively (p. 13).
The third criterion was that communities had to be small enough to ensure the 
forestry sector played a prominent role in the local economy. Parkins et al. (2003) found 
that the size of forestry communities in BC played an important role in shaping the 
diversity of local economies. As the resource town literature indicates, due to the rural 
and remote nature of forestry-dependent communities, larger communities are likely to 
have more government services and be more economically diverse than smaller 
communities (Halseth, 1999; Tonts, 2011). As such, I assumed that community-company 
relationships in smaller communities would be more palpable than in those found in 
larger communities because of the presence of fewer service industries.
To measure community size, I used census population counts. To measure the 
‘type’ of settlement, I used both Statistics Canada’s ‘rural and small town’ (RST) 
classification system23 and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) ‘predominantly rural region’ classification system using 2006 
census data (Statistics Canada, 2007b). I utilized both classification systems to address 
issues of scale (du Plessis et al., 2001). As du Plessis et al. (2001) explain, the RST 
definition is useful in understanding communities and community-level issues as it is 
based on CSD data, while the OECD system is useful when considering regional
23 RST is defined as, “individuals in towns or municipalities outside the commuting zone of larger urban 
centres (with 10,000 or more population)” (du Plessis e t a l., 2001, p. 6).
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economic development and labour market issues as it is based on census division (CD) 
data.
Each of the study communities had a population of less than 10,000 people in 
2006. Quesnel had the largest population of the study communities followed by 
Mackenzie and Houston. Both Houston and Mackenzie had populations of less than
5.000 in 2006. Haynes (2003) asserts that communities with a population of less than
5.000 are likely to be less resilient than large ones (greater than 10,000). All three of the 
study communities experienced a drop in population between 2001 and 2006 (Table 4). 
During this period Mackenzie experienced the largest drop (12.8%) followed by Houston 
(11.6%) and Quesnel (7.1%). The difference in the severity of the recession between the 
communities is reflected in the population changes between 2006 and 2011. Mackenzie’s 
population drop (22.7%) was associated with the temporary, but more than year long, 
closure of the mills. The stability of the local forestry sectors in Houston and Quesnel are 
reflected by minor decreases and growth, respectively.
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Table 4:
Population change in study communities: 2001-2011
2001 2006 2011 % Change 
2006-11
Houston 3,557 3,163 3,147 -0.5
Census rural (%) 859 (27.2) -
Census urban (%) 2,304 (72.8) -
Mackenzie 5,206 4,539 3,507 -22.7
Census rural (%) 223 (4.9) -
Census urban (%) 4,316(95.1) -
Quesnel 10,044 9,326 10,004 7.3
Census rural (%) 0(0) -
Census urban (%) 9,326(100) -
Source: BC Stats, 2008; Statistics Canada, 2012
In terms of the type of settlement, Statistics Canada data (2007b) indicated that 
both Houston and Mackenzie fall within the RST classification. Both communities are 
classified as rural, residing within ‘weak’ metropolitan influence zones (MIZ). This 
means that less than five percent of Houston’s or Mackenzie’s workforce commutes to 
work in an urban centre making their local economies weakly integrated with 
surrounding urban economies. Using the RST classification system, Quesnel is 
considered to be an ‘urban’ community as it is a Census Agglomeration (CA)24.
When considering the OECD ‘rural region’ classification, using 2006 census data, 
each community is within a ‘predominantly rural’ region25 with a ‘degree of rurality’ of 
100% (Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, 2009). Ehrensaft 
& Beeman (1992) created a classification scheme that divides ‘predominantly rural’
24 Census Agglomerations (CAs) are neighbouring urban or rural municipalities surrounding an urban core 
with a population of at least 10,000 (Statistics Canada, 2010).
25 A region is considered ‘predominantly rural’ if the percentage of the region’s population living within 
‘rural’ local units (CSD) is > 50%. A ‘rural’ local unit is one with a population density of < 150 inhabitants 
per square kilometre (Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, 2009).
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regions (CDs) into: ‘metro-adjacent’, ‘non-metro adjacent’ and ‘northern’ rural regions26. 
Houston resides within a ‘northern region’, Mackenzie resides within a ‘metro-adjacent 
region’, and Quesnel resides within a ‘non-metro-adjacent region’.
The fourth criterion used for case selection was that there had to be at least one 
large forestry company operating within the community. To determine local ownership 
structures within different communities, I used the Major Primary Timber Processing 
Facilities in British Columbia published by the Ministry of Forests and Range (MoFR, 
2006a), which outlines the location of companies by forest region and community, 
estimated annual capacity, and ownership of primary processing mills throughout BC. I 
also used AAC apportionment commitments to determine the prominence of each 
company within their Timber Supply Areas (TSA).
The local forestry sectors in Houston, Mackenzie and Quesnel are dominated by a 
few large mills. Houston’s local forestry sector is dominated by Canfor and West Fraser; 
Mackenzie’s local forestry sector is dominated by AbitibiBowater and Canfor27; and 
Quesnel’s local forestry sector is West Fraser, Canfor, and Tolko (Tables 5, 6, & 7). 
Analysis of AAC apportionment for the Morice (Houston), Mackenzie, and Quesnel 
TSAs also indicated that each of these companies accounted for significant shares of the 
local timber supply (Ministry of Forests and Range, 2003).
26 In BC ‘northern’ predominantly rural regions are above the 54th parallel (Ehrensaft & Beeman, 1992, p.
200).
27 Several ownership changes have taken place in Mackenzie since 2005: the AbitibiBowater’s sawmill was 
sold to Conifex and its pulp and paper mill was sold to Mackenzie Pulp Mill Development Corp and then to 
Paper Excellence, and the Pope and Talbot pulp mill was first sold to Worthington Properties then to Forex.
109
Table 5:
Sawmills in study communities: 2002-2007
Capacity/Production (1,000 m3)
Community Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Houston Canfor 1038 1038 1345 1421 1421 1421
West Fraser 696 696 779 850 968 968
Mackenzie AbitibiBowater 826 826 791 944 1239 1298
Canfor 448 448 566 602 602 602
Canfor 425 425 543 578 578 578
Quesnel West Fraser 795 868 892 1133 1227 1227
Canfor 373 623 944 944 944 944
Tolko 460 460 481 519 496 460
West Fraser 314 314 382 382 394 406
C&C Wood 
Products
57 64 64 64 64 64
Source: Spelter etal., 2007
Table 6:
Pulp and paper mills in study communities: 2005
Community Company Type Annual Capacity (000s of tonnes)
Mackenzie AbitibiBowater Pulp 180
AbitibiBowater Paper 180
Pope & Talbot Ltd. Pulp 250
Quesnel Cariboo Pulp & Paper Co. 
Ltd.
Pulp 329
Quesnel River Pulp Co. Pulp 331
Source: MoFR, 2006a
Table 7:
Plywood, veneer, and panel mills in study communities: 2005
Community Company Type Annual Capacity (million sq. ft., 3/8")
Quesnel West Fraser Plywood 202
West Fraser Veneer 144
West Fraser Panel 279
Source: MoFR, 2006a
The final criterion for case study selection was the presence of MPB stress within 
each community’s respective TSA. The MPB epidemic is perhaps the most significant
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environmental issue facing the northern Interior’s forestry sector. It has challenged the 
future viability of many forestry-dependent communities because it threatens the stability 
of local timber supplies and forestry employment (MoFR, 2006b). This is expected to 
create threats and opportunities for different communities depending on the severity of 
the outbreak on local timber supplies.
During my research, the Quesnel (Pedersen, 2004) and Morice (Snetsinger, 2008) 
TSAs were both experiencing AAC uplifts of 63% and 10%, respectively, to salvage 
beetle-killed wood. However, timber supply forecasts indicate that AACs are expected to 
decrease by 12% or more in 16 TSAs and 12 TFLs between 2000 and 2050 (MoFR, 
2006b, p. 73). In the Quesnel TSA, the AAC is expected to fall by 32.6% while the 
Morice TSA is estimated to fall by 8.1%. Conversely, the Mackenzie TSA is expected to 
experience an increase in AAC of 10.3% due to the predominance of spruce.
4 3 . Data collection
Triangulation and reflexivity were employed to address rigour (trustworthiness) 
and validity (meaningfulness) (Bailey etal., 1999a; 1999b; Bradshaw & Stratford, 2005). 
Triangulation refers to the use and combination of several different research methods, 
sources of data, investigators, and theories (Baxter & Eyles, 1999). Multiple data sources 
and methods are employed strategically to corroborate or ‘cross-check’ (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1998) the results and identify ‘converging’ findings associated with each 
research method for each case (Merriam, 1998; Tellis, 1997). Reflexivity involved the 
questioning of my role in the research and how it influenced the data, analysis, and 
findings (Bailey et al., 1999a; 1999b; Bradshaw & Stratford, 2005; Nast, 1994).
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Dissimilar research methods and strategies were selected to gather primary and 
secondary data to minimize the effect of individual methodological biases (Eisnehardt, 
1999; Kirby et al., 2006). By gathering data from different sources and perspectives it 
helped to identify relationships that were not readily visible and reduce the risk of bias 
and error within the research findings (Singleton et al., 1993).
Secondary data sources included census data, archival data, local/regional 
newspapers, company newsletters, local histories, union newsletters, and municipal 
records. Secondary data was used to establish detailed histories of each community and 
company by outlining important events (Rajala, 2006; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). These 
case histories served as a framework for formulating semi-structured interview guides 
and focus group questions, validating findings emerging from interview and focus group 
data, gaining a better understanding of the local institutional environment, and providing 
a contextual framework for data analysis (Yin, 1994).
Primary data were gathered using focus groups and key informant28 interviews 
with community leaders, leaders of community organizations, local businesspeople, local 
union representatives, forestry sector workers, and mill managers. Focus groups and 
interviews accessed respondents’ local expertise with regards to restructuring and the 
local forestry sector. I conducted a total of 67 interviews and three focus groups between 
May and September of 2008 (Table 8). These groups were chosen to gain a 
comprehensive, multidimensional view of the community-company relationship dynamic 
(Beckley, 1996; Halseth & Sullivan, 2002; Williams & Bull, 1997).
28 The term ‘informant’ (as opposed to participants or respondents) was chosen, as interviewees will be 
informing the research, rather than merely participating in it.
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Table 8:
Key informant interviews by occupational group
Houston Mackenzie Quesnel
Community leader 
Leader of a community
3 4 3
organization 4 3 6
Mill manager 5 2 3
Businessperson 4 7 2
Union representative 1 1 2
Forestry sector workers 3 7 7
Total 20 24 23
Focus groups were used to explore and highlight general issues facing the 
community, region, and the forestry sector (Breen, 2006; Fern, 2001; Morgan, 1998). 
Focus groups are well suited to accessing “tacit, uncodified and experiential knowledge 
as well as the opinions and meanings of participants” usually not readily available in any 
other form (Hopkins, 2007, pp. 528-529). Information gathered in the focus groups was 
used to inform interview questioning and the final analysis.
One focus group was held in each community. The focus groups consisted of 
three forestry workers in Houston, five forestry workers in Mackenzie, and three 
community organizations in Quesnel. Focus group participants varied between 
communities because of availability of participants during data collection. Scheduling a 
group of forestry workers in Quesnel was not possible as the local sector was 
experiencing a temporary boom related to the MPB uplift. However, the participants were 
closely involved with the local forestry sector. Group discussion was recorded in each 
instance because all participants gave consent. Shorthand notes and flip charts were used 
to record the key topics of discussion. After each focus group, a summary was sent to 
each participant for feedback.
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Key informants were purposively selected based on their personal experience with 
economic development planning, local corporate decision-making, local labour 
movements, community-company collaboration, or community service provision (Bailey 
et al., 1999a; Eisenhardt, 1999; Gilchrist, 1999). Purposive sampling was guided by my 
theoretical framework to provide an ‘illustrative’, as opposed to a ‘representative’, 
sample of key informants with unique insights on community-company relationships 
(Valentine, 1997, p. 112). As Johnson (1990, p. 27) explains, purposive sampling, “is not 
opportunistic, but rather guided by the [researcher’s] theoretical or experimentally 
informed judgements” .
A list of potential key informants for each community was constructed by 
approaching different community agencies and organizations, local businesses, forestry 
unions, and forestry companies (Ramsey, 1998; Ryser et al., 2006). Those individuals 
were contacted and asked if they would be willing to participate in the research. A 
‘snowball’ list of potential key informants was compiled by asking interviewees to 
identify other key-informants. The snowball technique also allowed me to overcome the 
issue of access by establishing trust. I continued conducting interviews in each 
community until I was confident saturation had occurred. I was confident that saturation 
was achieved when reoccurrence of names was frequent.
The interview method was selected because it is an effective means of 
investigating complex phenomena (Herod, 1993; Schoenberger, 1991). Interviews also 
facilitated access to individual perceptions and opinions on various aspects of the 
research topic (Robinson, 1998). Semi-structured interviews were conducted because 
topics and events central to the research topic were covered while accommodating for
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variability between communities (Dunn, 2005; Sabot, 1999). It also allowed each 
informant to address topics they deemed important (Nolin-Hanlon, 2000; Robinson, 
1998).
An interview guide and consent form was sent to each informant prior to the 
interview. Informants were also given the opportunity to select the location for the 
interview. When informants gave consent, interviews were recorded. Detailed field notes 
were taken regarding the place where the interview took place, the general mood of the 
informant throughout the entire interview, non-verbal cues, my immediate impressions of 
the key-topics or themes arising from the interview, and topics that needed to be 
addressed in subsequent interviews.
4.4. Ethical considerations
As this research involves human subjects, there were a number of ethical 
considerations to be addressed, and these were clearly outlined in plain language on a 
consent form (Appendix A). These consent forms were read aloud to the participant(s) 
prior to the interview or focus group. A copy was also given to the participant(s) prior to 
the interview or focus group so they could refer to it at any time. Consent forms indicated 
that: (1) participation was voluntary; (2) anonymity and confidentiality would be 
maintained; and (3) the research had been approved by UNBC Research Ethics Board.
4S.  Data analysis
I analysed a number of secondary data sources including census data, archival 
data, local/regional newspapers, company newsletters, trade journals, local histories,
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union newsletters, and municipal records to construct a picture of community-company 
relationships in Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel. I used these data to construct detailed 
chronologies of companies and communities, establish questions and prompts for 
interview and focus group scripts, check and validate findings from analysis of the 
primary data, and draw conclusions related to my research questions. These data were 
indexed and analysed with the NVivo 8 software package.
The first round of coding involved analysing the data with an a priori coding 
framework designed to identify different events and actors within the local forestry sector 
over time. This was done prior to the collection of the primary data. The second round of 
coding was conducted during analysis of the primary data. Codes and themes within both 
data sets were juxtaposed to ensure validity and rigour.
Thematic analysis was conducted on the primary data. This was done by listening 
and re-listening to interview and focus group tapes; typing interview and focus group 
notes and summaries; reading and re-reading the typed summaries a number of times; 
constructing matrices of responses; coding the data; collating codes into preliminary 
themes; comparing themes to coded extracts and to entire datasets; refining themes; 
relating themes back to the research questions; selecting exemplary quotes; and writing 
(Basit, 2003; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Lacey & Luff, 2001). While analysis generally 
followed these steps, it was not linear. For example, writing was not the final stage of 
analysis, rather, it was a process that began with data collection and continued throughout 
the research process.
The first round of analysis involved becoming familiar with the data (Patton, 
2002). Exemplary quotes were transcribed and summaries were prepared for each
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interview and focus group. Editing of exemplary quotes was limited to removing 
irrelevant pauses and breaks in conversation without altering their meaning (Butler, 
2001). Once the summary was drafted, it was sent to the participant to ensure that 
summaries were accurate and exemplary quotes were representative. It also helped to 
identify things that needed to be added or clarified in the text (Dunn, 2005).
The second round of analysis involved coding the primary data. Field notes and 
interview summaries, and focus group summaries were coded to help organize, reduce, 
explore, and interpret the data (Cope, 2005; Crang, 1997). The coding procedure used in 
this research was iterative and flexible (Basit, 2003; Kirby et al., 2006). During the first 
round of coding I utilized ‘open-coding’, going through the entire data set, line by line, 
identifying anything that appeared interesting and relevant (Hannam, 2003). Codes were 
merged and refined during successive rounds of analysis.
The third round of analysis involved sorting codes into preliminary themes. 
Themes helped to explain the experiences, ideas, and feelings of the participants 
(Aronson, 1994). Initially, 10 themes were identified. I reviewed each of the codes within 
a theme to determine how they fit together to form the theme. During this phase a number 
of ‘sub-themes’ emerged within each theme or broke off to form new themes (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).
The fourth round of analysis involved defining the themes. As I went through 
each theme code-by-code I created memos on the relationships between each code within 
the theme. I also created a number of “spider” (Basit, 2003, p. 147) or “hurricane” 
diagrams (Kirby et al., 2006, p. 235) to help visualize the relationships within, and the
117
linkages between, the themes. At this point I had five themes, each with a number of sub­
themes.
Table 9:
List of themes by round of analysis
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
1. Capital & investment 1. Change to how profit 1. Different views on
2. Community is pursued nature of relationships
3. Company & power 2. Economic climate 2. Changed approach to
4. Economies (at different linked to engagement community,
scales) 3. Central role of local engagement, &
5. Environment & resource managers responsibilities
base 4. Changes to local 3. Gradual change after
6. Geography communication restructuring
7. Labour & labour issues 5. Local investment &
8. Local forestry sector commitment to place
9. Policies (government & 
company)
10. Relationships & change
The fifth round of analysis involved critiquing the themes. I reviewed themes to 
ensure they were focused and accurately represented the data. I critically assessed each 
theme for internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Internal homogeneity refers to the data within a theme fitting together to clearly and 
meaningfully form a concept. External heterogeneity refers to the presence of clear 
boundaries between different themes. Following this round of analysis I was left with 
three themes that were drawn upon at different times to create a narrative in each of the 
findings chapters (Chapters 5 - 7 ) .  These three themes are the different views on nature 
of relationships; changed approach by companies to the community, levels of 
engagement, and definition of responsibilities; and the gradual change in relationships 
after restructuring (Table 9).
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4.6. Conclusion
This chapter outlined the design for my research, including the case study 
selection framework, research instruments, ethical considerations, and the analysis. In 
summary, the research employed a case study approach to gain an in-depth analysis of 
community-company relationships in northern BC. The case study approach allowed me 
to address the particular, and it is conducive to studying phenomena in their local setting. 
Cases were purposively selected to vary in terms of the selection criteria in an effort to 
illuminate their role in shaping community-company relationships.
A multiple method approach was adopted to corroborate findings. Secondary data 
was gathered to construct detailed histories of each community and company. Content 
analysis of the secondary data helped to form lines of inquiry for key-informant 
interviews and focus groups. Primary data relating to various aspects of community- 
company relationships was gathered via focus groups and key informant interviews. 
Thematic analysis of the primary data was flexible and iterative. Together, primary and 
secondary data were used to support, corroborate, and strengthen the research findings.
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Chapter 5: Findings: The Nature of Relationships
Interviewees and focus group participants were asked a series of questions 
regarding the past and current nature of the local forestry sector. The questions were 
semi-structured and open-ended to allow the interviewee to address issues and topics 
related to their own experience and expertise. By juxtaposing responses regarding past 
and contemporary relationships I was able to gain an understanding of the nature of 
change in community-company relationships. Analysis indicated that while these 
relationships were enacted in different ways across each community, there were a number 
of common themes. These commonalities and differences will be outlined throughout this 
chapter.
The first of three research questions was, “What are the types o f relationships 
forestry companies have adopted when engaging forestry dependent communities?” This 
was explored from the perspective of people living within the study communities. I chose 
to ask interviewees and focus group participants about community-company 
‘relationships’ to assess how communities and companies were connected, how they 
regarded one another, and how they interacted in a local setting. More specifically, this 
chapter also explores how the institutions, geography, and history of the forestry sector in 
BC’s northern Interior have shaped relationships between capital and community in 
unique ways.
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first and second sections outline 
community and company perspectives on relationships, respectively. Communities regard 
relationships as being shaped by the unique position that forestry companies occupy in 
local economies and how this creates unique expectations. For companies, relationships 
focus on identifying and fulfilling duties and obligations necessary for producing profit. 
The third section examines how dependence and vulnerability have worked to shape 
unique relationships in these forestry towns.
5.1. Communities’ perspectives on relationships
While each community had a unique history and set of characteristics that shaped 
relationships, the nature of relationships was similar in each community. This was related 
to the unique positions that companies occupied in the local economies. This section 
outlines from the communities’ perspective: (1) the different priorities of companies and 
communities regarding relationships; (2) community efforts to support relationships; and 
(3) perceptions of companies’ commitment to place.
Across all three communities there was consensus that community-company 
relationships were primarily focused on employment related issues. While both 
companies and communities focused on employment, each had different priorities. For 
companies, relationships centred on providing employment and establishing conditions 
conducive to producing profit. Communities were primarily concerned with forest 
industry employment because of its significant contributions to wages, residential and 
industrial taxation, and service sector within local economies. As such, communities 
supported the forestry sector in an effort to address employment stability.
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Both companies and communities agreed that the primary purpose for forestry
operations is to generate employment and profit. However, there was divergence of
opinion over what other types of activities, commitments, and responsibilities
accompanied running a mill. Communities expected forestry companies to play an
important role in addressing community development, improved quality-of-life, financial
support for infrastructure and services, and support for community events and
organizations. These expectations were established by the behaviour and approaches of
companies during Fordism.
Diverging community and company priorities regarding relationships were a
source of ongoing tension. Tension was most readily apparent when exploring forestry-
sector employment. Communities look to forestry companies to increase local
employment opportunities and stability. By contrast, companies often addressed
employment looking for ways to improve efficiency o f operations to address profitability.
Many community members noted that these different objectives are often at odds and that
the tensions have been exposed and amplified by economic restructuring and successive
economic downturns. A forestry worker from Houston commented on the disparate views
of companies and communities and the tensions they create:
They [companies] have different priorities and are not working together with the 
community on different issues and programs. Mills are looking at how to cut costs 
while communities are looking for job stability. Corporations do not live here so 
they do not have the same values as communities. (HI 1)
A mill worker from Mackenzie outlined how these tensions were linked to the drive for
increased efficiency through economic restructuring:
Some towns just keep shrinking. The industry has modernized and got more 
efficient and towns have lost jobs and people. I mean, at the plank factory they
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were making a whole lot more product with two mills instead of three and you are 
down to 450 people instead of 900. When I first started at “B mill” we were 
doing... 7 loads a day. When they shut down they were doing 31. Every time they 
made an improvement 50 guys would be “down the road”. .. Back then nobody 
got fired, it was just attrition so you hardly noticed it, but we sure feel it now. 
(M10)
Communities also indicated that different expectations regarding decision-making
and consultation were a source of tension. Forestry companies occupy a unique position
in communities because most of their actions have large implications locally. Even small
decisions regarding local mills have important ramifications for workers, families, and
organizations. Despite this, residents often learned of important decisions after they had
been made. Further, the social and economic consequences of decisions were often not
addressed by companies. For communities, this was a result of important decisions being
made in distant urban centres. Consultation regarding decisions that impacted
communities has always been rare, and usually limited to instances where companies are
required to meet with groups or participate in committees. The leader of a community
organization outlines how the need for increased consultation is a long-standing issue for
residents and community organizations:
There is no community consultation or consideration for the community or 
community relations. I’m not saying that there should be on every single decision. 
But there should be some sense of corporate responsibility and recognition that 
company actions and decisions have community impacts. (H2)
The need for consultation arises from the importance of the forestry sector in local 
economies. Companies were expected to play a central role in operating each community 
because of prominence. In each community it was important for forestry companies to be 
part of the community like other organizations, businesses, and groups. A businessperson
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from Houston outlined the importance of having businesses and companies closely
involved with community issues because of the unique geography of the northern Interior
and the peculiarity of resource-dependent economies:
In this town it is expected that forestry companies be part of the community. They 
have always been a part of the community and both plants have been here so long. 
It is part of being in a small community, you support things, you get involved, you 
become part of the community. That is just the way it is in a small community, it 
really doesn’t matter who you are ... (H9)
Many community members indicated that being ‘part of the community’ encompassed an 
active interest and involvement in community functioning and addressing pressing issues.
Despite their unique position in the local economy, community members felt that 
forestry companies did not have strong ties to the community. Companies engaged in 
local relationships to secure profitability related to the location of resources, 
infrastructure, and capital investment (Dicken, 2004, Massey, 1984b). As a local 
businessperson from Mackenzie commented, “In terms of the companies I don’t get the 
sense that they are ‘rooted’ here. They look at what is best for the bottom-line. I think 
they could do business better by looking at the big picture” (M3).
A small group of interviewees felt that the ties between West Fraser and Quesnel 
were unique due to the company’s history. These unique ties were thought to evolve out 
of the founding and development of the company locally and its close historic links to the 
town. There was a strong feeling amongst most interviewees that West Fraser had a 
directive to support Quesnel because company owners and many of the early managers 
actually lived in, and came from, the community. The leader of a community 
organization and a businessperson reflect on the importance of history in creating close 
relationships with the company, respectively:
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Some companies have been very detached from the community. West Fraser is 
different. The family that started West Fraser was from Quesnel. Lots of the 
people that ran West Fraser, besides upper management, were from Quesnel.
Their directive was to support Quesnel [which resulted in] heavy involvement by 
management. You don’t see so much of that from the other mills. (Ql)
West Fraser is different than other companies. They are more “rooted” here than 
other companies because they started here. They are more people oriented than 
other companies. They hold lots of community events. West Fraser is not 
detached, they see themselves as a major player in town. They have a private 
airplane that can be used for medical emergencies. (Q5)
This unique relationship was seen as fostering greater commitment and consideration
through information sharing and support for local events and initiatives. A mill manager
and a community leader also described how close relationships with senior company
executives contributed to greater consideration for the community when important
decisions were made:
Hank Ketcham29 and others from West Fraser have tried to keep people 
knowledgeable on what is happening in the business and trying to explain why 
some of the decisions being made are being made. The company is aware of their 
impact on people and the community of Quesnel. It is not easy because all of our 
decisions impact people. This has been the West Fraser approach. For a long time 
West Fraser was, and essentially [remains], a family run company. They have not 
lost that contact with the guys in the mill... The company is trying to keep that 
“personal” relationship going. (Q20)
Even though we are dealing with large corporations, it still has a “small town” 
feel. This is partly related to the fact that the Ketcham’s started their business 
here. West Fraser holds their AGM here every year. West Fraser started here in 
Quesnel and they don’t forget that. This is related to the fact that the founders of 
West Fraser, the Ketchum’s, are from Quesnel. With the local owners, when they 
were involved in the mills they did every job so they understand the impacts of 
their decisions on the community. I am not saying that there are not challenges, 
they are a business and they have to make hard decisions for the business, but our 
experience has been that there is loyalty [to Quesnel]. (Q14)
29 Hank Ketcham is the President, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer o f West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd.
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While it is difficult to evaluate whether West Fraser has a greater degree of 
‘loyalty’ to Quesnel than it does to other places it operates in, there may be something to 
the feeling that it is in some way a ‘Quesnel’ company. Many TNCs hold qualitative 
characteristics that are shared in part with the history and culture of their country of 
origin. These economic, social, and cultural characteristics can be carried within 
companies and influence, to some degree, how they operate in other places. These 
characteristics influence, “modes of corporate governance, corporate financing systems, 
and their strategic behaviour” but do not result in loyalty to place (Dicken, 2000, p. 281).
A common stereotype associated with locally owned companies is that they are 
more embedded, similar to the community in terms of culture, and concerned with the 
well-being of the community than are extra-locally owned companies (Dicken et al., 
1995). It is often assumed that local ownership contributes to feelings of obligation and 
loyalty on the part of companies. However, these assumptions and stereotypes are not 
supported when examining the history of each community. As Massey (1984, p. 102) 
notes, “even with geographical ownership of production... regionally based capital is not 
necessarily ‘loyal’; indeed it would be foolish to be so”.
However, a smaller contingent of community leaders and leaders of organizations 
directly involved with forestry companies, dismissed the notion that West Fraser had 
fundamentally different relationships with the community. While it is clear that West 
Fraser has been an important contributor to community events and infrastructure, their 
relationships with the community were similar to other companies. Community leaders 
felt that like other companies in the Interior, West Fraser has been active in expanding
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operations throughout the province and the globe. This expansion has made the company
less reliant on its Quesnel operations for survival over time:
We just don’t get it yet... West Fraser is rapidly becoming a global corporation. 
But people here hang on to the idea that West Fraser was founded in Quesnel. It 
maintains one of its head offices here but the president, CEO, and board of 
directors are all in an office in Vancouver. I think that people still imagine West 
Fraser to be a “Quesnel company”.
I think that there is still enough of those families in the business, those guys 
grew up in Quesnel, that with two competing decisions that are both good for the 
bottom-line, they might make the one that favours Quesnel. But this sensation that 
we are attached somehow is strange. With all of the consolidation and 
globalization that is going on we don’t get it yet. Because West Fraser is the 
primary driver in this community people see Quesnel as representing West Fraser, 
I don’t know how true that really is. People forget that it is not 50 years ago...
The people at West Fraser might favour Quesnel, they might not. There is still the 
sense that communities are attached to forestry companies, the reality may be that 
we are not. (Q10)
Decisions to re-invest in local operations and relocate corporate offices to the 
community were better explained by the existing mills and access to resources (most 
recently large volumes of cheap MPB salvage wood). As a local union representative 
noted, despite its unique history, West Fraser has not been involved in the community in 
markedly different ways than other companies, “Companies do not really have roots in 
the community. They are no different than any other industry trying to make a profit. 
West Fraser has not approached this community any differently than they have other 
communities” (Q18). This points to the difficulty in determining whether companies’ 
history and actions are indicative of “deep or merely cosmetic” social embeddedness 
(Dicken et al., 1995, p. 41).
The geography of the northern Interior, and settlement size, played important 
roles in shaping community-company relationships in Houston and Mackenzie. Living in 
rural, remote, and small town communities had positive implications for communication,
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involvement by mill managers and forestry employees, and high levels of support for the 
community relative to larger centres. Due to the smaller size of Houston and Mackenzie 
local mill managers were more visible than in Quesnel. In Quesnel, managers were as 
involved in community activities outside of work, but their involvement was perhaps not 
as visible due to the larger population size. Small community size promoted a higher 
level of involvement by company employees and local managers. In the experience of 
one mill manager in Houston, “the level of company involvement is higher because of the 
size of the level of dependence on the companies” (H8). A mill manager in Mackenzie 
felt that greater involvement in the community was a common characteristic of life in a 
small town:
I have a personal connection with the community as a manager because it is so 
small and I live here. People stop and talk to you in the grocery store about things. 
Virtually all of the company staff members are involved in something or another. 
There is still a strong sense of community. The longer you are here the more a 
part of the community you become. You want the community to provide 
resources to make it a better place. (M l9)
In each community, mills enjoyed high levels of community support, relative to
larger centres, because of their prominence within the local economy. This was perceived
to influence mill managers to play a larger role within the community than they might
have in larger centres. Most pointed to examples of how mill managers are involved in
extracurricular activities such as coaching sports teams, involvement in community
organizations, and volunteer activities. A forestry worker in Houston outlined how:
Mills in Vancouver do not enjoy the same culture of support that mills in the 
Interior enjoy. There is a supportive culture in the workforce [here]. This may be 
related to the fact that managers are more involved in small communities. 
Managers in smaller places tend to be more involved. (H4)
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Regardless of the state of the forest industry, there was an atmosphere of support
within each community. Although many took issue with changes associated with
economic restructuring, they remained supportive of industry because of the employment
benefits to the community. Many know that the development of other industries is not
likely to create the same number of high paying jobs. As one interviewee from Quesnel
stated, “People here know who pays the bills and there is no apathy towards the situations
facing the mills” (Q6). A retired mill worker in Quesnel felt, “The wealth within the
community exists because of forestry, you just have to look around town at the vehicles,
there isn’t much rust” (Q12). Similarly, a community leader in Mackenzie stated, “At the
grass roots level the support is here even if the corporate approach has changed. For
instance, it [support for forestry companies] is better here than in most places” (M21).
In Mackenzie, the community remained supportive of industry even after forestry
companies closed local mills. Although there were feelings of animosity towards each
company immediately following the mill closures, community support of forestry
companies remained strong throughout the crisis. While this may seem counterintuitive
given the negative impacts of restructuring and the recession on the community, support
was derived from economic dependence on the local forestry sector for the community’s
continued survival. A businessperson highlighted the role that dependence plays in
shaping relationships within Mackenzie:
[In the past] and today, everyone is very supportive of forestry and forestry 
companies because everything depends on forestry in Mackenzie. I mean I won’t 
survive here if those trees are not being harvested and processed, nobody does. 
That is not happening right now. In reality, nothing happens here without [the 
forestry companies]. You won’t have a community this size here with people 
picking huckleberries or whatever... (Mi l )
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Relationships with individual communities were found to be the legacy of almost 
thirty years of close involvement with communities during Fordism. Local standards for 
involvement were established within each community and were based on regional norms 
and local histories and circumstances. Involvement did not vary between companies too 
greatly as a result. As one interviewee explained, “if one company sets the bar other 
companies usually reach for that bar” (Q14). While each company had varying levels of 
involvement and support related to different policies and approaches, the nature of 
relationships were similar across the region. For instance, there was little difference 
between how individual companies viewed their roles within, and responsibilities to, 
communities. For example, the prominence of West Fraser in Quesnel, and the Canfor 
sawmill in Houston were a result of local history. While this has resulted in heightened 
expectations, it did not result in the adoption of unique roles or levels of involvement.
Relationships with individual companies were also examined comparing company 
involvement and behaviour before and after the sale of a mill. In most cases, there were 
no fundamental differences in relationships between individual companies. This was 
attributed to two things. First, when mills were bought and sold, for the most part, local 
managers and employees retained their jobs. Although the mills changed hands during 
sales, there tended to be continuity of mill employees and managers30 over time. Put 
differently, communities largely dealt with the same people before and after the sale of 
the mill or company:
30 Analysis indicated that woodlands managers remained within the communities for the longest periods of 
time. They were less likely to change frequently as they had knowledge as to the unique aspects of logging 
and relationships with contractors and suppliers within each community. Production managers were more 
likely to change frequently because o f the nature of the position. However, analysis did not indicate that 
they were more likely to be replaced because the mill was sold to another company.
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From the community side of things there was not much change [when mills 
changed hands]. In essence the same people remained in Houston when the 
company changed hands from Northwood to Canfor. Really, the biggest change 
was the colour and shape of the logo. (H3)
Second, in most cases when mills changed hands it was rare for companies to implement
drastic changes to policies pertaining to the community. Significant changes were usually
restricted to practices and processes within the mill related to production. An interviewee
in Mackenzie commented on how there was relative continuity of relationships even
when mills were changing hands frequently “The corporations have really started to
change to the point where it is like a rollercoaster... [However,] the relationships have
slowly changed over time. We are slow to see change in everything...” (M20).
The one notable exception was in Houston when Northwood purchased the BVFI
sawmill. Northwood drastically cut spending within the community and laid off
approximately 90 employees at the mill to address inefficiencies (Hols, 1999). However,
this approach was taken because the BVFI sawmill complex was inefficient and
unprofitable. One of the main motivations for Northwood buying the mill was to
eliminate inefficiencies to make the mill profitable.
52.  Companies’ perspectives on relationships
For companies, relationships, involvement, and investment centre on maintaining 
profitability. Companies have always been involved in things such as community 
planning and service and infrastructure provision to maintain operations. More 
specifically, relationships are cultivated and maintained insofar as they: (1) address 
profitability and efficiency of local operations; (2) maintain production; and (3) curtail 
community resistance. By addressing these issues, companies felt they could provide
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stable employment, which would serve both the company and community. Activities and 
commitments beyond running the operations were largely entered into when necessary. 
When involvement was no longer required it became discretionary in nature and 
contingent upon economics.
Companies indicated that they were motivated to accept roles they held within 
communities out of necessity. During Fordism involvement ensured that companies could 
attract and retain a stable workforce. Company managers and employees also became 
involved in things like municipal politics because they comprised most of the 
community. Put differently, finding people not directly involved in forestry would have 
been a challenge. As time passed, companies reduced involvement in community 
functions because the physical infrastructure was built and municipal governments were 
established. Companies felt that because stable workforces were established and 
populations grew, direct involvement was no longer required. This highlights the 
utilitarian approach that companies have towards communities (Young, 2008). As such, 
much of the evidence indicates that companies have always viewed involvement within 
communities as being primarily linked to maintaining production. A community member 
reflects upon how this outlook has not really changed as much as some community 
members indicate:
Companies are not as involved as they were before because they really don’t have 
to be. There is no need to cajole workers to come to Mackenzie because all of the 
amenities are here. There are houses now and there are different facilities. For 
today’s companies there is not really much need or pressure to build infrastructure 
because lots of that stuff is already here. (Mi l )
Mill managers felt that companies best serve the community by addressing 
profitability and efficiency of local operations because it results in stable employment.
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From the companies’ perspective, community-company relationships, “are more about
providing employment” (H I3) than anything else. Several mill managers argued the most
rational course of action, in terms of serving the community, was to focus on what was
best for the company. However, few acknowledged how this approach had different
implications for communities as the forestry sector underwent restructuring. As one
manager commented, “We recognize the biggest thing we can do for the community as a
company is provide safe, stable employment. The community and employees need to
know that we will be around tomorrow” (Q4). The visibility and implications of this
strategy has been magnified by the recent recession:
During the downturns companies have to focus on providing jobs. The culture is 
about providing jobs and keeping the company moving ahead. There is less focus 
on doing anything else. It is pretty sad when you drive by the other mills like 
Abitibi and there isn’t a soul working. Our [the company’s] main goal today is to 
stay in the game. To survive you have to focus on keeping jobs and retaining 
skilled labour. (M l9)
At the time of the interviews, companies in Houston and Quesnel worked to cut operating 
costs by curtailing shifts and production levels. In Mackenzie, four mills were closed. 
These strategies focused on helping companies weather the downturn and remain in 
business. By doing so, companies ensured some mills would re-open once markets 
recovered.
This recession highlighted how economics have always been central to 
relationships and the important changes to the forestry sector that have been occurring 
since the 1980s recessions. When faced with adverse economic conditions, companies 
moved quickly to reduce costs and conserve capital. The nature of relationships in 
Mackenzie were vividly laid bare when companies quickly and abruptly closed the mills.
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One interviewee expressed the shock that the closures created in these words, “some were
upset with the Abitibi closure because they did not meet with the community... there was
no opportunity to talk together. The decision was made outside of the community and
that was it” (M l8). The shock stemming from the closures was partly because no one in
the community imagined that all of the mills would close together:
Community identity is very attached and linked to forestry and the forestry 
companies. In reality, nothing happens here without them. It is a total shock to us 
today that Abitibi just shuts their doors and Pope and Talbot goes broke. It just 
showed us that nothing is for certain. It was a total shock to the community.
(Mil )
They [the company] closed everything down on the Abitibi site. We don’t have 
any direct contact with Abitibi. If you’re from Abitibi you might get a phone 
message to call somebody in Montreal but other than that there has been nothing. 
(M2)
Companies placed a high priority on profitability and efficiency in all of their
dealings with communities. Companies tended to remain involved in the delivery and
planning of services that they used. For example, companies often supported fire
departments and emergency response units because the mills require them. Contributing
money directly, or in kind, ensured that required services were available and that the
quality was acceptable. Involvement in planning for services also ensured that costs were
kept at an acceptable level. A mill manager from Quesnel explains why employees are
encouraged and reimbursed to take part in training for emergency services:
We [companies] participate in training and pay wages of employees [undertaking 
training] because we need the services. Therefore, we have to support them. If we 
are involved in providing services we can ensure that we have access to the 
service and that the cost is minimized. (Q23)
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Mill managers also became involved in different community activities in an effort 
to create a cooperative local working environment. Managers were closely involved or 
keenly aware of community issues regarding air quality, land use planning, and resource 
management. Involvement was motivated by a need to influence decisions or policy that 
had a “direct impact [on the] bottom-line” (Q21) or had implications for how mills 
operated. This was usually done to curb resistance to company decisions and different 
aspects of local operations. By pre-emptively addressing contentious issues that could 
result in local resistance, less time was spent explaining their position or addressing 
protests later on:
[Company] management believed that the resource was public and needed to give 
back to the community by providing employment and by being part of the 
community. This made it easier to operate because there was less resistance 
within the community. [Company management] saw the relationship as a 
partnership with the community. (H I7)
In Quesnel companies were closely involved in planning initiatives related to air quality
in an effort to minimize resistance and confrontation:
Right now we have a big issue with air quality in Quesnel. Next to Prince George 
we have the second worst air quality on particulate matter in BC. This is a really 
good thing, we have been working since ’97 and the mills came working with 
us... Canfor, West Fraser, and Tolko and different community groups all became 
involved. We have been working together and industry has been voluntarily 
implementing the suggestions of the committee even though they are not 
obligated to do so... This type of thing has not happened in other communities 
where you can’t get industry and environmentalists to sit at the same table. I think 
that it just worked here because of the cooperative mood that exists. I think that 
they [companies] cooperated because they wanted to avoid confrontation that 
arose during the Cariboo Chilcotin Land Use Plan. (Q11)
Similarly, involvement in community decision-making or planning was generally 
limited to issues that affected mills. One community leader noted that the motivations for
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most involvement are quite clear, “Companies are usually involved in planning that
directly affects the bottom-line” (Q21). For companies this approach is logical,
“Companies are engaged with the community only to the extent to which they can see a
benefit. They will be involved if it makes good business sense to do so.” (Q18). For
example, companies were closely involved in planning community infrastructure that
impacted operations. Much like their involvement with services, being involved in the
planning of infrastructure promoted their position and ensured that their needs were
addressed. A mill manager in Houston explains:
We have not been involved in things like community planning but we get 
involved around infrastructure. For instance, we got involved with planning 
involving roads and the highway. We [the company] got involved because we are 
a major user. The town has been good at bringing us out into those conversations 
with the ministry. (H8)
However, these commitments were flexible. Increasingly, anything unrelated to mill 
operations was often treated as being outside of the company’s “sphere of influence” 
(Q15) or “area of expertise” (Q12) and left to the community. When asked if companies 
took interest in, or were involved in community decision-making or planning, most 
managers indicated that companies were not. There was consensus amongst managers 
that, “decision-making [regarding community issues] is outside of our [company] 
purview” (Q4).
Reduced company involvement and flexible commitments within communities 
were tied to several factors (Barnes et al., 2001). First, national and provincial 
governments and forestry companies have moved away from a local governance model 
based on ‘managerialism’ towards ‘entrepreneurialism’. Under the entrepreneurial model 
communities are no longer merely responsible for providing services by receiving capital
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and information from external sources. Communities are also to be responsible for their 
own futures by creating and attracting economic opportunities. This shift reduced 
financial and bureaucratic burdens on government and companies. Second, as a result of 
increased competition, decreasing profitability, changing markets, changing product 
demand, and reductions in middle management, forestry companies are no longer willing 
or able to engage in a more active paternalistic approach.
5 3 . Resource dependence and relationships
Community-company relationships are shaped a great deal by high levels of 
community dependence and lack of economic diversification. Several longstanding issues 
impacted relationships including: (1) the nature of local development and diversification 
planning; (2) the availability and quality of leadership, human capital, and expertise; and 
(3) the adverse implications stemming from the perception of forestry-dependent 
communities on future development opportunities.
In each community, planning for economic diversification and development was 
not a priority prior to the current economic downturn and the mountain pine beetle 
(MPB) epidemic. Prior to these events it was particularly difficult to bring the issue of 
economic diversification to the fore of community debate. As a result, in each community 
economic development efforts and planning have been primarily reactive in nature. 
However, the current downturn, and the subsequent closure or curtailment of the local 
mills, highlighted the pressing need for economic diversification. A businessperson from 
Mackenzie and a community leader in Quesnel illustrate how crises and restructuring 
have exposed the weaknesses of forest town economies:
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People never used to think about [economic] diversification in Mackenzie. We 
need to realize as a community that we must change and that things will be 
different. We need to have something else besides forestry to sustain the 
community. The town is starting to see projects like Mackenzie green energy 
moving forward. (M3)
Over time there has been fewer companies within the community, now instead of 
six or seven companies we are down to three or four. That affects the 
community.... It puts us at a greater risk from a diversification perspective. If 
West Fraser is in trouble then the whole town is in trouble. I don’t think that the 
real changes will come until we lose mills. Those changes are already happening 
in other places like Mackenzie and Prince George. (Q10)
These excerpts underscore the long-standing difficulty of getting resource-
dependent communities to address diversification proactively, rather than reactively
(Clapp, 1998; Freudenburg, 1992; Halseth & Sullivan, 2004). A small number of
interviewees were frustrated that communities did not pursue diversification during
favourable economic times. Historic stability and prosperity thwarted efforts to direct
resources toward local economic development initiatives not related to industrial forestry.
Many were complacent about planning for diversification and did not see it as a pressing
issue in their communities because, “People do not acknowledge the uncertainty and
vulnerability regarding the future as long as their pay cheques keep coming” (M23). A
community leader in Houston commented that complacency towards economic
diversification has been a longstanding issue:
One of the big issues we face is similar to issues faced by all resource-dependent 
communities, “How do you get people to seriously look at diversification?” We 
have a history of dependence and this makes us reactive not proactive when 
pursuing diversification. It is hard to get any type of long-term commitment for 
diversification planning. (H I9)
Forestry communities did not actively pursue economic diversification because 
council was unable to maintain interest in, and long-term commitment to, various
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projects. This is related to the unique structure of forestry-dependent economies where
“community visions of possible futures are clouded by historical dependencies”
(Teitelbaum et al., 2003, p. 173). It was often stated that diversification was not a priority
because most planning efforts centred on forestry. Individuals who were in favour of
developing diversification plans and projects felt their efforts were stymied because the
majority of the community and municipal council were committed to maintaining
forestry as the major component of the economic base. A Mackenzie businessperson
reflected on the power forestry had in shaping dialogue on the local economy, “Forestry
was the only thing that people ever thought of in terms of economics and politics” (M l7).
An interviewee from Houston described the barriers facing diversification efforts in most
forestry towns in this way:
This [not pursuing diversification] comes with being so dependent on forestry, 
most people feel that you do not bite the hand that feeds you. In general, this has 
meant that people in the community do not question practices. The council and 
mayor’s vision of the town’s future was not different than Canfor and Houston 
Forest Products’ vision for the future. It is hard for me to say whether companies 
wrote the vision for the community’s future or whether the community just 
adopted it. It was just one and the same. When [the community] did any strategic 
planning, forestry was all that they wanted to think about. (H2)
Companies also played a role in moulding agendas by directly intervening in local 
politics periodically. Companies wielded disproportionate levels of power within each 
community. The prominence of forestry in local economic development plans was in part 
related to the power and influence forestry companies have with local governments. 
Historically, this allowed companies to shape or guide the agenda of council to address 
pressing issues. Because companies were able to influence council to remain focused on 
forestry it undermined economic diversification and community development efforts. In
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Houston, the leader of a community organization recounted the critical role company
influence played in shaping the municipal agenda over time:
All of our eggs are in one basket here. The relationship between the forestry 
companies and council was as thick as can be. The companies [have always] 
called the shots and everyone in town jumped. Some councillors were employees 
of the big companies. The current mayor’s husband was a manager at Canfor. 
Everyone jumped to the tune of the companies, which is a bad thing from my 
point of view.
The attitude of the companies and management was very patronizing. If 
you wanted to talk to companies about the impacts of changes on the community 
they would just say “no way”. The attitude towards mayor and council was that 
you work for us and you do what we want you to. The attitude towards the mayor 
and council is also very patronizing. They feel as though they know what is best 
and that everything will be fine because we have one of the biggest mills in the 
world. (H2)
Interviewees in Quesnel explained how companies used their influence over municipal
and provincial politics to protect their economic interests:
When I was on the board of the Chamber of Commerce I felt that we needed 
better land use planning. I felt that there needed to be better land use planning 
surrounding [example omitted] to recognize values [other than forestry]. As a 
result I convinced the chamber to put forward a motion to write a letter to the 
Ministry of Forests reflecting this. By the next meeting the local forestry 
management was out in full force and the motion was rescinded. (Q21)
Companies were involved in things like land use planning and things like the 
CORE31 process. The CORE process sat everybody down to come up with a land 
use plan. It was a good idea but it ended up really dividing the community, this 
one more than others. You would hear stories that because industry was paid to sit 
at the table they would just stall things and prevent decisions from being made 
until they could finish their plots out in the region we were talking about. 
Everyone else had volunteered so we were just kind of waiting so it got frustrating 
and it divided the community. (Ql)
Economic diversification (or lack thereof) became a pressing issue during this 
research. Communities were forced to adopt a reactionary approach to economic
31 “CORE” refers to the Commission on Resources and Environment, created by the NDP government in 
1992 to restructure provincial land use planning (Mason, 1999, p .100).
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diversification because of current and impending changes to local forestry sectors. In 
Houston and Quesnel recognition of the importance of diversification was growing 
because of threats to the resource base, “Our thinking has changed over time due to 
constant pressure. Now we are actively exploring diversification. This has been prompted 
by the mountain pine beetle crisis” (H2). However, because the mills were still operating 
diversification was still not a prominent community issue. A local leader from Quesnel 
reflected on the newfound prominence of economic diversification within municipal 
politics:
The number one issue facing the forestry sector in Quesnel is what will be the full 
impact of the MPB outbreak. What will happen to the city? This crisis has driven 
us to think about what the future holds for the city and what we are going to do 
about it. It has driven council to address things like economic diversification. That 
is the key issue facing us over the next five years. (Q8)
The reactive stance towards economic diversification was established in the past
when community leaders, leaders of community organizations, and forestry workers
relied heavily on companies to address pressing issues and undertake planning and
decision-making roles. Today, many believe that companies can, and should, continue to
address issues that arise by providing adequate funding, expertise, and support. The
legacy of company involvement has made it difficult to get community members to think
about, and discuss, community development:
In terms of community planning they [forestry companies] were not very 
involved. Actually, there was very little community planning to get done, it was 
more of a swashbuckling era. Companies would just throw money at the problems 
that did arise. There was not much earnest community debate going on here.
(Q19)
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This has created a significant obstacle for communities because in the past companies 
used to address most shortcomings and issues with funding. However, with economic 
restructuring, these funding pools have largely dried up.
Many community leaders called for increased collaboration regarding economic 
diversification as it is in the interests of both companies and communities. Diversification 
would reduce the amount of reliance on companies for donations, demands on managers, 
and industrial taxation. However, given the size of leadership pools and the complexity of 
these issues, achieving these goals would only be possible with greater support and 
involvement from local managers. A community leader from Quesnel reflected on 
frustration surrounding reduced company involvement and focus on community 
planning:
There has been little diversification, which is the flipside of specialization. I wish 
that forestry company management would be proactive in terms of relating to the 
community on the issue of diversification. The approach of everybody that I have 
talked to is that “our best contribution is survival” . They do not see their job as 
being community development... We [the community] have not seen the types of 
leadership from the companies that I would have hoped for in terms of economic 
development planning with council. (Q21)
Despite the potential benefits to companies, managers were not likely to take 
prominent leadership roles in economic development planning. This has created a 
dilemma because managers continue to be a valuable local source of expertise and 
knowledge. However, this expertise has not been utilized to address economic 
development to any great extent. This is part of an overall trend of withdrawal from 
previously held roles (see Chapter 6). Companies assumed that over time local leaders 
would eventually emerge to fill gaps. However, due to the structural characteristics of 
resource town economies this has not always happened. To account for this, some felt
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that councils needed to change their approach to planning given the state of the forestry
sector and relationships. Diversification efforts would be better served if councils pursued
favourable economic development opportunities and planning scenarios while engaging
companies strategically on an issue-by-issue basis. By doing so, councils may be able to
increase their chances of securing critical support for important projects:
Some people are saying that the issue [with the forestry sector and community- 
company relationships] is related to non-local ownership. I don’t think that the 
companies are out to get us. Companies are there to make money and as such their 
priorities are not community development. You just need to know that and move 
forward. (M22)
Lack of diversification initiatives were related to the high degree of specialization
within the local economies. The historic strength of the forestry sector contributed to the
development of service industries that support forestry. While these businesses have
reduced dependence on individual mills for employment, they have not reduced the
communities’ overall dependence on forestry. Forestry-dependent communities often
develop specialized local economies that utilize the same resource base with service
industries that support forestry companies (Teitelbaum et al., 2003). Communities need
to diversify in areas that complement one another so that they do not use the same
resource base or compete for labour. Diversification into other types of resource
development, depending on the commodities, may continue to degrade socio-economic
conditions and community well-being (Tonts et al., 2011). The leader of a community
organization in Houston outlined how substantial economic opportunities arising from
forestry contributed to the growth of a highly vulnerable and specialized local economy:
The best course of action [for local businesses] is to pursue [economic] 
opportunities available within the scope of [the big forestry companies]... All of
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the forest industries are linked and interconnected. This creates an issue when you 
face a downturn because when one goes down, they all go down. (H2)
In each of the communities, success of the forestry sector also stifled local 
diversification efforts because it attracted large proportions of available human capital. 
For many local businesses it was hard to retain employees because once they were 
trained, upgraded their skills, or gained various certifications they took higher paying 
jobs at the mills. As such, many other businesses remained underdeveloped which only 
contributed to dependence and vulnerability. A community leader from Mackenzie 
reflected on the structural issues inhibiting the development of new businesses, “There is 
not a lot of diversity within the community’s economic base. It is hard to start new 
ventures because people get trained and end up moving to the mills” (M24).
Negative public perception of forestry-dependent communities was also 
detrimental to initiatives aimed at attracting investment to the local economy. For 
example, in Mackenzie this negative public perception has hurt efforts to build a tourism 
industry and cultivate other economic opportunities. Municipal council and many 
businesses struggled to attract and retain investors and labour because the community 
was often portrayed as ‘dying’. Mackenzie was continually invoked as a dramatic 
example of this during the recession when it was heralded as dead within the national and 
international media32. Local leaders worried that they may never be able to overcome this 
stigma:
There is a negative perception of the forest industry. People see it as a sunset 
industry. There is a negative perception of the town right now; people view 
Mackenzie as a “dying town”. With those perceptions how many people will want
32In February, 2008 the Washington Post published an article (Faiola, 2008; A01) outlining how the US 
housing collapse had crippled the US and Canadian forestry sectors. The article used Mackenzie to 
illustrate the personal and community impacts of the global recession.
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to live here? If that is our image, how do you grow? People with this perception 
are not going to be willing to invest in the town. (M24)
As a result of dependence and lack of diversification, stability of the study 
communities’ economies remains susceptible to global competition, market fluctuations, 
restructuring, and availability of natural resources. This was especially evident in 
Mackenzie where all of the major mill facilities had shut down in the 2007-2010 period. 
As a result, the local economy was devastated as the unemployment rate reached 70% 
(Nelsen et al., 2010).
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a disparity between how companies 
and communities view the nature of their relationships. Communities’ view of 
relationships remains anchored in practices established during Fordism where companies 
committed to a wide range of activities and obligations beyond providing jobs. Most 
notably, communities hold fast to the idea that resource usage should be linked to the 
stability of employment and the functioning of a desirable and attractive community. 
Conversely, from the firm’s perspective, the nature of community-company relationships 
continues to centre on addressing the needs of capital; involvement has always been 
determined by economic considerations. Companies are not involved with communities 
out of benevolence, but out of necessity. Engagement in community functions, 
organizations, and events was motivated by the need to run profitable, efficient 
operations with little community resistance. The tension that results from these disparate 
conceptualizations and expectations has challenged many of the long-held assumptions
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about what communities can and should expect of forestry companies in terms of 
involvement, governance, employment, and funding. The next chapter further examines 
how companies have largely withdrawn from local involvement in response to economic 
restructuring within the forestry sector.
This chapter also focused on the important role the recent recession has played in 
highlighting to communities how much companies have changed their involvement and 
obligations. Until recently many communities in the northern Interior had been sheltered 
from restructuring by virtue of the size and efficiency of their mills. Government and 
industry refer to the northern Interior as a model for efficiency and success in the face of 
change. For communities like Houston, Mackenzie, and Quesnel concentration of the 
forestry sector continued to benefit local economies until very recently. As such, 
longstanding issues associated with continued resource dependence have not been 
addressed and the ability of communities to persist under flexibility is only beginning to 
be critiqued. Analysis also indicated that negative aspects of flexibility were not fully 
visible prior to the recession. This has left communities to address the implications of 
resource-dependence and restructuring at a particularly inopportune time. As companies 
have pulled back and closed mills in response to the recession, communities are faced 
with limited finances, reduced participation by local management, negative perceptions 
of the region that have discouraged new investment, greater demand for services, and 
high amounts of turnover and outmigration. Communities are realizing the need for 
change at the very moment that they are least able to institute change.
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Chapter 6: Findings: How Relationships Have Changed
This chapter addresses the research question “How have community-company 
relationships changed over time?” This question was explored by asking interviewees to 
compare and contrast different aspects of company involvement in community 
functioning over time. Secondary data were used to triangulate findings by verifying 
events and actions and providing additional details, perspectives, and context. This builds 
upon Chapter 5 by examining the ways in which companies have changed their 
involvement and roles within communities. The chapter unpacks how local forestry 
sectors have changed for communities, and the ways that flexibility has been extended 
beyond production and extraction activities into various aspects of community life and 
functioning. Doing this involved exploring how different processes operating at multiple 
scales and how neoliberal discourses have worked to reshape the northern Interior’s 
forestry sector.
This chapter is divided into three sections focusing on how companies have 
pursued flexibility within communities. The first explores how companies have gradually 
withdrawn from many former obligations and activities. Companies have achieved this 
by asserting the need for creating and increasing local efficiencies in the face of 
globalization of the forestry sector. The second outlines changed relationships with 
municipal governments characterized by the adoption of an increasingly indirect role in 
local governance. Companies have effectively used this position to lobby municipal
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councils to create flexible local business environments suitable to the increasingly 
volatile nature of the forestry sector. The third explores how companies have changed 
how they conduct business within communities.
6.1. Gradual retrenchment from community involvement
Community members readily identified different periods in community-company 
relationships during Fordism and after the recessions of the 1980s. Different terms were 
used to describe these periods, however, most asserted that companies started pulling 
back on community involvement after the deep recessions of the early 1980s. This shift 
was characterized as a move from a paternalistic to a hands-off approach, a holistic 
business approach to a narrower focus on profitability, family-run companies to global 
multi-national companies (MNCs), proactive involvement in community to detachment, 
or a focus on community stewardship to business management. In each of the 
communities interviewees indicated that, “the change in community-company 
relationships has been gradual and evolutional” (M21). After these crises, companies: (1) 
sponsored fewer events and provided fewer donations; (2) paid less attention to the 
functioning of the community; (3) reduced programs for employees; (4) reduced 
communication with the community; and (5) increased pressure on municipal council to 
reduce taxation.
Decreasing or erratic donations and financial support for community initiatives 
were a reoccurring concern. Support was considered an important component of healthy 
community-company relationships. In fact, donations and sponsorships were commonly 
used as a rough measure of overall company engagement. Community members often
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conflated ‘community support’, ‘level of commitment’, and ‘being part of the
community’ with high levels of donations and sponsorship. A businessperson from
Quesnel commented on how forestry companies became the primary providers for many
community events and functions:
They [forestry companies] very much saw themselves as being part of the 
community. They were very community-oriented... Everyone went to the mills 
for funding. If you needed money for sponsorship you automatically went to the 
mills because they were big financial supporters. I mean if you were hosting an 
event or fundraiser the mills would pitch in. (Q17)
For instance, community members were likely to classify a company as ‘supportive’ if 
donations were easy to obtain and the level of financial support was sufficient. Moreover, 
financial support by companies for community infrastructure and scholarships and 
bursaries were viewed as indicators of strong relationships.
Beginning in the 1980s, levels of company support became less predictable due to 
economic volatility within the forestry sector. Company involvement, participation, and 
support for community initiatives were closely associated with profitability. As a result, 
local relationships became strained or tense during periods of decreased profitability. In 
the words of one forestry worker in Houston, “strained relationships are usually a result 
of economic uncertainty. The relationships are like those found in a family really. 
Strained relationships happen when there is economic hardship. Things are really 
different in periods of profit” (H4). Many felt that corporate managers were more likely 
to make decisions that impacted the community using a narrower economic calculus than 
they were in the past. A community leader from Quesnel explains how financial and in- 
kind support are envisioned and increasingly linked to economics:
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You could say that donations from companies reflect their level of community 
support at any given time... I think that when times get tough for companies it 
impacts their level of support for different things and organizations. From the 
stories you hear around town, when times are good it is easier to get some support 
form the mills. When times get lean they [companies] are looking at the bottom- 
line and that money dries up... (Q8)
One of the largest implications of changing relationships for local people was the
need to self-fund or secure funding from the local business community. While forestry
companies provide the majority of funding for community organizations, events, and
infrastructure, support has declined over time. As one interviewee in Mackenzie stated,
“companies have seriously tightened the finances. Wherever they could cut things out
they did. The cash flow from the company has been dried up” (M23). Companies began
limiting donations to specific organizations or events rather than providing monies for
every request they received.
The current recession illustrated the need for communities to reduce reliance on
corporate donations and support. As one community member indicated, “Downturns also
led to less funding which resulted in shrinking services over time. This led to community
members having to bear the financial burden associated with corporate withdrawal”
(M20). For most of the northern Interior, this most recent recession has been unique
because in the past donations and support from companies persisted during periods of
labour unrest and downturns. In Mackenzie, the current recession marked a significant
break from the past where corporate contributions towards high school scholarships and
bursaries were slashed:
I don’t know if any of them [forestry companies] have scholarships available.
This town one year had something like $43,000 in local and regional scholarships 
available to our high school grads. If they get $10,000 this year I will be really 
surprised. [In the past] Each company would give something. The local groups
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and businesses can’t because everything is suffering as a result [of the downturn 
in forestry]. (M l6)
Many community members and organizations were frustrated with the reduction
in corporate donations because they are dependent on support for many activities.
Reduced funding has been met with resistance and frustration but community members
have few options for recourse. In most cases, communities have looked internally to
replace funds, which has become increasingly difficult in an atmosphere of job loss and
overall employment instability:
People begrudge the companies to a certain extent because it seems like they 
don’t care as much anymore. They don’t have the same benefits such as parties, 
picnics, or events. Those types of events show people that they are not just about 
the bottom-line. (M l2)
People in this community have been fortunate and have had so many good times 
that they always expect it to be good. People are used to the cushy times. Even 
though they have tightened their belts they do not expect the companies to do it. 
They still expect the good times now. Most people say “They’ve always done it” . 
People here are too used to cushy times. They did not expect companies to tighten 
their belts in terms of spending. For instance, companies used to pay for family 
skating. They do not anymore. Some people are bitter about that. Some see the 
companies as making millions of dollars so they are seen as being able to afford 
to support the community. (H5)
Job loss associated with automation and rationalization of industry has played an 
important role in changing community-company relationships. Economic restructuring 
has hastened the steady decline in the number of people employed in the forestry sector. 
A mill worker from Mackenzie outlined how automation impacted labour: “in terms of 
working within the mills, workers have been replaced by algorithms across the entire 
industry” (M21). Prior to restructuring, unions and communities accepted mechanization 
and automation so long as it led to the creation of other high wage jobs (Hak, 2007).
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However, analysis revealed that the reduction in the number of forestry sector jobs have
exacerbated a number of long-standing barriers to community development.
Economic restructuring has reduced the number of people directly and indirectly
employed in high-paying forestry jobs, which has eroded the municipal tax base (Ostry &
Davis, 2009). While production levels have increased from the 1960s to the 1990s the
number of people employed in sawmills, pulp and paper mills, and logging have steadily
decreased (Marchak et al., 1999). Companies argued that restructuring has reduced the
number of people employed in resource extraction and processing but has allowed
industry to remain competitive, thereby securing the remaining jobs. A former mill
manager in Houston described the benefits arising from restructuring like this:
The tangible change has been that there has been a drop in the population of the 
community over time. Higher technology means that workers need to be skilled to 
work in the sector. People in the community are beginning to come around.
.. .They see that change in the forestry sector was necessary and it allows for the 
mills to continue operating here. (H I7)
Labour shedding within the mills was identified as a key factor in company withdrawal 
over time. As companies employed fewer workers they reduced their connection to the 
community. One community leader in Quesnel felt that, “The fewer people you [forestry 
companies] employ the less community driven you become” (Q ll). While companies 
may employ a smaller percentage of the local labour force than they have in the past, they 
still represent the primary economic engine of the local economy.
Companies downplayed the magnitude of change, noting that most of the trends 
occurring since the recession can be observed in other industrial sectors. The changes that 
happened within the Interior’s forestry sector were seen as necessary to address issues of 
declining profitability so companies could remain competitive and survive. Mill
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managers felt that people’s perceptions of past relationships were biased by time and
were currently unrealistic:
[Now] there is a difference between what is expected of companies and what 
actually is done. You cannot go back to the old days because the whole world has 
changed. Today people do not like the relationship with large consolidated 
companies. They talk about the “good old days”. It is more to do with perception 
than with the actual relationship. They should realize that when companies are 
given the opportunities to invest in their mills they have an opportunity to survive. 
(H17)
Some viewed changes to the community-company relationships as inevitable,
asserting that communities should realign their expectations accordingly. They indicated
that there were challenges and opportunities associated with change and communities
needed to rework how they addressed issues. Changes to relationships were viewed as a
necessary strategy that helped both companies and communities survive over time.
Companies were forced to change relationships with communities to survive.
They had to go to multinationals to survive. They had to cut costs and it allowed 
[our local mills] to keep going. The issue came down to profitability and survival 
of operations. That is like anything in the world when you think about it. (M l)
For residents, as forestry companies became bigger through consolidation, there 
was less focus on things beyond profitability. As a result, mill workers became less 
attached to their jobs and were wary of their future in the community and the forestry 
sector. This disconnect was partially responsible for eroding personal attachment to 
companies and jobs over time (Reed, 2003b). Although detachment between employees 
and employers was contentious, it has not been strong enough to instigate many career 
changes as workers have few alternatives to working in the mills and many are tied to the 
community through the housing market. A mill worker noted how relationships began to 
change for individual workers beginning in the 1980s, “People feel separated from the
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company and are not as loyal as they would have been in the past because companies
have adopted a more impersonal relationship with employees” (M l2). A joke by a union
leader in Mackenzie was particularly revealing of low morale within different mills:
[People] used to identify with a company because your friends, family, and in­
laws would all work on different shifts. People used to say that FFI stood for 
‘Friends, Family, and In-laws’. That has changed with today’s companies. Today 
people just approach the company as a means to a paycheque. (M6)
As mentioned in the previous chapter, companies’ views on community
involvement have changed from Fordism. For most community members withdrawal has
contributed to a palpable disconnect from individual companies. As has become
increasingly clear in the Interior companies can, and will, abdicate various roles and
responsibilities depending on profitability. While this may be nothing new to companies,
for a large contingent of community members it is a significant symbolic shift:
The forestry sector built the town and when they built the town they had a holistic 
attitude towards their responsibilities toward the town. The relationship between 
forestry companies and the community was symbiotic. In terms of attitude, 
forestry companies and the community were tightly linked. Companies viewed 
the town much like they viewed the mills, as part of their infrastructure. (M21)
The focus of the company is on productivity and business because they are under 
the gun facing hard economic times. Community issues are no longer on their 
radar, and it is understandable to a point but it has been a trend all along. This 
trend has been present all along but has been more visible lately. With Northwood 
it seemed like a “Houston” company, Canfor made it clear that it is not a Houston 
company. Canfor acts like a multinational corporation, and it is. (H2)
The real tangible change for communities was that during Fordism companies 
struck a better balance between addressing local issues and accumulating profits. Many 
viewed changes in community-company relationships as resulting from companies 
having to place a higher priority on profitability than in the past. Analysis also indicated
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that the roles companies played within communities changed. Over time, companies had
distanced themselves from being active participants within the community. Local
managers and community members agreed that companies increasingly focused on issues
related to the operation of mills.
We have also seen a responsibility shift on the part of forestry companies from the 
community to the shareholder. Companies do not view themselves as “stewards of 
the community”. [Now] they are responsible to the market and the shareholders. 
[Local managers] don’t see themselves as builders and creators but rather as 
business managers. They respond to markets and share value rather than to the 
greater good. (M21)
Twenty to thirty years ago companies were more involved in partnering with 
communities then they are today. Participating in things like donations, events, 
assisting the town in capital improvements were much more common thirty years 
ago. BVFI essentially built Houston. The subdivisions, houses, and infrastructure 
were built by BVFI. They were really tremendous corporate partners with the 
town of Houston. They used to have large Christmas parties. Times have always 
been tough, but there is not that same commitment to be part of the community 
today. Today it is more about providing employment. [In the past BVFI] were a 
tremendous partner with the town and held big parties and events. This approach 
was a commonly accepted practice for companies during this time. (H13)
For forestry workers, the atmosphere within the workplace became increasingly 
impersonal over time. The shift towards a ‘business only’ approach slowly weakened 
employee and community morale. Mill workers indicated that there was increasing 
pressure on local managers to become “top quartile producers” (M6) which narrowed 
their focus on issues related to mill productivity. For mill workers and their families, the 
changing priorities of local management had significant implications for job satisfaction 
and quality-of-life:
There is more pressure on employees now with the different companies. There is 
generally less concern for the individual employee, less importance placed on the 
individual. The concern for the employees is not the same as it used to be. (M l8)
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There used to be more money and the companies used to do a better job of 
appeasing workers and the community. Companies used to play the “nice guy” 
role within the community. They hosted Christmas parties at no costs to their 
employees. Now they charge money for tickets. There used to be incentives 
provided by companies for housing, this does not exist any longer. There has been 
a lot of hostility towards this change. Not much has been done proactively to 
address the changes. (Q18)
Increasing dissatisfaction and detachment amongst mill employees had
implications for the entire community. Greater employee detachment negatively impacted
community cohesion because it contributed to reduced participation in community
events, organizations, and volunteering. A community leader in Mackenzie and a union
leader in Quesnel describe how uncertainty in forestry has impacted volunteerism by
community members:
Because of this separation they [forestry companies] are not really part of the 
community. As a result people within the community tend to care less as they are 
not personally invested in the mill or company. This results in a situation where 
everyone is disconnected leading to stress and strain within the community.
(Ml 6)
Commitment is much harder to do on the part of workers and company. People do 
not invest themselves in the community or their jobs. Companies do not invest 
themselves in the community. Mills are just viewed as assets to be bought and 
sold. This approach has eroded volunteerism because people do not have an 
optimistic attitude. It is hard to get people involved. (Q18)
Reduced employee attachment also meant that fewer families were inclined to 
encourage their children to pursue work within the forestry sector. Many forestry workers 
did not want their children to work in manufacturing or logging because of the inherent 
uncertainty and instability. The atmosphere of detachment in the workplace and 
restructuring of the sector contributed to feelings of uncertainty and instability. This
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created a dilemma for those who wanted to stay within community, as opportunities for
employment outside of forestry are becoming increasingly limited.
Companies had a high status in the community in the past, now they are not as 
respected as they used to be. People are becoming less trustful of the forestry 
companies, but not enough to learn another trade. People used to encourage their 
kids to work in the mill but that has changed now... Kids in town are at loose 
ends. (Q19)
Company retrenchment changed the roles of managers in the community. Many
felt that the autonomy of local managers had declined beginning in the 1980s. Some
interviewees associated this shift with company retrenchment. Local managers had less
power to appropriate money for local initiatives or account for local idiosyncrasies. A
mill employee and a community leader in Mackenzie note that local managers
increasingly have to contend with difficult decisions made in distant corporate offices
during economic restructuring:
The “generational change” between companies has seen more and more decisions 
being made farther away rather than locally. It makes it harder for appropriations 
for the community. They were a lot more involved in the old days. Involvement 
and support has become less and less over time... Local managers do not have the 
autonomy to make spending decisions anymore. (M21)
For example, Pope and Talbot have tried to retain some skilled workers but a lot 
left. Again, locally, mill managers are really, really aware of how hard it is to get 
people to come to the community. In Oregon, where they are making the 
decisions for Pope and Talbot they don’t really understand as much. You have 
two different ways of looking at the situation but the decisions are ultimately 
made in a place that is perhaps not well integrated or aware of local issues. (M22)
6.2. Companies and municipal government
Over time, companies have decreased their direct involvement in municipal 
politics and governance. However, companies remain key players in municipal 
governance by influencing planning, agendas, service provision, and vision for economic
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development. Analysis also found that companies continue to directly engage municipal 
councils over taxation. Indirect involvement has been successfully encouraged by 
invoking the ideology of globalization to promote the importance of accommodating 
capital (Mitchell, 1997). Company discourse regarding the apparent ‘footloose’ nature of 
capital and increasing irrelevance of space has influenced communities to make 
themselves attractive places for investment. In essence, communities believe they are 
actively competing with one another for industry jobs. However, communities had little 
to bargain with other than creating favourable municipal conditions via regulation, or 
lack thereof; providing land for development (Harvey, 1989); and reduced taxation levels 
and expenditures (Bliss et al., 1998; Bowles et al., 2002; Warf, 2008). This occurred 
against a backdrop of changing corporate citizenship duties and declining economic 
benefits to communities, which has adversely impacted community well-being (Bliss et 
al., 1998). The most recent dealings also occurred during a time of unprecedented crisis; 
take-it or leave-it positions are harder to resist during times of hardship.
Companies maintained close relationships with municipal governments in order to 
address community issues that affected local operations. Regarding the level of influence 
held by companies, a community leader in Houston stated, “[Forestry] companies view 
themselves differently than other businesses. They tend to be less vocal than other 
businesses in town but when they talk they expect people to shut-up and listen” (H I9). 
Local businesspeople indicated that municipal councils have always adopted an 
accommodating approach to forestry companies. These interviewees felt that company 
issues and complaints take priority. Municipal councils were far less likely to challenge
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forestry companies over minor issues because they were cornerstones of the local
economy. One local businessperson in Houston stated that:
[Municipal council] is very supportive of the big guys [forestry companies and 
large contractors] but they give lots of hassle to the little guys. Small companies 
put up with the local politics because we have no choice. Small companies have 
to fight to get things done especially to get things from the district like [name of 
service omitted], (H9)
Over time municipal governments saw themselves as integral components in
stabilizing local mills. Municipal councils ensured issues raised by companies were
addressed and worked diligently to accommodate the needs of forestry companies.
Councils worked closely with industry to attract and retain investment in local mills. A
clear example was in Mackenzie during this recession where municipal government
worked with Canfor and the provincial government to keep their local sawmill operating
at a reduced capacity for as long as possible:
W e’ll go back a year. When Canfor, the major company, decided they needed to 
do some shutdowns, they were looking at shutting this one [the Mackenzie mill] 
down and 450 people [would be out of work]. So when the province and the 
community got involved we worked out some ways for them to keep running. We 
lost about 130 people at that time. [Now] they are down to about 110 now out of 
the 450, but they are still trying to run. This whole issue with the global forest 
industry is trying to be the last man standing. So we are pulling in our belts and 
giving whatever we have, and we will be the last man standing. That is the way 
they are looking at it. (M l6)
Each council worked to stabilize existing jobs and secure future employment 
opportunities to ensure community survival. In this regard, community members viewed 
relationships as being reciprocal. A leader of a community organization from Quesnel 
noted “the city and the companies work together because there are incentives on both
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sides to maintain the relationship. The city and companies work well together because it 
is in the best interests of everyone” (Q2).
An important aspect of creating hospitable conditions for industry involved
competing with other places to attract and retain capital by moving away from focusing
primarily on the provision of services (Cox & Mair, 1988; Furuseth, 1998; Harvey, 1989;
Young 2008). This competition, or entrepreneurialism, is linked to policy shifts that
limited state involvement in local development. Under this new framework, local
governments are responsible for competing for funding dollars to support local
development (Young & Matthews, 2007). However, as the case of Mackenzie illustrated,
the outcomes of local and regional development initiatives are varied and ‘unruly’ in that
some communities have progressed while others are further marginalized (Furuseth,
1998; Hayter, 2000a; Tonts et al., 2011).
Various organizations and municipal councils worked with industry in different
ways to support local relationships. Strategies often centred on adopting flexible policies
designed to adjust for, and accommodate, the needs of industry. In Houston, the
municipal council formally adopted an ‘industry friendly’ atmosphere in an attempt to
attract and retain industry. This strategy was aimed at creating a local setting favourable
to industry to stimulate investment and stabilize local employment. A community leader
and mill manager outlined how the community worked to support industry by
distinguishing itself from other communities in the region, respectively:
We have an open door policy in Houston, we are open for business... we are 
readily available to look at business opportunities. We have a “pro-business” 
attitude here. We have had that for a while. This attitude is related to the fact that 
we see ourselves as being an industrial community. I mean that is what we are, so 
let’s take advantage of that and try to be proactive and look at any opportunities 
that come our way, with open doors and open minds. We as council have a good
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relationship with the two companies [Canfor and Houston Forest Products] 
because we try to work with them. Our policies are there as guidelines, they are 
not there to handicap or put up barriers to business. (HI6).
The community is helping companies by creating a climate that is conducive to 
attracting and running a business. The “Bums Lake culture” is opposed to big 
corporate conglomerates in favour of small operators. They actually are going 
head to head with business. In Houston people are supporting industry and are 
looking to support industry instead of having them go it on their own. We are 
trying to create a climate to attract investment and expertise.... There are people 
in this town that think that way [referring to the “Bums Lake culture”]. They have 
their heads in the sand and do not realize that the world has changed. (H I7)
In Quesnel, municipal council worked with companies to secure the construction
of a new $105 million sawmill by giving a $600,000 tax exemption to West Fraser (West
Fraser Timber Co. Ltd., 2005) “per year for 10 years on the municipal portion of its [the
mill’s] property taxes” (City of Quesnel, 2009, p.28). This was a strategic effort by the
city to secure reinvestment in a local mill to promote diversity and stability within the
local sector. A community leader, a forest sector worker, and a union representative
elaborated on Quesnel’s efforts to support the local forestry sector, respectively:
I don’t know if you know that the city gives revitalization exemptions, which is a 
property tax exemption that we gave specifically to West Fraser. The value of 
eliminated property taxes is a total of six million dollars over ten years. So we did 
that intentionally to try to assist them to get their new plant running and to bring 
some diversity into the area. The diversity being, the relocation of their head 
office jobs and the sales jobs to the area. (Q8)
There has also been an increased awareness over the need to be responsible of the 
part of the city to encourage reinvestment. This has resulted in tax exemptions for 
the recent West Fraser mill. Both community and industry are talking and being 
responsive to the state of the [forestry sector]. (Q22)
Council and forestry companies work well together here. The council worked 
with West Fraser and provided incentives for them to invest in the “supermill” . 
Council runs down the middle to make things work. They are very 
accommodating to industry in other words. (Q18)
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Companies and communities worked well together on issues pertaining to
operations unless either was under financial strain. When either was faced with economic
hardship, the tenor of relationships shifted from cooperative to adversarial. A community
member highlighted this change, “[companies] are seeing a squeeze and mills are
tightening up their spending. This contributes to strains on the community-company
relationship” (Q12). At the local level financial hardship usually prompted companies to
lobby municipal governments for tax concessions. An interviewee from Quesnel
described the effect that profitability has on the relationship between companies and
municipal government:
Most of the issues between the companies and the city were around things they 
needed to conduct business. If a company wanted something they got it, they 
really did not interfere with the town. When money ran low things became more 
adversarial. It is easy to be generous when you’ve got lots. It became more 
confrontational for local government because it is hard to get along if you have no 
money. For years if the municipality had no money the companies would just kick 
in. Everywhere you look there are things that have been donated by the different 
companies. When that dried up it put pressure on the municipality. (Q19)
Companies’ roles in these efforts were predominantly indirect. Municipal councils
have adopted agendas that favour forestry companies, with little direct involvement from
company personnel. Council members with ties to forestry were primarily responsible for
advancing company agendas. Most council members had a vested interest in establishing
conditions that contribute to the profitability of the local sector. When asked to reflect on
the indirect nature of company involvement in municipal politics and how it influenced
the community agenda, a union leader from Quesnel responded:
In terms of municipal politics it is sort of on the fringes. There are mill people on 
council. There is a bias towards the forest industry on town council from people 
that were involved in forestry on council. You could see it when committees were 
set up or [when] they talked about a community forest. The council always has
162
people on it that are linked to the forestry sector. Companies had their fingers in 
the political structure that is still there to some extent. You have seen that over 
issues with taxation. There is not as much direct involvement in local politics but 
pressure is there to reduce taxes and influence the agenda of council. (Q9)
In Houston, community members and leaders indicated municipal council
formally adopted a favourable approach to companies, consisting of policies aimed at
fostering the local forestry sector. During this research, the council was working with
industry to determine how to assist local mills with the goal of sustaining local
employment. For instance, the community decreased spending on events to adjust to
reduced tax revenue. As one community leader from Houston indicated:
I know for some of the other communities, such as Bums Lake, industry is within 
municipal boundaries so it may be different. I know this last year and even the 
year before we looked at our taxation and tried to address, although it may have 
been in a small way, the profitability of the local companies. We tried to reduce 
taxes [paid by the companies]. We looked at our rate this year and really did try 
and lower that. Although they [companies] had higher assessments we really tried 
to lower the taxation rate [to be] the same or lower than previous years because 
we knew they are hurting and tried to work with them that way...
We are looking to reduce taxation rates because we know that industry is 
hurting right now. We want to create policies in Houston that make it conducive 
for industry to come to town and sustain operations. We need to recognize that 
they cannot provide everything now. The council and some of the community 
recognize this point. If it is choice between keeping them going and shutting them 
down we need to recognize that they cannot be expected to do everything. This 
sentiment was communicated to the town through meetings and press releases. As 
a result, functions are adjusted. The prizes and extravagance does not have to be 
there. You have to tighten your belts and change the focus. The important or 
major events are still there. We just try to focus on the quality of community 
events, not the quantity. (HI6)
The ‘pro-industry’ approach adopted by council illustrated the uneven power distribution 
within the community. For example, councils tended to adopt a firm stance with residents 
and local businesses regarding issues such as air quality but did not challenge forestry 
companies. An interviewee from Houston noted the longstanding double standard within
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the community, “Council has passed bylaws encouraging high efficiency wood stoves
and low flush toilets [for residents] years ago but they were not willing to challenge
Canfor’s beehive burners” (H2).
Companies have taken a ‘hands-off approach to municipal politics in most cases.
Companies prefer to remain detached from municipal politics unless issues impact their
operations. Reflecting on this new approach by companies, a community leader in
Mackenzie stated, “Companies are more detached now, they are content to let the town
council run the town with little input from the company” (M24). Forestry companies
were able to adopt this approach “[when] local politics exerted less influence on the
corporate bottom-line, corporate leaders withdrew from local politics” (Beckley, 1996, p.
44). Regarding companies’ approach to municipal politics, an interviewee in Quesnel
stated, “The companies try to stay out of municipal politics and local decision-making.
They tend to stay within their area of expertise” (Q12).
Companies prefer to be indirectly involved in municipal politics in an “advisory
role” unless direct involvement is necessary (Q2). This approach increases flexibility as it
allows management to intervene or pullback as issues arise and priorities change. A
community member from Houston, a mill manager from Mackenzie, and the leader of a
community organization in Quesnel outlined how companies have taken a ‘hands-off’
approach to municipal politics, respectively:
The companies were not really all that interested in community decision-making, 
planning, or politics. There was never any direct involvement with politics, but 
employees were involved. They never really get directly involved in things, they 
sponsor things and let the community take care of itself. They are not involved 
extensively in politics. (H I8)
In terms of politics the involvement by the companies has toned down now but it 
has not completely gone [away]. We still take issues to council. There has always
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been communication between company and community especially regarding big 
issues. Day to day plans have not been discussed but big issues certainly are.
(Ml 9)
Companies are involved in community affairs when it directly in their best 
interests... The attitude of companies towards the community all depends on 
where you sit, if you are in the boardroom in Vancouver you may not care about 
what happens in Quesnel, if you are a mill manager with a family then you 
probably see it quite differently. (Q10)
Community members had mixed feelings about the lack of direct involvement by
forestry companies in municipal politics. On the one hand, community members viewed
companies as valuable sources of local human capital that were underutilized in planning
and decision-making. However, communities were grateful for increased independence
from companies and indicated that there was no desire to return to paternalistic
relationships. The leader of a community organization from Quesnel summarized the
dilemma facing communities with regards to company involvement:
I think that companies operate fairly effectively within their sphere of influence. 
At the provincial level companies are often at the table talking about what they 
need to keep going. But in terms of local politics you don’t see or hear about 
[them being involved]...
If companies wanted to be involved in the community they could be 
highly influential. So the fact that they aren’t [involved] as much, maybe that’s a 
good thing. But on the other hand, maybe we are missing some really good 
management talent that exists [in companies]. In community like this that is so 
dominated by forestry having the forest companies at arm’s reach from your 
government is almost [as important] as the separation of church and state 
[laughs]. You want to kind of maintain that separation! (Q15)
One area of municipal politics in which companies frequently became directly 
involved was municipal taxation. Industrial taxation levels motivated companies to 
become involved in municipal politics. As one interviewee commented, “The main 
intersection between company and community are the efforts to reduce taxation. This is
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understandable from their point of view. Forestry towns have very high industry
taxation.” (Q21). Companies lobbied municipal councils over issues, plans, and
expenditures that affected, or were perceived to affect, their taxation levels. A community
leader from Houston stated that local mill managers approached municipal council
regarding reducing municipal taxation levels to help sustain local forestry companies:
The local managers came and talked to us about this issue [reducing taxation] and 
were pleased to see that we had already addressed this in our budget deliberations. 
We really worked hard, and acknowledged the issues in the forestry sector. It is 
widely known here, and across the province that industry pays the majority of 
municipal taxation. We see lowering taxation as a way to attract new industry. If 
we can lower our rates it will encourage other industries to come. It will also 
encourage industry to reinvest in infrastructure here. I mean, if rates stay the 
same, why would anyone want to reinvest or come to the community? (H I6)
A corporate employee from Quesnel outlined the role taxation plays in company
involvement in municipal politics:
In terms of municipal politics, companies are involved to a small degree. In terms 
of influence we try to be involved. Companies have formed the Industrial Rate 
Payer Group to review where we think the [municipal] budgets should be, 
especially as they relate to our taxes and around industry. (Q7)
The most vivid example of company involvement regarding taxation was in 
Quesnel where companies formed the Industrial Ratepayer Association to address 
industrial taxation, a longstanding local issue. During this research, taxation was a 
significant issue as companies felt municipal taxes should be flexible so as to 
accommodate conditions faced by companies during crises. For instance, companies 
framed recent lobbying efforts as being driven by the recent recession. A municipal 
leader from Quesnel indicated that companies increased pressure on council to reduce 
costs during the economic downturn:
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From the perspective of the mills, they are very focused on their bottom-lines now 
and are concerned with losing lots of money. We [the community] represent a 
“cost centre” to them, and similar to other “cost centres” they would like us to be 
lower cost and not come after them for so much money on taxation. (Q8)
In response, council worked to reduce taxation in an effort to secure investment, address 
stability of the local sector, and reduce dependence on industrial taxation.
Some community leaders from Quesnel viewed high industrial taxation levels as 
being ‘inequitable’ and ‘unfair’ because it composed a large proportion of the city’s total 
tax base. Council wanted to address the imbalance between residential and industrial 
taxation to address the viability of industry. However, community members felt that 
municipal taxation only accounted for a small portion of each company’s operating costs, 
making the impact of reduced municipal taxation negligible on the sustainability of local 
industry. Moreover, mill managers and community leaders did not address the 
disproportionate requirements and impacts on infrastructure of industrial users relative to 
residential users:
Changing the amount of industrial taxation can be connected to the Industrial 
Ratepayers Group, we get prompts from them all of the time. The Competition 
Bureau of BC put out a report [stating] that industry is getting gouged by 
municipalities. They say that municipalities do not provide services to industry in 
proportion to what they receive in taxation from industry. The Competition 
Bureau suggested that residents in industrial towns get a free ride and that 
industry pays the whole shot.
Based on that comment we took a look at ourselves and said yes we are 
probably not being equitable to our industry here... One of the solutions they 
[The Competition Bureau] came up with was to lower municipal taxes even 
though in the grand scheme of things municipal taxes are a drop in the bucket for 
these companies. But it is a fixed cost and every company wants to lower their 
fixed costs. There was also a feeling by council that taxation was not equitable. 
Four years ago the industrial ratepayers accounted for over two-thirds of the tax 
base while the majority of services [provided by the city] were residential. Most 
people would agree that is a problem. Council realizes that it is not fair. Over the 
years council has changed and some are more “pro-business” and less about low-
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cost services. So I guess there are internal and external drivers in terms behind 
taxation issues in Quesnel. (Q8)
Community leaders stated that companies pressured council to reduce taxation on
the basis that they do not use many of the services provided. Local leaders indicated they
have to consider companies’ opinions when planning services and infrastructure budgets.
As one interviewee in Houston stated, “If you are going to fund services or infrastructure
with tax dollars it is often contentious with industrial ratepayers if they do not use the
service. The needs of industry affect decision-making regarding funding with taxation
dollars” (HI9). Similarly, a mill manager in Quesnel asserted that communities need to
consider the state of forestry when spending tax dollars, especially during downturns:
The number one issue for industry in Quesnel is taxation. We see that other 
resource towns are working with industry to reduce taxes. We also need to 
address spending. A multiplex is being proposed and the community will be 
looking to industry to pay. Is this the right time to be spending money? Questions 
like this largely fall on deaf ears. Let us get out of the ditch then let us look at 
pursuing projects. Industry has had good times over the years but now industry 
needs to change and it is not. (Q23)
Information sharing also started declining beginning in the 1980s. For different 
community organizations it became harder to access information regarding the local 
forestry sector. In instances when companies were bought and sold, various 
communication responsibilities were shuffled between the periphery and different 
corporate offices. This was also an issue for local company employees who had to 
contend with different corporate mandates, policies, and cultures. The recent recession 
made reduced communication a pressing issue. In Houston and Quesnel, reduced 
communication and information sharing raised concern regarding the future of the local 
forestry sector. In Mackenzie, the lack of communication and information sharing was a
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predominant issue because companies were not forthcoming about plans for the mills in 
the midst of shutdowns. In the absence of information from company officials during 
times of uncertainty, rumours became important sources of information and 
disinformation, which contributed to anxiety, insecurity, and instability (Bradbury & St- 
Martin, 1983).
For communities, it is becoming increasingly difficult to get information from 
forestry companies regarding future plans. Interviewees commonly indicated that, 
“corporate cards are kept close to the chest, which leads to speculation within the 
community” (H2). A sentiment across each community was that it was getting harder to 
obtain information regarding companies’ plans for local operations. This made it 
especially difficult for community leaders and families to plan for the future. Many 
community members hoped that information regarding the future would be provided as 
needed. However, information regarding the sustainability of different mills was not 
shared with the community. As such, they felt that companies should take a larger role in 
communicating the implications of different environmental and economic scenarios with 
the community and employees. As one interviewee from Quesnel involved in forestry 
stated:
When you look to the future, in five years time there are going to be fewer mills 
here. West Fraser has enough timber to supply their big sawmill. The other 
companies are poor in terms of timber. I don’t think Tolko will be operating, 
Canfor might be... but you still see people enter into mortgages for houses that 
they can barely afford because they have got a toe into one of the mills in town. I 
just think that is unethical for the companies not to be up-front about their future 
plans. (Q6)
Many felt that companies reduced information sharing and communication as a 
strategic effort to remain competitive. Community members also speculated that
169
communication had reduced due to the increasing speed of change within the forestry
sector. Mill employees felt that because companies were dealing with rapidly changing
circumstances they simply did not have the time to communicate with communities
regarding their plans. They also felt that companies might not be sure of plans
themselves. As a retired forestry employee in Houston stated:
Information sharing is probably getting worse over time. This is probably related 
to the mountain pine beetle outbreak because things are changing fast making it 
hard to get information. We used to have five-year plans [in the forestry sector]. 
They may not anymore because of things like the pine beetle. (H3)
Some of the anxiety related to communication issues could be addressed if
dealings between municipal councils and companies were more transparent.
Communication between councils and managers was often conducted behind closed
doors with little public consultation. This contributed to uncertainty and anxiety within
the community especially during times of economic unrest:
Relationships are more secretive now meaning that there is less opportunity for 
information sharing with the general public. Now there is less opportunity for the 
general public to know what is going on. We just found out that Canfor asked for 
a tax break and I’m sure that they will get it. It was never a matter of public 
meeting or public agenda. It is not as bad as it used to be but people are 
discontent. (H2)
6 3 . The local business community
Companies also changed how they did business within the community after 
Fordism. The first change identified was the adoption of policies that reduced local 
purchasing. These policies were perceived to limit local management’s ability to account 
for local peculiarities. Second, companies increasingly sought to reduce costs by using 
large contractors. Companies also pressured existing contractors to reduce costs and
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assume more financial risks. These changes contributed to the loss of services within 
each community.
The adoption of centralized purchasing by forestry companies has become an
increasingly common practice over the past 20 years. Centralized purchasing was highly
detrimental to the local economies because of increased economic leakage. Local
businesspeople and community leaders indicated that companies purchased fewer
supplies and services from local businesses than at any other time in the past. A Houston
businessperson outlined changes in local purchasing practices over time:
I own a small business that supplied the mills. I supply the mills less today than 
before, there has been a shift.. .There was a centralization of purchasing which 
meant that less and less was being purchased locally... We started to see this shift 
thirty years ago towards bigger and better. Global operations and global products 
have made it hard for the local economy. There is this perception that nobody can 
compete with big box stores so people leave without giving local businesses a 
chance. It is a trend amongst companies and consumers. Economic leakage [from 
the local economy] is worse than it has ever been. (H6)
The leader of a community organization in Houston summarized how changed
relationships have impacted the local business community:
Both Northwood and Canfor have always had a central management style. This 
has meant that decisions are not always made locally. Houston Forest Products 
used to be better with local decision-making. However, it has lessened since the 
West Fraser takeover. The centralized management style affects the community in 
a number of ways. First, with central purchasing policies companies stopped 
purchasing things locally. For example, the stationary store is very good and gives 
very good prices. Companies prefer to buy in bulk from somewhere else and have 
it shipped in. Things are shipped in now from outside of the community. It is 
corporate policy so it happens whether it makes sense or not. Second, the 
corporate policy on contractors effectively pinches the profits of individuals. 
Companies are always looking to pinch logging contractors. That is one of the 
bigger concerns in the community. (HI)
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Businesspeople viewed centralized purchasing policies as rigid, limiting
managers’ ability to accommodate for local circumstances. Local businesses are being
used less by mills as main suppliers of goods and services. Companies only used local
businesses in emergency situations when they could not wait for parts or services to
arrive from regional services centres like Prince George, Vancouver, or Edmonton. As
one interviewee from Quesnel noted, “The local forestry industry is less ‘community-
based’. For instance, if managers want to purchase from one of the local businesses they
have to talk to a purchasing department in Edmonton.” (Q10). As a result, many local
businesses could not survive and were replaced by corporate franchises. Consolidation,
and the rise of large contractors (particularly in the logging sector), has reduced the
profitability of many local businesses. Community leaders in Mackenzie and Houston
described the adverse impacts of centralized purchasing policies on local economies:
Local managers are making fewer and fewer decisions and purchasing of goods 
and services is going to businesses in Prince George more and more. I mean we 
have lost services like BC Bearing. The services in Mackenzie that are used are 
generally on a Saturday night when they can’t get anybody else. Local businesses 
are used for emergency purposes only, not for day-to-day stuff. That has really 
hurt our industrial area.
We had this same problem when I worked at Northwood. The heavy 
equipment operator would come into the office mad because he needed stuff and 
he could get it in town but he was not allowed to because central purchasing got 
everything out of Prince George. Everything became slower and the local 
merchants just don’t have much of a chance to bid on these items.
When Abitibi shutdown we went and met with local businesses and that is 
something they all said. They weren’t getting the local business [from forestry 
companies] that they did historically. Local branches of big multinational 
companies like Finning get contracts. (M24)
Forestry companies used to book all of their travel through the local travel agents. 
That was for all travel, from millwrights to executives. Now arrangements are 
made out of Vancouver. [Companies also] used to order their stationary out of 
Houston, Prince George, or Smithers. For the most part they used to shop locally 
for stationary. Now it is bought from suppliers in Vancouver.
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There was a “marginal improvement program” when Canfor took over 
Northwood and was aimed at increasing the bottom-line. We lost services from 
the community as a result and there has been increased retail leakage to other 
places like Smithers and Prince George. Two or three machine shops in town are 
out of business because corporate business went to Prince George or Edmonton.
In fairness this was done to ensure high quality, but that is not true in every 
instance. Some work is done locally on a needs basis. (H2)
Businesspeople felt changed corporate policies ignored the variation between
communities. Businesses in small, remote communities do not have the ability to
compete with larger centres, but they often fulfil important roles for the mills and the
community. The loss of contracts from mills was enough to force bankruptcy in many
cases. As such, these policies were perceived to be too rigid because they restricted local
managers’ discretion by adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach to conducting business in a
highly varied region. As a result, many local businesses did not have an opportunity to
provide skilled services as corporate policies precluded them from contracts. A
businessperson in Mackenzie highlighted the relationship between economic leakage and
centralized purchasing:
It is also harder to get money or support from the big companies. Big companies 
also had centralized purchasing so money was not spent locally... The real change 
was in the way that companies interacted with the local business community. We 
started to see a shift towards purchasing from suppliers out of town. There is 
some feeling of being a number when dealing with the large companies. We lost 
lots of businesses and skilled guys from town because of it. (M l)
The rapid growth of a few companies within the Interior strengthened the 
bargaining position of companies with contractors. Community leaders and 
businesspeople were very concerned that the concentration of local forestry sectors in the 
hands of a few companies has made small business communities increasingly vulnerable. 
For instance, in Quesnel some businesspeople felt that West Fraser’s dominance of the
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local sector gave small businesses and contractors few options or leverage when
negotiating. Consolidation and corporate concentration in the northern Interior have
increased the power of forestry companies while increasing risk for local suppliers and
contactors. Local contractors have few options but to accept the terms of contracts
dictated by the mills:
If you are involved in the forestry sector locally you have to deal with West 
Fraser. If you have a falling out with them you may as well leave town. The 
current ownership situation is not healthy for the community. (Q6)
The squeeze is getting tighter and tighter. The bottom-line is becoming more and 
more important to the companies. This is squeezing out local contractors and 
forcing them to take whatever the mill decides to give them. Many of them are 
stuck taking the contracts because they would not be able to find work elsewhere. 
(H7)
When industry is cutting back, one of the first places they cut back is on the “out 
in the bush people” and on those contractors. And they cut them down and 
everything is so fine, like their profit margin is so fine, and you have a lot of 
trucks that are driving from so far away and their timeline is so short to get in. A 
company will go to a guy and say that we did a round trip in our pickup in one 
hour and 23 minutes so you should be able to do it in one hour and 25 minutes.
(Qll)
Another significant change involved contractors used by the mills. Rationalization
efforts by forestry companies had increased pressure on local contractors. The most
recent economic downturn has highlighted the adverse conditions and stress faced by
contractors. Forestry companies have moved towards awarding contracts to large,
independent contractors to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Large contractors are
more efficient because they can purchase specialized, expensive equipment.
Rationalization has forced many local contractors out of business:
During the time that I was in Houston there was a period of consolidation of 
contractors. It didn’t happen with HFP but with Canfor by its former owner 
Northwood. They looked at consolidating some of its contractors relative to its
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log supply. It happened between 1995 to 2000. From the community standpoint 
there was cause for concern from the wood side. It caused quite an uproar within 
the community and amongst the contractors. During this time period there was a 
move by the company towards using fewer logging companies in the bush. In a 
way it was introduced to address efficiency and costs. (H4)
During the 2008-2010 recession companies sought to reduce costs by demanding
concessions from communities, employees, and contractors. This is part of a trend by
forestry companies since the early 1970s to reduce costs to address decreased profitability
(Prudham, 2007). In 2009, Canfor demanded that contractors reduce costs by 10% to help
the company address the recession. Local businesspeople indicated that rationalization
and rising input costs increased pressure on an already strained industry. Most of those
interviewed indicated that experienced contractors were forced to operate at a loss or go
out of business (Patterson, 2008). A businessperson in Quesnel outlined how the
economic downturn increased pressure on local contractors:
We [the community] were all surprised to learn that recently one of the licensees 
cut 20 minutes off of the cycle time. The logging trucks already drive too fast 
under horrible conditions. It is unprecedented to take a look at cycle times, that 
are already dangerously short, and say, “we’re pinched for cash guys you have to 
drive faster.” I just don’t get it.... Well I guess I do, it is like everything else that 
happens with companies. It is money based but at some point somebody really has 
to take a look. It is unsafe for the drivers and the general population. It just means 
that it forces drivers to work longer, make one more trip, do something to make 
ends meet. This just places more stress on an already stressed out logging 
industry. This move will force experienced operators out of business and bring in 
inexperienced operators under the assumption that they can make some money if 
they really pinch. (Q19)
Since the 1980s, forestry companies have also removed many of the policies or 
contract provisions aimed at benefitting the community. These policies were viewed as 
part of a company’s commitment to the community. Many contract provisions and
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requirements designed to ensure money circulated within the local economy were
eliminated over time. A union leader in Mackenzie gave an example:
In the case of FFI contractors had to live in town. If you were a contractor you 
had to maintain a residence in the community. That was part of their commitment 
to the community... In the case of AbitibiBowater upper management was very 
concerned with share values. When you would talk to them it seemed to be all 
they cared about. There were no concerns for the workers or the community other 
than required statute things around safety. They never went above and beyond. 
That was a big change. (M6)
Changes to relationships have contributed to shrinking populations and the loss of
local businesses. These trends have made it hard for communities to justify, provide,
qualify for, and support many retail and government services due to shrinking population
sizes. This is particularly problematic because adequate local infrastructure and services
are required to develop successful diversification plans (Bliss et al., 1998). Without
sufficient infrastructure or services, communities have a difficult time attracting and
retaining businesses and people. With regards to retail services in the study communities,
job loss has contributed to the loss of local businesses. As such, economic leakage has
increased with commuting for shopping and services. Community leaders worried that as
local populations dwindle, they will not have sufficient population bases to qualify for
various social services. This trend is already occurring in each community as the erosion
of local services has forced some to commute to Smithers, Bums Lake, Prince George, or
Williams Lake. A community leader and a businessperson in Mackenzie described these
causes and impacts, respectively:
We do not have many of our own local services anymore, lots of them are from 
outside because you don’t have the population [to sustain them]. We have seen it 
with social services, education, and healthcare. All of this is [compounded] by 
globalization of the industry. All of these changes can be linked to this trend that
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reduces the number of people required in production and reduces the number of 
people within our communities... (M l6)
Our largest variety store is the Bargain Shop. We used to have a Northern Bay 
store that carried furniture and clothing. We used to have a SAAN store, that was 
very much a clothing store, but they went into receivership and had to downsize 
but we did not survive the cut. The Bargain Store that just sells candy and stuff, 
that is their business model. I mean, here we are a town of almost 5,000 and you 
can’t buy shoes for your kid. I feel badly for the family unit because not 
everybody wants to hop in a vehicle and spend a day in a larger centre shopping. 
We probably should have [looked to] grow or solidify the services that are 
available here. The selection for retail products just is not available here. (M4)
In Quesnel, a community member outlined how reduced employment in forestry will
impact the community’s service sector in the future:
Losing people will contribute to eroding the services and infrastructure within the 
community. We have seen head offices and government services moving to 
Williams Lake. This is a contentious issue within Quesnel but nobody is fighting 
it. People are now heading to Williams Lake for services and retail options. (Q11)
6.4. Conclusion
The 1980s recession was a catalyst for gradual retrenchment of companies from 
community affairs. This shift exposed a disjuncture between company and community 
perspectives on their responsibilities and obligations to each other. This recession 
emphasized for most that communities had fewer resources available to address crises. A 
key finding of this chapter was that forestry companies have framed their withdrawal 
from communities as being necessitated by the need for increased efficiency. Local 
management increasingly used economic considerations and the need to increase local 
competitiveness when withdrawing from or ceasing previously held responsibilities or 
activities. As a result, finances dedicated to community activities, organizations, and 
services gradually tightened up or were shifted to the community from the companies. On
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the whole, communities found there is currently less balance between meeting the needs 
of the community, local issues, and production. This has adversely impacted morale.
Interestingly, in response to withdrawal by companies, community members as 
well as local organizations and governments adapted to account for reduced resources 
and support. Despite stating that community issues are largely beyond their purview, 
companies remain heavily involved in municipal planning and regulation. Companies 
continue to work to minimize risks to profitability at the local level by being indirectly 
involved in local governance. By withdrawing from formal obligations, companies have 
been able to reduce demands upon managers and financial capital while retaining the 
ability to protect operations. Communities have tried to find a balance between 
accommodating industry and meeting the needs of community members. Individuals and 
community organizations have moved towards self-funded events and organizations, 
changed their expectations regarding amenities, reduced their personal attachment to 
companies, tried to create a local climate that is conducive to attracting and retaining 
industry, and experienced changes to service availability due to rationalization and 
centralization.
Company discourse justified changing relationships as being necessary to cope 
with changing economic realities in the forestry sector. They portrayed their actions as 
being ‘normal’ behaviour given the global state of the industry. Withdrawal was depicted 
as decreasing burdens on companies while increasing the freedom and independence of 
communities. The actions of companies indicated that it is the responsibility of 
communities to find new and innovative ways to address shortfalls during downturns. 
Community leaders tended to support this sentiment, asserting that it was incumbent
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upon communities to do more with less. In essence, companies have portrayed 
themselves as being helpless because restructuring was beyond their control due to 
hostile global circumstances and inhospitable local conditions (Mills, 2012). This chapter 
showed how companies have effectively utilized discourse to change community 
expectations regarding employment changes and involvement due to restructuring and 
they remain influential actors in local governance. Companies have also changed policies 
related to how business is conducted locally and this has resulted in the loss, or increased 
instability, of many local businesses. These changes have weakened communities, 
harming their abilities and capacities for community development.
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Chapter 7: Findings: Drivers of Change
In Chapters 5 and 6 ,1 addressed the nature of community-company relationships 
in forestry-dependent communities and how the relationships have changed with 
economic restructuring. This chapter addresses the research question, “What processes 
have driven changes in community-company relationships?” As outlined in Chapter 6, 
community-company relationships have gradually changed over time moving towards 
company retrenchment and community instability. This chapter explores the economic, 
political, social, environmental, and technologic processes that shape interactions 
between forestry companies and communities.
This chapter is structured around three drivers of change identified in the analysis. 
The first section outlines how globalization and consolidation of the Interior forestry 
sector have created new pressures on companies that have changed how local mills 
operate. The second section examines how corporate restructuring has changed the 
responsibilities, expertise, tenure, and skill sets of local managers and how these changes 
have impacted communities. The third section outlines how changes to forestry policy 
have not only eliminated ties to communities, but also represent an important symbolic 
shift in how community-company relationships are viewed by the province and by 
companies. It is important to note that these categories do not represent distinct, separate 
forces. Rather, each of these processes are interdependent.
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7.1. Globalization and consolidation of the Interior sector
Globalization of the forestry sector was identified as a primary driver behind
changing relationships. Common definitions of globalization included increased
competition within the global marketplace, changing demands of international
consumers, and changing forestry policy. In terms of companies within BC, globalization
was seen as forcing a widespread shift from local ownership to “multinational” (Q ll;
M6; M l; M7) or “global” corporations (M16; Q ll;  Q10). Changed relationships were
also linked to the increasing magnitude of global pressures regarding regulations,
competition, and market demands. Many felt that as companies began to manage
operations and issues across vast spaces in different regions, relationships were shaped
less by local institutions, issues, and history:
The attitude change on the part of companies has shifted from being community 
oriented to being globally oriented. Quesnel is just a small fish on the world 
stage... Globalization has driven the change in community-company 
relationships. It is more profit-driven and globally oriented. Communities are just 
one fish in the pond. I think that global issues have driven the changes in 
relationships. Things like global competition... (Q ll)
Increasing global connectivity was also identified as driving changing 
relationships. Companies framed their actions as being motivated by a continued struggle 
to compete in a global marketplace. As such, addressing flexibility within mills and 
communities helped to keep companies efficient, productive, and profitable. As a mill 
manager in Quesnel stated, “Everything is connected in the forestry sector from global 
prices of chemicals to local issues like the mountain pine beetle. The mills in BC and in 
Quesnel have to compete with every other mill in the world” (Q23). This strategy appears 
to have been effective (see Chapter 6) as mill workers in each community were well
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aware of their mill’s productivity in relation to others across the company, region, and
province. A mill manager in Houston outlined the importance of flexibility in the face of
changing global markets and increased competition:
Relationships have changed because world economies are opening up. This 
creates a need for resources all over the world. Look at emerging economies like 
China. These emerging economies will be the resurrection of the forestry sector 
because we will lessen our dependence on the American market... However, we 
have to compete with other countries [to supply those resources]. (H8)
The increasing size and scope of forestry companies was attributed to changing 
community-company relationships over time. Community members often characterized 
this phenomenon as a move away from ‘small locally owned’ companies towards ‘global 
forestry’ or ‘multinational forestry companies’. For instance, community members 
readily identified how MNCs gave less consideration to community obligations and 
involvement. However, from the mid-1950s onward, most companies in Houston, 
Mackenzie, and Quesnel have generally been large multinational companies. Therefore, it 
was unlikely that changing relationships can be adequately explained by changing 
ownership types of forestry companies alone. Rather, changes are better explained by the 
adoption of different approaches by firms to communities that were increasingly 
indifferent to local circumstances and institutions (Cox & Mair, 1988). As previously 
mentioned, locally owned companies were not found to have a greater degree of loyalty 
to individual communities. Furthermore, locally owned mills have to compete in the same 
global marketplace as their multinational competitors. As such, locally owned firms face 
the same pressures to reduce costs and uncertainty during periods of crisis. The 
predisposition to adopt practices that enhance community welfare is not assured by 
ownership type (Krogman & Beckley, 2002).
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Changing relationships are better explained examining the different demands
from global and local institutions following the 1980s. Rapidly changing environmental,
economic, political, social, and technological conditions instigated change in the regional
sector. Indeed, change in the economy of the Interior has always been constant and
drastic. It appears that companies adopted different relationships with communities when
they are faced with drastic changes in economic conditions. As companies faced
shrinking profit margins after the 1980s recession it was evident that restructuring was
required. Changes to how companies operated locally were one part of on-going
restructuring efforts. Mill workers generally shared the sentiment that, “As the money
evaporated out of the industry there was a necessity to [become] better and faster. It has
taken the economic slack out of the operations” (M l5). As profitability decreased,
companies adopted different approaches to communities:
The change in community-company relationships has been driven by the lack of 
profitability by individual companies. Companies with money didn’t get that way 
by being nice, they can’t afford to be compassionate big brothers. Companies are 
[no longer] creators [like they were in the past], today they are buyers and sellers. 
(M21)
In the Interior, companies responded to the crises in the 1980s and 1990s by 
consolidating. Forestry companies used consolidation strategically to lower costs and 
achieve economies of scale by increasing efficiency, optimizing production (usually by 
closing small, inefficient mills), integrating fiber usage, amassing tenure, and moving 
towards large-scale operations (Nelson et al., 2006; Parfitt, 2005; Sanderson, 2006). For 
forestry-dependent communities, consolidation and subsequent “capital intensification” 
has resulted in layoffs (Markey et al., 2005, p. 25), mill closures (Bowles et al., 2002; 
Reed, 2003b), and uncertainty. As a businessperson in Mackenzie stated:
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You also have the situation where companies are getting bigger and bigger. In the 
past when a company failed, it barely made a ripple in the water. Now you have 
large corporations and if they fall at a bad time it is a bigger kick that hurts more. 
What is the fallout of that for communities?
When Canfor has bought out companies they closed down mills. What 
does that do to a community like Mackenzie or Chetwynd? We are not going to 
operate again unless commodity prices rise so much that somebody else comes in 
and buys up the assets... When you look at the family tree of business, there are 
really only a few [companies] in the game. When big companies swallow small 
companies it usually results in closure. This has had big implications for forestry 
towns. (M4).
The impacts of consolidation were most visible within Quesnel where the West 
Fraser acquisition of Weldwood had several positive and negative implications for the 
community. In terms of the negative implications, consolidation essentially made 
Quesnel a company town. Now, Quesnel’s future is tightly linked both to the strength of 
the forestry sector and to the fortunes of West Fraser. There is also less local competition 
for skilled-labour and contracting services. As one local service provider stated, “initially, 
when the consolidation by West Fraser happened it was scary [for the community 
because] now everybody in town has the same email address, westfraser.com” (Q2). 
Recent rounds of consolidation are creating a “trend towards the re-emergence of the 
single company town” throughout the region (Bowles et al., 2002, p. 30).
At the community level, fewer companies resulted in fewer sources of funding, 
during a period characterized by shrinking corporate donations and support (as outlined 
in Chapter 6). Put differently, larger companies did not always donate larger sums of 
money for different community initiatives and organizations. As the leader of a 
community organization stated, “Look at this town, there are fewer companies in Quesnel 
now. We went from six or seven companies down to three or four. This means there are 
fewer companies to go to for donations for community projects now” (Q16).
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Consolidation also placed more pressure on remaining companies to provide the 
community and different community organizations with financial support. This created 
issues because if a company did not support events, groups, or causes then opportunities 
for securing funding were limited. In Quesnel, many community members commented 
that West Fraser is expected to play a large role within the community because of its 
prominence:
West Fraser may be nervous that Quesnel has essentially become a company 
town. This raises concerns over dependence and places pressure on them to 
provide things. It creates a situation where they face a never-ending revolving 
door of people wanting things. (Q21)
Consolidation was also linked to increasingly formalized relationships. 
Community members felt changes were increasingly guided by “corporate thinking” or 
the “corporate approach” (Q10). As companies become larger they had less time and 
lacked the ability to assess the local impacts of their decisions. Increased complexity was 
attributed to large consolidated companies having operations throughout the province and 
the world33. When describing the impact of large, consolidated forestry companies on 
community-company relationships, two leaders of community organizations from 
Quesnel, a Mackenzie businessperson, and a community leader from Mackenzie stated, 
respectively:
Locally owned companies had a different “respect” for the community. 
Multinational corporations have what can be described as a “loose connection” 
with the community. With locally owned companies the owners all lived here, 
they had to be part of the community. Multinationals still contribute to the 
community financially... but as the companies have become multinationals, there
33 For example, when looking at the major companies in the study communities during data collection, 
Canfor had 31 operations across BC, Alberta, Quebec, and the United States (Canfor, 2008), West Fraser 
had 40 operations across BC, Alberta, and the United States (West Fraser, 2008), and AbitibiBowater had 
67 operations in BC, Quebec, Ontario, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, the United States, 
England, Scotland, and South Korea (AbitibiBowater, 2008).
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has been a shift in focus away from community needs to shareholder needs. For 
example, when Canfor took over Slocan there was a big change in community 
focus. Canfor was less community oriented than Slocan. Also, Weldwood was 
very community oriented and was heavily involved in consultation. Locally 
owned companies worked with you and we have lost that with big companies.
(Q ll)
Consolidation by West Fraser affected the community-company relationship but it 
is difficult to say how. It is clear that [consolidation] is going to change it. If 
companies become global in their reach then the owners and senior decision­
makers are outside of the community then it will change how they will interact 
with the community. It is likely that mills will become numbers and they will be 
less likely to consider the community impacts. You can see that consolidation has 
driven a change [in communities] but it varies from place to place... (Q10)
When we look at how it [community-company relationships] works today we can 
look at Pope and Talbot as an example. They come in and run the mill, they are an 
American company out of Portland. They invested in different things that didn’t 
work out. So when you have a big corporation, and you have weaknesses in that 
corporation, it can hurt the community. You might have this [a local] mill making 
money, but it falls on hard times because the company is not solvent. So with Pope 
and Talbot, the Mackenzie mill suffered because the company fell on bad times... 
Mackenzie has suffered because of things beyond local circumstances. (M4)
BCFP and FFI were like large families within Mackenzie and could be 
characterized as “family” companies. There was a shift within forestry onto the 
“global scene” and forestry communities began to suffer. Within Mackenzie this 
shift was characterized by the shift towards Fletcher Challenge and Donahue in 
the mid-1980s... “Globally oriented” companies approach employees and 
communities as if they were numbers not people. The “family mills” approached 
people differently, they cared about the province and the community. Global 
corporations are withdrawn from the community and tend to be more antagonistic. 
One of the big things when you talk about the difference between global and local 
forestry is [with global forestry] you don’t have the ability to find out, or 
influence, what is going on. (M l6)
Consolidation also had positive implications for Houston and Quesnel. Investment 
ensured local mills remained operating while mills in other places were forced to close. 
Investment in supermills has “created the mind-set that the company is committed to the 
community. The investment is seen as part of that commitment” (Q5). Community 
members postulated that increased capacity and efficiency of mills and the loss of
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appurtenancy could make Houston and Quesnel integral production centres in the future.
Consolidation combined with rationalization, capital investments, and tenure changes
have created synergies and economies of scale in a few places throughout the Interior
(Nelson et al., 2006). A leader of a community organization outlines the implications of
consolidation for Quesnel:
There was also consolidation on the part of West Fraser. They used to have a 
sawmill and half ownership in a pulp mill, now they own 3 of the 5 mills. 
Consolidation has made the community vulnerable because of reliance on one 
employer. [On the other hand] it also makes it stable in others because West 
Fraser may still produce 2x4s when it is not profitable because they need the chips 
for pulp mills. Being diversified in operations means that something is usually 
making money for the company. On the negative side, if West Fraser fails then 
Quesnel fails.
The major forest companies went to the Gordon Campbell government with 
the argument that they could not be successful globally, unless government policy 
that supported expansion, consolidation, and globalization of the forestry sector. 
And the Liberal government agreed with that argument and built their forest 
policies around that argument. I think they [government] bought it. If it was not 
for the level of integration of in Quesnel we may have lost a sawmill or two. It has 
been good for us in that sense. The downside is that we have lost many of the 
tools and opportunities that might have been available to us around the land base, 
the trees, and the forest sector. (Q10)
12.  Corporate restructuring
Relationships with local management also changed in part because contemporary 
managers varied from their predecessors in several respects. First, contemporary 
managers have different skill-sets than previous managers. Second, managers face 
different pressures and operate in a different environment than their predecessors. Third, 
local managers are increasingly recruited from outside the community and staying for 
shorter periods of time. As a result, community members indicated that levels of trust in 
local managers had declined over time resulting in different relationships.
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As previously mentioned, the most readily identifiable link between the economic
landscape and community involvement was how local managers approached operating
the mill. As profitability changed within the sector, local managers faced increasing
pressure to focus heavily on rationalizing operations. A local businessperson in
Mackenzie outlined the impact of the changing economic landscape on local managers:
Managers were different then because times were different. Times and conditions 
have changed. Those days you could sell everything you made for a profit, now 
you have problems with selling products and profitability. The main difference 
now is that managers are primarily profit driven. Now because everything being 
sold is at a loss the companies are not donating much of anything. The pressures 
on managers today are different than they used to be. When you are working in a 
“money-making” environment it is totally different than working in a “money- 
losing” environment. Your operations and opportunities are totally different. 
(M il)
The changed focus of local managers was often attributed to corporate managers 
placing greater emphasis on addressing profits. For example, a community member in 
Mackenzie indicated, “Managers receive pressure from above to increase production. 
This shift can be linked towards companies being more focused on profits over time” 
(M l8). It is important to note that the primary goal of companies has always been, and 
will continue to be, making money and increasing profit margins. There was no evidence 
to suggest that companies or managers were less focused on making profits in the past. 
Rather it appears that companies have changed how they conduct business at the local 
level (outlined in Chapter 6). Community members felt that some local managers were 
uncomfortable with this new approach but have little recourse for action. A local 
businessperson in Quesnel outlined how local managers were under continuous pressure 
to press businesses and contractors to reduce costs:
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On the local end the managers may feel bad that they are pinching because it is 
not their role and not a role they are comfortable with but do not have a lot of 
choice. It is a difficult situation where tough policies get handed down to them 
from the “bigwigs” in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. (Q19)
In a similar vein, a retired company manager stated corporate policy plays a
smaller role in community-company relationships than the approach of local managers.
Despite this, mill managers play a key role in shaping community perceptions of
corporate approach at the local level. Communities often conflate corporate policy with
the actions of individual managers. Local managers are often responsible for
implementing corporate policies and establishing and maintaining community-company
relationships (Hoppe et al., 2007). Similarly, local managers play an integral role in
shaping the perception of relationships within communities:
There were times that were tough on the industry. As such, companies were 
frugal. However, the attitude did not change, the people were the same. People are 
the face of the company. It comes down to the individual and it really is what 
makes the difference. For example, if you had a “hard ass” company with a giving 
manager, the community would be happy. There is no real generalization 
[regarding approaches taken by companies] to make because it varies by 
individual location. The approach of [local] management is the key factor. (H I3)
It was clear that contemporary managers are well equipped to address issues of 
productivity and efficiency while being less skilled at, or interested in, addressing the 
community. This was why community members had a strong affinity for earlier 
managers. Almost everyone spoke highly of managers from the dominant firms during 
Fordism; BVFI in Houston, BCFP and FFI in Mackenzie, and Weldwood, West Fraser, 
and Western Plywood in Quesnel. These managers were often nostalgically characterized 
as ‘community builders’, ‘town fathers’, or ‘community-oriented’. However, a few 
people aptly noted that these managers handled community obligations ‘off the side of
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their desks’ because the success of the company was often highly reliant on the success
of the local operation (Grass, 1987).
While there was consensus that past managers had different skill-sets than current
ones, only a few interviewees directly addressed the issue. A former mill manager from
Houston outlined how the desired qualities of managers have changed over time as
companies ceased to look for, or develop, an all-encompassing skill-set in local
managers. Rather, due to decreased profitability, they focused on recruiting and
promoting managers adept at addressing productivity, cutting costs, and increasing
efficiency. As a result, there was less focus or emphasis on encouraging or developing
leadership qualities pertaining to various community functions which is part of the
overall withdrawal from community activities outside of operating the mill (Beckley &
Reimer, 1999). Currently, managers focus on running the mill and act primarily as
technicians rather than community leaders (Krogman & Beckley, 2002).
The people recruited for jobs now have different attributes then people did in the 
past. People are recruited now with the ability to manage costs and have the 
ability to make the company a buck. They are not looking for a guy that can 
embrace the community and be a good community leader. Before, managers had 
to have a more encompassing skill-set. Today it is a non-issue. [Company] people 
used to volunteer more than they do today. There is not the same warmth and 
feeling that the company is there for the community like it used to be. (H I3)
For many community members it was apparent that mill managers had different 
experiences than their predecessors. This shift was partly attributed to the increased 
recruitment of managers with business credentials from universities or colleges. In the 
past, managers gained tacit knowledge of the forestry business by working their way up 
from the bush or shop floor to the boardroom. As a result, not only did they have a 
comprehensive understanding of the forestry sector, they also had commonalities and
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credibility with communities and workers. This career path was widely credited with why
past managers were viewed as being trustworthy members of the community:
Also, the quality of senior management seems to have decreased over time. The 
skill-sets needed to deal with people are just not there for the most part. Managers 
today are just not used to dealing with people because for the most part they did 
not start on the shop floor. Managers seem to have a narrower focus then they did 
in the past, many MBAs have little focus on people, however, there are 
exceptions. You may be good with the numbers not with the people and still be 
considered a good manager [by companies]. That is my observation.
Senior management will not have to work their way up from the shop 
floor in the future. Those situations do not exist anymore. Those people went 
through tough times. They went from working in the bush to running a multi­
billion dollar company. Managers today do not have those opportunities because 
they move from school straight to the office. They may not spend much time in 
the bush in their entire careers. Today, they are there to manage costs and 
contractual obligations for the company. It makes it hard for managers to gain 
credibility with mill workers because they have never done any of those jobs. You 
don’t have a clue the hardship that workers in the bush go through. Managers in 
the past rode the trail with the original owners and worked their way up. (H I3)
However, today’s managers also face a different operating environment than their
predecessors; instability and volatility have replaced stability and control (Leyshon,
2011). As profitability in the forestry sector faced downward pressure from increased
global competition, shrinking markets, and increased costs, managers had less personal
discretion over spending within the community. An interviewee from Quesnel working in
forestry highlighted how the changed operating environment facing companies impacted
community-company relationships:
The goal of companies is primarily to make a profit. The goal may not have 
changed but how they do it has... Senior people in companies that have been here 
are concerned with community but have others to consider. They have to consider 
the shareholders and employees and so on. (Q6)
Over time managers had less discretionary power when allocating funds and time to 
community issues not directly related to production. Reduced direct involvement in
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community planning, administration, and social organization has also been observed
amongst mill owners over time (Teitelbaum et al., 2003). Most managers now operate in
a much more formal corporate structure which requires them to be increasingly
accountable for expenditures. This contributes to decreased levels of financial and in-kind
support for community events and initiatives. As a mill worker in Mackenzie stated:
In the past companies were very community-oriented and contributed to things 
such as bursaries, charities, and community organizations. Back then companies 
were pretty free with the purse strings. [In the past] mill managers had free rein 
over things and were not restricted to just concerning themselves with the mill.
We are faced with a different perspective nowadays. Now, managers have to 
contend with the “bean counters” in Vancouver over everything they do... We 
have seen a steady decline in company involvement over the last couple of years.
It has gone hand in hand with market conditions for product and the US market 
demand. (M8)
Finally, local managers began staying within communities for shorter periods of
time. As previously outlined, this was responsible for reduced loyalty to the community,
understanding of the community, communication about management, and levels of trust
within the community. The shortened tenure of managers also contributed to curbed
attachment to the community. Some felt that this strategy was employed by forestry
companies to reduce personal ties to the community as managers unencumbered by
longstanding personal relationships were more apt to make unfavourable decisions to
address profitability. A union leader from Mackenzie outlined how AbitibiBowater
addressed the issue of community and company loyalty:
In the case of AbitibiBowater managers were brought into town from elsewhere. 
The mill manager was from Newfoundland, the HR manager was from Ontario... 
there was nobody from the community. I mean typically, nobody in Mackenzie is 
from Mackenzie... but it used to be that if you moved up in management you 
were there for years. Now you are moved around from place to place. There are 
no ties to the community as a result.
192
Abitibi did it for that reason I am sure, so that managers would not build a 
relationship with the community. The higher up you were in management the 
more you moved around. In the case of AbitibiBowater, managers had to own 
shares in the company and were required to hold on to them. They wanted to tie 
you to the company, not the community. I have not seen that in other companies. 
With Pope and Talbot and Canfor, there was no mandatory rotation of 
managers... For example, Pope and Talbot had such a good relationship because 
of their manager and because he has lived here for years and has ties to the 
community... I guess the logic is that if you have fewer friends in the mill or 
community you will be willing to make the hard choices. (M6)
It seems unlikely that companies purposefully moved managers frequently in an
effort to decrease community loyalty. Rather, mobility is better explained by the changed
organization of forestry companies. As a community leader in Mackenzie stated, “After
we experienced the ‘global shift’ we have a situation where management personnel are
not really part of the community... People were parachuted [into the community] from
back East” (M l6). As forestry companies became larger there were an increasing number
of employees across different corporate divisions. Managers moved frequently to gain a
variety of experiences and to work their way up the corporate ladder (Marchak, 1991;
Smith, 1999). Similarly, managers indicated that most come to remote forestry towns in
the region with the intent of gaining enough experience to secure desired jobs in the
Lower Mainland or Vancouver Island. As a forestry worker from Houston stated:
The big difference with the corporate takeovers has been seeing different 
managers come to town from different corporate divisions. This has led to strong 
ties of upper management to the business, not to the community. Managers are 
brought in and are more mobile than they were in the past. They come to northern 
communities for the experience. The big change has been the change in 
[community] loyalty. When you had local owners, people were promoted from 
within and came from the community. They had real ties to the community.
(HI 1)
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Transience amongst local management was found to reduce levels of
communication with the community. Brief tenures at a variety of different mills are not
conducive to developing personal relationships and networks with community members
or organizations. This reduced the likelihood that new managers would communicate
with the community outside of issues directly related to business operations. Many
community leaders indicated that as a result communication with local management
occurred on an issue-by-issue basis. Analysis revealed this was part of a trend where
management had less understanding of the communities they worked within:
Communication is not as strong as it used to be. [Reduced communication] may 
be related to the fact that managers used to stay in the community longer. Those 
managers had a better understanding of what made the community tick. Now 
managers come into town from somewhere else and only stay here for a couple of 
years and come in on a tight deadline. They don’t really get a chance to do things 
they want to in the community. (M24)
In Houston and Mackenzie reduced attachment of local managers was also related 
to increased incidences of commuting. More managers and forestry workers were opting 
to live in Smithers or Bums Lake or Prince George and commute to work. Several 
community members stated that commuting had always been a problem but it has 
increased because companies no longer encourage employees to live in the community. A 
local businessperson outlined problems associated with managers living outside of the 
community:
When a manager does not live in the community there is potential for problems. 
Employees and management from Canfor live outside of Houston. This lessens 
the attachment of individuals to the community. BVFI encouraged everyone to 
live in Houston. That type of push does not exist within companies anymore. It 
has been a gradual change. (H6)
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In an article in Pulp and Paper Canada (Boughner, 2009), Mackenzie Pulp’s
former General Manager, Tom Boughner, outlined how mill manager tenure and
involvement directly impacts community trust in companies and mill productivity. For
companies to address these issues, they should hire managers committed to living and
participating in the communities they work within. He felt the managers should stay
within a community for an extended period of time (longer than three years) and become
involved because they play an integral role in shaping community-company relationships.
These relationships were found to impact mill productivity and community trust:
Before I accepted this position ten years ago, I told Fletcher Challenge that it was 
time for them to stop viewing Mackenzie as an entry point to the bigger mills at 
Crofton and Campbell River on Vancouver Island. It was time to hire a manager 
for Mackenzie who wanted to live in Mackenzie, provide the kind of leadership 
that was necessary, and participate actively in community life for three to five 
years. I made that commitment knowing that three years was the average tenure of 
my nine predecessors.
In 1999,1 was intensely motivated to demonstrate that shrewd team 
building and fired-up, trust-generating leadership could make a big difference in 
performance. After five consecutive annual production records (from 2001 to 
2005) we’d proved that (Boughner, 2009, p. 38).
Changed autonomy of local management, a changed corporate approach, the skill- 
sets of new managers, and the shortened tenure of managers have reduced levels of trust 
in local management relative to their predecessors. As a community leader in Mackenzie 
stated, “I would say that the changing corporate approach has reduced the levels of trust 
in management. Especially when you compare trust in today’s management to past 
managers like John Dahl34” (M24). Many felt that as managers became ‘less attached’ to 
communities, communities became ‘less attached’ to managers.
34 John Dahl was a founding manager and senior vice-president of Finlay Forest Industries’ wood products 
operations (Drushka, 1998).
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There were some anomalies to this situation, which served to bolster the
significance of this finding. As mentioned, Tom Boughner the former General Manager
at Mackenzie Pulp remained in his position for 10 years, an especially long period of time
within the forestry sector (Boughner, 2009). Employees, community members, and
workers held him in high regard partly because he remained in the community for a long
period of time. Also, Woodlands managers were viewed as being attached to the
community and highly trustworthy because the nature of their job required them to stay in
one location for longer periods of time, develop personal networks within the community,
and communicate with contractors and the community on a regular basis.
For community members, increasing geographic distance between corporate
decision-makers and those directly impacted by decisions was detrimental to the
community. This disconnect was seen as detrimental because companies made decisions
with fewer considerations for community impacts:
It is clear that if companies grow global in their reach, rather than just local, it is 
going to change the relationships they have with everybody. If the senior 
decision-makers are outside of a community, if the owners of a business are 
scattered around the world as shareholders, all of those things are going to change 
the way that a company interacts with a community. Decisions to close a mill may 
be insignificant because they are removed from the impacts. (Q10)
Many felt that because, “most companies are detached from the local situation, there
really is no community focus. Most of the head offices are in other provinces or countries
so they do not have that community focus” (M20). Similarly, two Mackenzie community
leaders outlined the community implications:
Decisions are generally made elsewhere and for the most part local management 
is not in the loop. We understand that they cannot run to us with the information 
but it makes it hard to plan accordingly... There are different ways to look at
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decisions surrounding global and local issues. With regards to Pope and Talbot, 
decisions are made in Oregon so local issues are given little consideration. (M22)
We are facing a different corporate culture than we had with local ownership, it is 
a lot more bottom-line driven. Companies have moved towards centralized 
operations. Nobody even has a head office here anymore, things are sent to Prince 
George or Vancouver. When decisions are made there is not a lot of consideration 
given to the community. (M24)
It is important to note that while this theme was prevalent in each of the 
communities, it was most significant in Mackenzie. This is attributable to the lack of 
communication over mill closures. Conversely, this theme was least prevalent in Quesnel 
where the local sector was still running at a high capacity and West Fraser had recently 
relocated its corporate offices to the community. Many felt that West Fraser was more 
sensitive to the impacts of its decisions on the community than other companies because 
many corporate employees lived in Quesnel.
For residents of resource towns, as the power to make decisions moved outside of 
the community there was less consideration for local implications. While local managers 
often had community interests in mind, they lacked the power to influence decisions that 
impacted the community. An interviewee from Houston felt, “the main decisions 
regarding the mill and community are made elsewhere. People here just run the mill, they 
do not run the business” (H I8). Several community members in Mackenzie outline this 
change:
Managers at Canfor have said that decisions are not made out of Mackenzie 
anymore, they are told what to do. Management decisions have been taken away 
from the people in town. With large corporations that seems to be the way it is. 
(Ml 8)
Managers here don’t really have the ability to make decisions like they did before. 
Big decisions have to be approved from far away which means that it takes longer 
to make decisions. It means that it takes longer for decisions to be made.
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Managers used to have the ability to make decisions on an issue-by-issue basis. 
(M l)
People in town realize that the current situation is a result of a broader problem. In 
the case of the Abitibi closure there were negative feelings because people saw it 
as being part of a numbers game where the mill and town were isolated [from 
Quebec] and the people and the town were viewed as being just a number. (M23)
The biggest implication of the lack of local decision-making power was curbed 
community development. A community leader from Houston noted that the reduction of 
local decision-making power has been detrimental to community development because, 
“decision-makers and headquarters are no longer local. The people that are rooted in the 
community no longer have real power to do anything” (H2).
Community members also felt that decisions were being made with less 
consideration for the social and economic impacts associated with their decisions. A 
leader of a community organization in Quesnel stated, “decisions related to the local 
forestry sector are moving away from the community... Decisions are made in 
boardrooms with greater consideration for profit margins and the decisions being made 
are made in different ways” (Q10). A leader of a community organization in Houston 
stated:
In the corporate world where decisions are made based on maximizing value for 
shareholders, we need to protect that idea that [forestry] is about more than just 
profit. We always need to be cognizant of this and need to thank companies help 
them remember their roots. (Q14)
Most felt that corporate decision-makers were less concerned for the local impacts 
of their decisions because they have little in common with community members. As such, 
company decision-makers may find it hard to empathize with “guys in the bush” because 
they many have little experience within mills or logging (M7). Many community
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members felt that in the past, local management gave greater consideration to the
implications of various decisions and policies because they had more in common with the
community members. A forestry worker from Houston stated:
Locally owned mills have personal relationships with the town, corporations do 
not live here so they do not have the same values as communities... When you 
had local owners, people were promoted from within and came from the 
community. As a result, most company people had real ties to the community.
(HI 1)
Mill managers and other company employees agreed that the decision-making
framework is different from the past. Decisions now have to pass through greater
bureaucracy. As one interviewee stated, “[with bigger companies] there was more
bureaucracy in some ways and finances tightened up. Some times it worked better, some
times it did not” (H3). A forestry worker from Houston stated:
The culture of, and basis for, decision-making changes in public companies.
There is more bureaucracy to deal with when making decisions. Also there are 
different frameworks for making decisions. You have less ability to make 
decisions [regarding] local issues. However, you still make decisions on what is 
best for the firm. (H4)
Communities felt that as corporate policies changed over time, so did the types of
decisions made by local managers. These changes were attributed to the adoption of a
more formal decision-making structure. As such, local managers no longer had the
latitude with regards to running the local mill that they once held. A former forestry
worker in Quesnel outlined how changes to decision-making were illustrated by company
dealings surrounding forestry policy:
It was not immediately noticeable that local decision-making changed in 
companies. Companies here were big businesses to start with [but in the past] 
local managers could bend rules locally. However, as [time passed], and 
companies grew, up [local management] could not bend as much and the Ministry
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could not bend as much. This was a little foreign to everyone because for years as 
long as the money flowed down south we could do what we wanted. (Q19)
Mill managers disagreed that publically held companies had less consideration for
community issues. They felt that shareholders played a small role in shaping company
policy. Corporate policy was seen as being determined by corporate managers, much like
it had been with privately held companies. For example, a mill manager in Houston
asserted that upper management has always decided how companies operate:
Shareholder profits are one thing influencing relationships but it is really linked to 
those in charge. Relationships [with the community are] not really driven by 
shareholders as upper management decides how to pursue shareholder value and 
profit. (H I3)
Changes to corporate command-and-control structures and the operating 
environment of forestry companies support the finding that local mill managers have not 
lost the ability to make decisions, rather they have greater responsibility for the 
profitability of mills. This responsibility, combined with a changed operating 
environment, in part explains why local managers allocate fewer resources to community 
initiatives and organizations. While the power to make decisions may not have moved out 
of the community, local decision-makers are unable to allocate resources commensurate 
with past levels because profitability is harder to achieve today.
7 3 . Forestry policy and the social contract
The loss of appurtenancy, which tied specific volumes of logs to local processing 
facilities and required public review for mill shutdowns, was identified as the most 
important policy change for forestry towns. Forestry workers and local leaders felt that
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this change effectively ended the ‘social contract’ established during Fordism. Many saw
this as undermining the stability and viability of forestry-dependent communities
throughout the province. Conversely, local managers felt that the loss of appurtenancy
had little to do with the issues facing communities. Rather it was a symbolic change
which represented the need for flexibility within BC’s forestry sector.
Community members felt that the loss of appurtenancy played a key role in
contributing to increased vulnerability and decreased viability of forestry-dependent
economies. The loss of appurtenancy was identified as playing a crucial role in changing
the geography of production in the Interior. Those in Houston and Quesnel felt their
communities would benefit because local mills were highly efficient. The reason
commonly given was that “the loss of appurtenancy has not been an issue because of the
efficiency of local mills” (Q21). Local management felt that Quesnel is uniquely
positioned to take advantage of the removal of appurtenancy:
The forestry policy framework has changed over time. It is far too complex to 
identify individual changes that have affected community-company relationships. 
However, the loss of appurtenancy was a big change for forestry communities. In 
the case of Quesnel it may turn out to be an advantage because we have the ability 
and infrastructure to become a super centre for milling. (Q22)
Perhaps not surprisingly the loss of appurtenancy was found to be most troubling 
in Mackenzie. There was an overwhelming sense that the shuttered mills would not be 
able to reopen, or that start-up would be delayed, once local logs were redirected to mills 
in Prince George. There was concern that once logs started moving south to be processed 
there would be fewer incentives for companies to reopen local mills. A Mackenzie union 
leader provided an example of the impact of removing appurtenancy on the relationship 
between local timber and jobs:
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The biggest change in terms of policy with respect to this community, and the 
reason the community shutdown, was the removal of appurtenance clause. There 
is no longer a tie between community and logs for [the purpose of] employment. 
The removal of appurtenance in 2003 pretty much guaranteed the demise of small 
communities in rural BC.
We did not see the change right away but if you drive out to the old FFI mill 
they logged all along it beside the road and in the mill yard. And all of those logs 
were shipped to Quesnel, and they were logged right beside the mill in the log 
yard... The loss of appurtenancy was the biggest devastation and betrayal to the 
250 communities. (M6)
These sentiments are not surprising when one considers the origin of 
appurtenancy during Fordism. Appurtenance clauses were created to appease organized 
labour and forestry communities as sustained yield policy directly equated community 
stability with the continued processing of timber. As the first Sloan Commission (1945, p. 
127) outlined (quoted in Prudham, 2007, p. 265), “sustained yield policy has, as an 
objective, the maintenance of forest cover and growth, thus ensuring a perpetual supply 
of raw material for forest industries with consequent stability of industrial communities 
and assurance of permanent payrolls.” There is the growing sense that government is 
placing more emphasis on sustaining industry than communities. Given the trends in 
production since the 1980s, this will be devastating for most forestry communities in the 
Interior.
Local mill managers felt that the removal of appurtenancy is playing a key role in 
reshaping the economic geography of the Interior for the better. The removal of 
appurtenancy allowed companies to close inefficient mills throughout the province and 
focus on investing in, and operating, efficient mills in advantageous locations. There was 
the feeling that positive and negative impacts associated with the removal of 
appurtenancy will further marginalize communities with small, inefficient mills. A mill
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manager in Quesnel indicated that the social and economic impacts of removing
appurtenance clauses are highly uneven:
There is also lots of emotion over the issue of exporting raw logs. People in town 
are reading about mill closures around the province. You need to realize that some 
companies are going to fare better than others and some locations are going to 
fare better than others. (Q23)
Companies felt the fear of a radical remapping of regional production and
settlement were overstated. A forestry worker provided a unique perspective stating that
the removal of appurtenance did not represent a significant change for companies. This
interviewee asserted that forestry companies have always moved timber “where it made
economic sense to process them” (Q6) and while some mills may shutdown as a result,
the cost of transporting timber will play a large role in mediating the closure of a large
number of mills. Similarly, Nelson et al. (2006) and Haley and Nelson (2006) found that
companies viewed the removal of appurtenancy as an indication that it was politically
acceptable to close mills and rationalize operations, as this policy had never been strictly
enforced. While a number of smaller mills adjacent to larger supermills may close as a
result, the fear that most of the processing in the Interior will eventually occur in a few
regional processing centres like Prince George, Vanderhoof, Quesnel, and Houston is
unlikely because of space:
I think that appurtenancy was overrated. It was more of a myth than a reality.
Logs in this province were always processed where it made economic sense to 
process them. I don’t think that doing away with appurtenancy changed much. As 
far as what the future holds, in that regard, I think that you are seeing some of that 
when you look around the region. It is tempered by transportation costs because 
logs are heavy and expensive to move around so you can only move them so far. I 
think a good example is West Fraser recently bought a mill and a forest licence in 
Fort St. James. You are never going to see that mill operate again. The logs are 
going to be processed in Fraser Lake.
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But how much of that is going to go on [shrugs shoulders]? I don’t think that 
you are going to see logs moving too far. It is way more efficient to move lumber 
than logs... you certainly hear this concept that the “supermills” are going to be 
hubs and you are going to have the West Fraser mill here and the Canfor mill in 
Vanderhoof and the big mills in Prince George and Houston... I don’t really 
know. But heaven help you if you are in Fort St. James or McBride where there is 
nothing... Anyways, time will tell. (Q6)
For communities, appurtenancy should have been re-tooled instead of eliminated. 
Many felt, “the loss of appurtenancy effectively ended the social contract between 
forestry companies and communities” (Q21) because companies no longer have formal 
obligations to communities vis-a-vis the provision of stable employment. Almost all 
community members indicated that the tenets of the social contract established in the 
1950s were still applicable and required today, perhaps more than ever. Government 
intervention and oversight regarding employment is still required in the forestry sector to 
ensure that companies address community well-being. As a former mill manager from 
Houston stated:
Loss of appurtenancy will drive a change in the shape of the north. There should 
have been a middle ground between what was and what is. It is the people’s 
timber, companies have to make some sort of commitment to the people. Policy 
really needs to try to get the best of both worlds: economies of scale in some areas 
and offshoot industries in others. There are so many social issues related to 
forestry, government needs to address these issues.... You cannot look at 
community-company relationships in isolation from the role of the provincial 
government and how supportive they are of the industry and the community. The 
strength of the relationship is related to the viability of the company, amongst 
other things. It is not just the markets that influence [relationships], it is also 
influenced by government policy. (H I3)
Local mill managers and company employees agreed that the loss of 
appurtenancy has impacted forestry communities, but insisted that the change was 
necessary for ensuring a vital forestry sector. Most mill managers felt that forestry
204
companies need to be unencumbered by geographical commitments to defined mills.
From their perspective, companies need to be able to maximize efficiency by processing
timber where it makes the most economic sense. Local managers were not indifferent to
the community implications of this change; however, it was necessary to maintain a
competitive edge in global markets. Most dismissed the notion that changes to
appurtenancy had an impact on the current hardships facing forestry communities. A
former mill manager in Houston outlined changes associated with, and the reasons for,
removal of appurtenance:
The relationships with the community changed when the tenure changes in the 
early 2000s with the loss of appurtenancy and there was no need for public review 
for mill shutdowns. You used to have to get permission of the minister. New 
tenure policy has damaged the relationship. Shutdowns used to be subject to 
public review by the Ministry of Forests and the logs used to be tied to the mill. 
New government policy drove that change. However, the change is not 
necessarily bad. Logs need to go where the most value will be extracted. Public 
perception is that loss of appurtenancy caused this recent crisis. It was related to 
other factors. Tenure reform did not contribute to the situation facing the forestry 
sector today. (HI7)
Mill managers and government employees felt that changes to appurtenancy were
only one piece of larger changes to forestry policy undertaken by the provincial
government. These interviewees indicated that the forestry policy framework had
changed in order to better accommodate the needs of capital and government revenues.
Many of these interviewees attributed this shift with policies established by the BC
Liberal government. As a leader of a community organization in Quesnel stated:
In terms of a general forest policy framework, the Liberals went towards direct 
tax revenues. There were major cuts to the Forestry Sector. [The BC Liberals] 
then told [the Ministry of Forests] to concentrate on larger sales that impacted 
revenue. This removed incentive to create smaller sales for small operators. 
Forestry policy is now primarily concerned with bids, no other values are 
considered. If those other values are not being taken into consideration then it is
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in the best interests of large forest companies not to allow their land base to be 
used by small operators. We lost diversity in the forestry sector as a result... The 
last thing it would do is “diss” the forestry companies because they provide 
thousands of high-paying jobs, but there is always a cost. (Q10)
7.4. Conclusion
This chapter outlined how consolidation within the northern Interior’s forestry 
sector increased the size of forestry companies, which changed community-company 
interaction. Threats to profitability drove companies to rationalize operations, achieve 
economies of scale, integrate fiber usage, and amass timber rights. For communities, 
rationalization increased uncertainty. Indeed, uncertainty has replaced stability within the 
study communities. The key implication of increased competition and globalization has 
been reduced consideration of the community-level impacts of corporate decision­
making. Concentration of the sector has also limited the leverage of communities over 
companies when negotiating concessions or contracts. As local mills mattered less to the 
survival of individual companies and the operating environment became more complex, 
local issues and concerns held less sway. A combination of increased distance between 
corporate decision-makers and communities, decreased profitability within the sector, 
and a different corporate operating environment explain changes to community company- 
relationships.
This chapter also outlined the important position occupied by local managers 
within communities. Although local management is located at the bottom of the corporate 
hierarchy, they play critical roles within forestry-dependent communities and are the 
local ‘face’ of the company. They are important sources of human and financial capital.
206
As such, changes to the roles and responsibilities of local management have profound 
implications for community functioning, trust, and local perceptions of the company. 
Changes to the responsibilities and credentials of local management, aimed at increasing 
economic efficiency, have been detrimental to community trust and capacity.
Finally, while removal of appurtenance clauses represent a change to how 
companies operate, for communities it represents a symbolic change in how the 
provincial government and forestry companies viewed their obligations to rural 
communities. Companies felt that the removal of appurtenance marked the government’s 
tacit approval to address the economic health of operations before considering social 
responsibilities. Communities felt that government has relieved companies of many 
formal responsibilities that were part of forestry’s social contract during Fordism, while 
accentuating uneven development within the region. For communities, flexibility of 
policy has enshrined the primacy of private economic considerations at the expense of 
local economic and social considerations.
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Chapter 8: Discussion of Findings
This chapter discusses the research findings about how and why community- 
company relationships have changed over time in relation to the current literature. 
Relationships were explored at the community-level because: 1) forestry companies are 
key actors in forestry-dependent communities; 2) rural BC is undergoing economic 
restructuring that has eroded community stability; and 3) the adoption of neo-liberal 
policy has redefined relationships between the provincial government, forestry 
companies, and communities.
This chapter is divided into two sections that answer the dissertation’s research 
questions. The first section examines the types of relationships adopted by forestry 
companies when engaging communities. The findings suggest there were two broad 
approaches to relationships. The first was institutionalized paternalism, which coincided 
with the period of Fordist industrial development. During this period, companies and 
government played central roles within communities. The second approach began with 
the 1980s recession that spurred consolidation and accelerating change within the 
regional sector and marked the beginning of retrenchment of company involvement 
within communities. In Chapters 5 through 7, I argued that companies increasingly 
focused on ratcheting up productivity and subjecting decisions and actions to a narrow 
economic calculus while remaining indirectly involved in those aspects of community 
life that impacted profitability.
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The second section explores why community-company relationships have 
changed over time. The results suggest that companies establish such relationships based 
on the operating environment, the quality of the resource base, and requirements by 
government. A close reading of local histories and the struggles associated with the most 
recent recession suggest that relationships were never enacted in ‘ideal’ ways. Rather, 
change was contested locally and new relationships had to contend with established 
practices and institutions. From the community perspective, past relationships have 
provided assets and presented barriers to economic restructuring. However, I suggest that 
these findings underscore that government, companies, and communities each have roles 
and responsibilities to address future regional development plans and initiatives.
8.1. Historically, what types of relationships have forestry companies adopted when 
engaging forestry-dependent communities?
My research indicated that forestry companies have adopted different approaches 
to communities over time. These findings confirm and expand upon the resource town 
literature. Analysis revealed that relationships were never dictated to communities. At the 
local level community members played, and continue to play, an active role in 
negotiating local relationships with companies. Relationships are also shaped by the 
continuous interaction between global markets, provincial policy, company policy and 
behaviour, resource dynamics, community characteristics, and local histories.
Two different approaches characterized community-company relationships over 
time: (1) Fordism and institutionalized paternalism and (2) restructuring and the 1980s 
recession. Each approach was characterized by institutional arrangements between 
companies, government, labour, and communities. This section outlines the nature of
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relationships within each period and situates them within the resource town, economic 
geography, and regional development literatures.
From the 1950s until the mid-1970s, government and forestry companies adopted 
a paternalistic institutional arrangement towards forestry communities (Prudham, 2008a). 
Much of our understanding of this period comes from seminal works on Canadian 
resource towns (e.g. Lucas, 1971; Robinson, 1962; Siemens, 1970). These studies largely 
described socioeconomic conditions within communities or focused on different planning 
initiatives aimed at addressing longstanding issues in resource towns (Pressman & 
Lauder, 1978; Teitelbaum et al., 2003). Research on BC forestry-dependent communities 
during this period outlined how companies and the provincial government took a central 
role in both forest management and community life. Community members and mill 
managers confirmed that companies were closely involved in community governance, 
including service and infrastructure provision, as well as local decision-making.
My work also confirms that company involvement in the community was always 
utilized as a strategy to attract and retain labour to ensure that investments were 
profitable. The post-war boom in forestry was driven by a global need for resources 
related to reconstruction efforts, unleashed demand for consumer products, and the 
closure of various low-cost resource producers (Bowles, 1982; Bradbury, 1978; Haley & 
Nelson, 2006; Wallace & Shields, 1997). These factors created new, robust markets for 
forestry products that remained strong into the 1960s (Edgell, 1987; Hak, 2007).
The paternalist era played an important role in shaping community capacities, 
expectations, and resources, and supported a number of long-standing, deeply entrenched 
institutions. Fordist institutions were viewed as rigid obstacles that governments and
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companies would later try to overcome when dealing with economic restructuring 
(Harvey, 1990). Hayter, Grass, and Barnes (1994, p. 28) outline how various social and 
institutional relations became entrenched within BC’s forestry communities during 
Fordism:
... the social and institutional relations that sustained Fordist labour control had 
become so entrenched that they were very difficult to shift in any fundamental 
way. In many ways this is understandable. The resilience of the established class 
bargain was rooted in its very success over a long period of time, representing as 
it did the evolving complexity of labour relations agreements, the inertia of 
institutional structures in which so much had been invested, and, by no means 
least, a consensus over legal agreements that had been reached. That is, once the 
control of labour was embedded in these complex social and institutional 
relationships, it was very difficult to dislodge them.
Companies were closely involved in infrastructure and service provision 
throughout this period (Quark, 2007). Similar to research by Bowles (1982) and Lucas 
(1971), I found that functioning communities with amenities, infrastructure, housing, 
retail services, and municipal services were used as a tool to attract and retain workers 
and their families. The findings also indicate that during Fordism companies viewed 
communities as assets to help facilitate production and the accumulation of capital.
Although the extent of company involvement varied by community, paternalistic 
relationships had important implications for the physical and social structures of each 
community (Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983). Companies were involved in developing 
infrastructure and providing housing. With regards to services, they hosted or supported 
community events, organizations, and guided community decision-making. In Houston 
and Mackenzie, for example, companies were responsible for developing community 
infrastructure such as housing, recreational facilities, and retail services (Halseth & 
Sullivan, 2002; Hols, 1999; Veemes, 1985). In Quesnel, a number of different companies
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were responsible for contributing to, and developing, individual projects throughout the 
community. Here, companies played a smaller role in infrastructure provision, relative to 
Houston and Mackenzie, in part because the local forestry sector evolved slowly out of 
the ‘bush-mill’ era. In Houston and Mackenzie, there was extensive company 
involvement because of the capital invested to develop large forestry complexes. Cox and 
Mair (1988, p. 308) note that involvement is a result of risk associated with investment, 
“the firm with geographically limited built environment investments is therefore 
dependent upon the health of a particular local economy”.
Regarding the provision of services, this study found that companies were directly 
involved in planning and funding services. Involvement was a response to the absence or 
inadequacy of certain services required by companies or the labour force. Mill managers 
indicated that companies were involved in service provision so that they could ensure 
access to services that were necessary for the operation of the mills or to justify further 
investment.
Worker and community attitudes were influenced by paternalistic relationships. In 
each community, interviewees indicated their identities were rooted in being members of 
a ‘forestry town’, ‘company town’, or ‘mill town’. This had important implications for 
the functioning and nature of each community. As research has suggested, resource town 
culture is shaped by local institutions such as mills and unions (Cottell, 1974; Lee et al., 
1990; Machlis & Force, 1990; Preston et al., 1997), external cycles and fluctuations 
(Bradbury, 1984), and group cohesiveness shaped by isolation (Robin, 1978). In resource 
towns, work has a particularly important impact on community culture and shapes 
various aspects of daily life. As Tomlinson (1988; quoted in Belshaw, 2002, p. 9) found:
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We can no longer treat ‘culture’ as some peripheral music-making or worship 
marked off from the more influential spheres of the ‘political’ or the ‘economic’. 
Rather, to speak of working-class culture is to speak of the relation between these 
spheres, and of the ways in which these spheres are joined together to make a 
distinctive way of life.
For the study communities, forestry culture plays an important role in planning, 
participation, involvement, and individual attitudes and ideologies within the 
communities. Similarly, Reed (2003, p. 53) indicates that being part of a forestry- 
dependent community influences, “economic forms of organization, power relations, 
gender dynamics, material artifacts, religion, and language... [as well as] particular 
values and beliefs” . Kusel (2003) asserts that forest-dependence plays an important role 
in shaping local culture through the development of unique traditions, behaviours, and 
perceptions.
Local culture was created and reinforced by the organization of the forestry sector 
at local and extra-local scales. Global and local forces played important roles in shaping 
the perceptions of communities and how they functioned. For instance, workplace culture 
and managerialism served to reinforce the importance of management in making 
decisions regarding what was best for local operations and the community. This occurred 
in part because each mill’s labour force constituted a large portion of the community 
(Preston et al., 1997). This is consistent with the resource town literature which 
highlights how the availability of well-paid mill jobs were responsible for curbing worker 
initiative, the development of local leadership, and the growth of a local entrepreneurial 
culture (Barnes, 2005; Barnes et al., 2001; Beckley, 2000; Beckley & Krogman, 2002; 
Cramer et al., 1993; Gale & Gale, 2006; Markey et al., 2006). Similarly, research
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indicates that youth outmigration contributed to engraining attitudes and culture in 
resource-based communities (O’Connor, 1987).
Paternalism had a lasting impact on shaping community planning and limiting 
entrepreneurial activity. Under paternalism, many communities failed to develop “factors 
that contribute to community sustainability, such as volunteerism, entrepreneurship, and 
local leadership, [are] lacking, a deficiency in part due to the legacy of paternalistic 
corporate control” (Teitelbaum et al., 2003, p. 172). Paternalism meant that important 
decisions regarding the community and workers were dictated from outside actors, 
effectively curtailing the development of a local entrepreneurial class (Barnes et a l, 
2001). The dependence of local decision-makers on extra-local elites for capital, 
expertise, and direction was also responsible for creating a local climate that was not 
conducive to establishing an independent local entrepreneurial class (Gunton, 2003). The 
local entrepreneurs that did emerge within forestry-dependent communities tended to 
focus on servicing staples industries. More specifically, my research found that local 
business communities throughout this period were specialized in supporting industrial 
operations. However, support and service opportunities were somewhat limited to local 
entrepreneurs as branch-plant operations, such as Finning Tractor, opened to supply 
mills.
Within the study communities, the absence of local entrepreneurs and dependence 
of local leadership curbed community ability to lessen, or transition from, forest industry 
dependence (Freudenberg, 1992; Hayter, 2000a). In terms of local development, 
managerialism created a culture of reactive rather than proactive planning. This remains a 
pressing issue because community culture continues to support industrial forestry and
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local economic development strategies remain focused upon resource development, 
despite ample evidence from around the province that this may be increasingly perilous 
(Stefanick, 2001).
Local entrepreneurs and independent local leadership are important in creating a 
culture of proactive planning. Bryden and Munro (2001, p. 115) found that local 
entrepreneurs within peripheral regions play an important role in the “commoditization” 
of local assets such as culture, environment, and landscapes. The economic opportunities 
derived from entrepreneurial activity are an important component of local economic 
development that should be supported by companies and communities (Jakobsen et al., 
2005; MacKendrick & Parkins, 2004; Sommers & Birss, 1991).
Attitudes regarding ‘acceptable’ employment also discouraged diversification of 
the local economy. These attitudes were also a legacy of paternalistic relationships. 
Communities often viewed the forest industry (particularly manufacturing) salaries, 
benefits, and working conditions as acceptable forms of employment, eschewing other 
types of industries and employment. These attitudes often limited further education or 
skills training amongst youth and forestry workers. Different service sector businesses 
also had difficulty attracting and retaining labour because of these local conditions. High 
wages and benefits provided by resource industries hampered the growth of other 
industries and local businesses because they were the standard against which all new 
economic activities were evaluated, reflecting research elsewhere (Hayter et al., 1994; 
MacKendrick & Parkins, 2004; Polese & Shearmur, 2002; Slack et al., 2003).
Community-company relationships also played an important role in shaping the 
character of each community. Mills play a key role in socializing a particular discipline
215
of space and time that shapes community life within and beyond the mill (Norcliffe, 
2005). Outside of the workplace, the communities were influenced by the actions, 
policies, and decisions of individual forestry companies and macro-level trends within the 
forestry sector. For instance, hiring practices and high wages contribute to low levels of 
educational attainment (Beckley, 2000) and shift-work impacts social isolation, 
constrains employment opportunities for women, and affects household management 
issues (Preston et al., 2000). Similarly, Kruger and Sturtevant (2003, p. 30) found that 
forestry institutions and conventions shape the rhythm of everyday life within 
communities:
Social relations in rural communities are anchored to the political economy of 
their particular place. Identity is maintained through memory, tradition, and 
reputation; this historical sense of place provides the foundation for values and 
commitments. Booms and busts, political confrontations, and compliance, while 
registered in official records, also are registered in cultural products, institutions, 
and everyday decisions.
Community expectations regarding company involvement and obligations were 
also shaped by paternalism. Interviewees frequently used this period as a reference point, 
or benchmark, when referring to acceptable or desirable levels of company involvement, 
participation, and support. The paternalist era was used as a reference point because 
levels of support were generally higher and more diverse than are current levels of 
support. For example, companies were considered to be good corporate citizens if they 
provided levels of support commensurate with this period. Companies that do not meet 
these levels consistently are considered to have poorer relationships and are viewed as 
being less committed to the community.
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However, few community members or company personnel indicated that they 
wished to return to paternalistic relationships. Indeed, there has been a struggle within 
communities to resist paternalism and limit the influence of companies over time. 
Community members indicated that several aspects of paternalism were undesirable. 
Most notably, during Fordism companies played too large a role in community 
governance. From the company perspective, managers indicated the demands of 
paternalism placed a heavy burden on company resources, straining their ability to focus 
on productivity and profitability (Hayter, 2000b).
Practices and relationships established throughout Fordism were deeply engrained 
within communities. This finding is consistent with the resource town literature, which 
indicates the durability of these practices and relationships is related to the wealth and 
prosperity they garnered for communities, forestry workers, and companies (Cashore et 
al., 2001; Hayter, 2004a; Preston et al., 1997; Young & Matthews, 2007). In this study, 
one of the most durable institutions associated with paternalism was curbed 
entrepreneurialism and the restricted approach to local economic development. A 
community vision for local economic development was hard to separate from that of 
large-scale industrial forestry. The boom-bust cycle conditioned many community 
members to believe that downturns were temporary, solidifying resistance to change 
(Bradbury, 1984; Hassink, 2010). This is supported by the resource town literature, which 
indicates prosperity has limited community incentive to actively pursue diversification 
(Travers, 1993). Moreover, success of resource development encouraged communities to 
embrace strategies committed to specialization of the local economy (Markey et al., 
2005; Polese & Shearmur, 2006) making the Interior prone to regional iock-in’ (Hassink,
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2010). Finally, stability throughout Fordism encouraged communities to remain
supportive of resource industries and to continue fostering productivist local economies
(Barnes et al., 2001).
With regards to local power relations, my research indicates the top-down
‘command-and-control’ structure established during this period of time has played an
important role in shaping community-company relationships over time. This structure
established a culture of dependence in the study communities. Forestry companies wield
considerable power locally and influence many different aspects of community life
within and beyond the workplace (Wilson, 2004). Bradbury (1978, p. 129) also noted that
direct and indirect control exerted by companies over communities is perhaps one of the
most defining aspects of resource-dependent communities:
Corporate control in the single enterprise communities attached to mines and 
mills remained a significant factor in their make-up. Their continued dominance 
by large and increasingly multinational corporations meant that they were 
subordinate and beholden to decisions made by those corporations and their 
executive staffs, not only at the local level but in major metropolitan centres such 
as New York, Toronto and Tokyo. The granting of local government and the 
enfranchisement of the workforce, which were meant to decrease corporate 
paternalism of resource-based communities, generally served to change the focus 
of the dependence on the companies: the costs of developing housing and physical 
infrastructure were transferred from the companies to the town residents, and the 
responsibility of running the town was transferred to the local municipal 
government. In addition, the corporations, whether or not they desired it, still 
maintained a form of control over growth, viability and longevity of the 
communities by virtue of their control of housing stocks, development of land, 
their influence on municipal councils, and their hold over the major source of 
income of the workforce.
The unequal distribution of power between companies and communities created a 
legacy of reliance and dependence that became deeply entrenched within community 
institutions, most notably community governance. Community leaders were generally
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concerned with administering services and programs established by companies and the 
provincial government. This narrow role worked to limit the diversification of local 
economies. Amin (2005) reported similar findings in a study of UK branch-plant 
economies where local leaders became heavily reliant on top-down planning, making it 
hard to plan for diversification during deindustrialization. My research found that while 
communities disapproved of the power asymmetries embodied within paternalistic 
relationships, they favoured the ability to negotiate company support and concessions.
Community planning was also visibly impacted by the legacy of top-down 
managerialism. In each community, companies were responsible for shaping a vision of 
local economic development centred on forestry (Barnes et al., 2001). Strong support for 
forestry was championed by local elites with close connections to the sector. Community 
members supported this vision and model of local economic development, in part, 
because it provided stability and prosperity for most community members over time. 
Further, the structure of resource town economies, coupled with settlement and 
demographic characteristics meant that there were few people within each community 
who were not directly or indirectly connected to the forest sector.
An important finding was that heavy reliance upon forestry as the primary 
economic engine was linked to complacency regarding economic diversification. This 
finding is consistent with research by Markey et al. (2005, p. 57) who found that, 
“[resource-dependent] communities and regions are passive, dependent players in policy 
and project development” . During this era, communities became dependent upon senior 
government and corporate actors to provide money and expertise to address problems that 
did arise (Beckley, 2000; Dunk, 2002; Weller, 1977) leading to a sense of fatalism that
219
mills will always be around to address issues and provide (Cheshire, 2010). The vision 
and power directing development was concentrated in core regions within, and outside of, 
BC (Hak, 2007; Hayter et al., 2003; Rajala, 2006). These findings suggest that because of 
external control and the complacency it engendered, communities rarely identified 
economic diversification as a planning initiative that needed to be actively pursued.
Local managers played a large role within communities during Fordism. In each 
community, local managers and key company employees were closely involved in 
municipal governance, service provision, and community affairs. Motivation for 
community involvement was related to necessity and to ensure that large capital 
investments were profitable. Managers were also involved in municipal governance 
because they comprised a small group of residents with the requisite skill-sets and 
expertise to administer community functions. In the case of Mackenzie, early mill 
managers and company employees were often the only residents who remained in the 
community for any length of time because of high turnover rates (Baptie, 1975). 
Involvement in municipal governance was also to ensure profitability of local operations 
by securing the provision of adequate services and to quell community resistance as it 
arose.
A limited number of studies have addressed how local managers are involved in 
local government or how they carry out company policy within communities (Hayter, 
2000b; Marchak, 1983). For example, Hayter (2000b, p. 297) found that local managers’ 
“decision-making functions ...[were] at the bottom of an international hierarchy, and 
largely limited to responsibilities for operational matters and workforce supervision”. 
Bradbury (1977, p. 84) noted that local managers changed with the entrance of extra­
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local capital because, “the indigenous management and the family controlled executive 
structure were deposed and replaced by a locally based management which in turn was 
subordinate to the decisions makers of parent companies”. Indeed, in terms of the 
corporate hierarchy, production managers occupy the lowest position in terms of 
authority, pay, and status (Leyshon, 2011). However, an important finding from my 
research was that from the community perspective, local managers hold an important 
status and assumed many key responsibilities and leadership positions outside of 
production.
Managers and owners from this period were often envisaged as ‘town fathers’ 
with decision-making autonomy. Community members enumerated the range of 
community organizations, events, and infrastructure supported by local managers. 
Furthermore, companies were also viewed as having higher degrees of loyalty or 
commitment to communities because they provided greater levels of support for 
communities. However, the analysis indicated that while local managers had the ability to 
make decisions regarding a broader range of community issues, those decisions were in 
fact mediated by corporate policies (Marchak, 1983). Triangulation confirmed that 
community members often equated breadth of responsibility with autonomy. 
Additionally, local managers during this period were perceived as having greater 
autonomy because they were directly involved in community issues. However, corporate 
actors, far removed from communities, delineated the purview and nature of local 
managerial involvement.
Approaches to community-company relationships began to change with the 1980s 
recession and they continue to evolve. Economic restructuring marked a shift in the
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relationships between government, companies, and communities, which impacted the
stability and viability of many rural communities within the province (Markey, 2010).
Edgell (1987, pp. 111-112) asserted that the 1980s recession marked a watershed change
for forestry-dependent communities, forestry companies, and the provincial economy:
The repercussions that spread through the provincial economy were catastrophic, 
and as mills closed the foundations of many forestry-based communities 
evaporated. The post-recession performance of the industry has differed 
significantly from recoveries following previous periodic downturns... There is a 
generally emerging consensus that this trend may not be ... an aberration from a 
longer-term historical perspective... and that the decline from the giddy heights of 
the 1970s is permanent.
Within BC, research on economic restructuring in forestry has focused primarily on the 
Coast. My research offers unique insight into the nature of economic restructuring in the 
northern Interior and its implications for communities.
The results demonstrate that economic restructuring marked the beginning of 
gradual retrenchment of companies within communities. The recessions in the 1980s and 
1990s provided the impetus for companies to redefine their relationships with 
communities. Companies curtailed their involvement outside of production and refocused 
on productivity to minimize risk and maximize flexibility (Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983). 
From the perspective of communities, economic restructuring was characterized as 
pitting ‘capital against community’ (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982). In terms of 
involvement, companies addressed uncertainty by reducing financial and human 
resources appropriated to the community. Flexible production has necessitated 
investment in new technologies and labour arrangements that reduced the number, 
stability, and quality of many local jobs (Holmes, 1997; Mackenzie & Norcliffe, 1997;
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Preston et al., 1997). This is consistent with Hayter and Barnes’ (1997, p. 196) study of
restructuring of the Coastal forestry sector, where:
The re-articulation occurring between mills and their associated communities in 
British Columbia’s coastal forest economy takes on various dimensions. Most 
obviously, the transition to flexible production has meant that once dominant 
companies provide communities with less income from taxes, fewer permanent 
jobs, fewer spinoffs for local businesses, fewer good-will contributions, and 
virtual elimination of casual (weekend and summer) employment for high school 
and university students.
Community-company relationships changed because Fordist institutions became 
liabilities to capital accumulation. As such, industry and government worked to address 
instability by reconfiguring policies and practices. Restructuring served to dismantle or 
modify established relations and institutions. This process has strained communities 
because under paternalism the requisite skills and resources required to assume these 
newfound responsibilities were not developed (Halseth, 2010; Page, 1996).
From the perspective of communities, restructuring has weakened relationships 
and was characterized by company retrenchment. Markey et al. (2008, p. 416) found that, 
“political and economic restructuring in BC since the 1980s illustrates an overt public 
and private position of rural community withdrawal”. The literature suggests that 
company retrenchment was associated with the need to focus on forest management and 
changing environmental, economic, and political pressures (Wilson, 1998). This research 
found that within communities withdrawal has been painful and contested. Further, 
retrenchment has only contributed to increased instability, vulnerability, and uncertainty 
(Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983).
Companies addressed some uncertainties by re-evaluating their role within 
communities and withdrawing from many previous commitments in order to reduce costs
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and focus on addressing profitability. Companies were no longer directly involved in 
things such as housing and infrastructure provision, community planning, and decision­
making. From the company perspective this approach represented a shift from 
‘community oriented’ to ‘lean and mean’. This finding is consistent with trends in the 
Canadian forestry sector beginning in the late 1970s when companies began, “abdicating 
responsibilities for community development and well-being” (Beckley, 2000, p. 23).
These trends are also present in other sectors and are part of rural restructuring 
(Markey, 2010). Quark’s (2007) research on rural manufacturing and the relocation of 
corporate headquarters in the U.S. highlights changing relationships between rural 
communities and corporations. She found that, beginning in the 1980s, some companies 
moved to adopt “principles of non-responsibility towards employees and communities by 
insulating themselves from the moral economies of place that empower communities to 
make claims on firms” (p. 38). These companies also adopted different relationships and 
approaches as part of a broader programme aimed at cutting costs and increasing 
productivity. Similarly, Bradbury and St-Martin (1983, p. 134) note that company 
withdrawal within resource towns must be critically assessed and should not merely be 
viewed as “liberal gains for the individual, or positive aspects of the decline of company 
paternalism”. Rather, one must consider that resource towns are unique places where the 
economic decisions have immediate implications for the community (Ostry & Davis, 
2009).
Within the study communities, as company discourse regarding communities 
began to shift, so did management’s focus on employment as the firm’s raison d'etre. 
Furthermore, firms began to reframe previously held responsibilities and obligations as
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secondary considerations that were now contingent upon market conditions and 
profitability. Local management placed greater emphasis on the local factors of 
production that needed to be harnessed to maximize productivity and profitability. This 
finding fits with Hayter (2000a) and Hayter and Barnes (1997) who found that corporate 
restructuring increased local management’s responsibility and accountability for 
profitability and productivity. As local managers accepted greater responsibility for 
profitability it gave them new priorities, responsibilities, and pressures with which to 
contend.
A unique contribution of this research was identifying how shifting priorities of 
local managers impacted forestry-dependent communities and community-company 
relationships. At the local-level, corporate restructuring was found to change community 
perceptions of managers, who were seen as having less autonomy. However, my analysis 
indicated they may actually have more autonomy, but are forced to adopt an increasingly 
economic logic when making decisions that impact the community. Put differently, after 
restructuring local managers were increasingly accountable for the profitability and 
productivity of local operations. Taken within this context, decreasing the provision of 
capital for community events, organizations, and initiatives can be viewed as a strategy to 
address mill balance sheets.
A unique finding from my research was that the changed corporate focus had an 
impact on the requisite skill-sets of local managers. This study revealed that 
contemporary local managers were hired for their business or university credentials. This 
marked a shift from previous managers who held experience by working their way up to 
managerial positions from the forest or shop floor. The earlier managers were generally
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held in higher regard within communities because they held many commonalities with
workers and their families. Newer managers were seen has having less in common with
workers and a limited understanding of the impacts of their decisions on communities.
Drushka’s (1985, p. 206) study of forestry restructuring found:
Characteristically, the managers [of the 1940s and 1950s] ... gained their 
experience of the forest industry, from bush to balance sheet.... Over the past 
twenty years or so, virtually the entire management structure of forestry 
corporations has been taken over by a class of professional managers.
The move towards university credentialed managers was driven by the increasingly 
complex technology that needed to be optimized within sawmills, the difficulty 
associated with coordinating an expanding number of mills within companies, and the 
increasingly global nature of markets.
These results also indicate that corporate restructuring impacted the movement 
and tenure of managers. This is consistent with the resource town literature where 
managers, skilled-workers, and professionals move to remote, rural communities looking 
to gain experience (Gill, 1990; Marchak, 1991). However, a unique finding from my 
study was that the tenure of local managers began decreasing beginning in the 1980s. As 
such, the turnover of local managers became more frequent as they were moved around 
to increase productivity. Newer managers with fewer personal relationships within the 
mill were viewed as being more apt to implement unfavourable decisions to address 
productivity.
My research found that these practices were undesirable for communities because 
of reduced community trust in managers and changed relations. Most notably, frequent 
turnover of local managers was found to adversely affect communication. Analysis
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indicated that communication between council and companies lost its personal feel and 
became more formalized due to the absence of personal relationships. However, these 
changes, which were instituted to increase mill productivity, were likely somewhat 
counter-productive as high levels of trust and strong relationships have been found to 
increase productivity (Boughner, 2009).
Corporate and government restructuring has also reduced the depth of local 
leadership within communities, making the transition from industrial forestry difficult. 
The loss of government and company personnel from communities has contributed to the 
loss of human capital and community leadership capacity. This was evident at the 
beginning of this research. While preparing lists of key-informants, the same names 
frequently appeared. While conducting my interviews it was apparent that a large number 
of leadership roles were being held by a small core group of individuals. Restructuring 
had eroded leadership capacities within the study communities and placed pressure on 
remaining leaders (Gill, 1990; Markey et al., 2006; 2010). The loss of even a few 
individuals from a community has the potential to place significant strain and fatigue on 
remaining leaders.
Within the literature, job loss is highlighted as one of the key community impacts 
associated with restructuring (Delcourt & Wilson, 1998; Dunk & Nelson, 1993). The core 
tenet of community-company relationships throughout Fordism was the provision of 
stable employment which gave way as companies sought flexibility by closing mills, 
substituting capital for labour, and modifying labour arrangements (Hayter & Barnes,
1997). The labour shedding throughout this period was permanent as companies sought 
to address increased competition, a depleting resource base, rising fiber costs, and
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changing public attitudes regarding resource use (Porter, 1991). Analysis indicated that 
this contributed to impersonal relationships and decreased attachment between companies 
and workers.
These results also indicate that the recession had different impacts on the Interior 
and Coastal regions of the province. Job loss in the Interior during the 1980s was 
persistent, but not as severe as on the Coast due to the age of infrastructure, the resource 
base, and changing markets. Mill modernization projects, particularly within sawmills, 
have steadily eliminated jobs since the 1960s. Job loss was certainly a concern for the 
study communities, however, this period was not characterized by the drastic layoffs 
associated with outright closures for most of the region. Rather, strikes were identified as 
key events that disrupted work as unions protested restructuring. This fits with empirical 
studies by Grass and Hayter (1989) and Hayter and Barnes (1992) that found 
employment losses following the recession were more severe on the Coast.
Throughout the 1990s companies increasingly focused on ratcheting up 
productivity. During this period, the provincial government adopted policies to encourage 
investment within the sector and to increase the competitiveness of the industry. For 
communities, this period was characterized by accelerating change, increased 
vulnerability, and erosion of resources and support. For companies, instability has 
prompted them to pressure the province and communities to create a business 
environment that is attractive for investment and increased competitiveness (BCCC, 
2006).
There was also a noticeable shift in regional development models from ‘top- 
down’ managerialism to ‘bottom-up’ entrepreneurialism. Under entrepreneurialism,
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communities are expected to move beyond providing services to take control of local
economic development. Advocates have argued that this model expands possibilities for
community development. However, this shift also expanded the complexity of economic
development (Cramer et al., 1993; Martin, 2006; Young, 2006a). Young (2008, p. 28)
argues that communities have been left to “find their own ways back into mainstream
economies” while government reduced key community services and supports. My results
show that under the entrepreneurial model, communities have opted to remain focused on
retaining and securing investment in industrial forestry rather than pursuing
diversification or embracing a fundamentally different vision of the economy.
Within the context of increasing global competition, the provincial government
and communities continually bargained with capital to retain jobs (Lane, 1988). This
study found that arrangements between communities and companies are weak and that
communities have difficulty striking equitable arrangements with companies because
bargaining is increasingly “asymmetrical” (Dicken et al., 1995, p. 42) or “lop-sided”
(Peck & Tickell, 1994a, p. 322). Dicken (1994, p. 123) states:
The problem facing the local community, in the global scheme of things, is that it 
is relatively powerless except in very specific circumstances (for example, where 
it possesses a unique or scarce resources that gives it some leverage). The idea 
that the transformations that are occurring in the organization of production 
systems (notably the growth of network organizations and relationships) will 
automatically lead to a general enhancement of local economic opportunity and 
well-being is a pipe dream.
In each study community, bargaining positions were uneven because of relationships of 
dependence and access to financial and human capital. At this point in time, very few 
communities possess the requisite resources or leverage to win equitable concessions
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from global capital. Indeed, the community members most likely to have such skills are 
often mill managers (Mascarenhas & Scarce, 2004).
Within the community economic development literature, post-productivist local 
economic development initiatives are seen as a viable and desirable response to 
restructuring. The study communities focused development planning and initiatives on 
maintaining productivism. This is due in part to recent investment by companies in large- 
scale operations. In Houston and Quesnel, investment in supermills had given the 
communities a temporary reprieve from the current economic downturn. This stability 
quelled any sense of urgency regarding economic diversification that exists in other 
forestry-dependent communities (Teitelbaum et al., 2003). However, as the closure of the 
mills in Mackenzie illustrated, stability resulting from investment in technology is only 
ever temporary.
In an effort to maintain productivism, communities have adopted a traditional 
‘booster’ approach to economic development. Analysis indicates that communities have 
adopted local economic development policies that focus on maintaining the status quo 
(i.e. industrial forestry). This approach has done little to shield communities from the 
current downturn. Similarly, the literature finds that this approach to economic 
development fails to develop or market local skills, entrepreneurship, or innovation 
(Collins & Quark, 2006; Hassink, 2010; Joshi et al., 2000; Kennedy et al., 2001; Mayer, 
1994). Opportunities for economic change will not occur if the structures, institutions, 
and transnational connections that contributed to uneven development are not addressed 
(Amin, 2005).
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When trying to attract and retain industry, communities often had little to bargain 
with besides tax concessions and lenient regulations. This approach to economic 
development does not fit with community economic development as it erodes local 
services and increases taxation for other industrial and residential payers (Bluestone & 
Harrison, 1982; Hanlon et al., 2007; Joshi et al., 2000; Slack et al., 2003). However, 
communities were constrained in their options making it hard to resist granting 
concessions because others were seen as willing to undercut them in what has been 
characterized as a ‘race to the bottom’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Warf, 2008). This has 
encouraged communities to bargain away the benefits of industry, which in-turn hinders 
diversification and contributes to vulnerability (Lyson, 2006; Norcliffe, 2005; Peck & 
Tickell, 1994b). Interestingly, there is a growing body of literature that indicates 
incentives are not effective in determining location decisions and actually contribute to 
uneven development (Glasmeier, 2000). Incentives offered by communities and 
governments are not large enough to offset the costs of certain locations. Communities 
with diversified economies and regional policies aimed at enhancing growth without 
sacrificing other opportunities are better able to withstand making concessions than 
single-industry communities (Agnew, 2000; Collins and Quark, 2006).
For the study communities, economic development planning continues to be 
reactive in nature. Despite recognizing the need for diversification, communities were 
unable to sustain focus, especially when times are good. This was illustrated in Houston 
and Quesnel where local mills did not experience shutdowns in the recent recession. 
However, in Mackenzie economic diversification planning took on a sense of immediacy 
because of the mill shutdowns. This reactive, ad hoc approach is not likely to be
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successful, as development requires longevity, focus, consistency, and stable funding 
(Clemenson, 1992; Markey, 2005; McTieman, 1999; Polese & Shearmur, 2002).
Governments and companies also assert that communities should be the central 
figures in economic development and regeneration. However, in the context of decreased 
funding and support, communities do not have the resources needed and lack control of 
the policy necessary to undertake these tasks effectively. This philosophy ignores 
inequalities present within BC’s core-periphery structure and threatens to further 
exacerbate longstanding uneven-development throughout the region. Similarly, Amin 
(2005, p. 622) finds, “the idea of wholesale economic regeneration through community 
involvement of one form or another is simply unrealistic, and potentially irresponsible, 
since the latter is rarely a pathway to formal employment or entrepreneurship among the 
socially excluded”.
Company discourse was an effective tool in shaping how communities viewed 
changing community-company relationships. This is supported by Bridge and McManus
(2000) who found forestry companies waged public campaigns to convince forestry 
communities and the province that their livelihoods depend upon forestry. In a similar 
vein, Freudenburg, Wilson, and O’Leary (1998) found company discourse in the United 
States framed environmental protection as threatening the very survival of timber 
dependent communities and regions. My research found that company discourse 
regarding communities, workers, and mills changed to reflect a heightened focus on 
profitability. Companies adopted the position that it was incumbent upon communities to 
compete for business. Therefore, communities entered into a bargaining process with 
companies because capital was perceived to be increasingly mobile.
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Companies frequently purported that local concessions needed to be made to 
avoid relocation or closure of operations (BCCC, 2006). Peck (2000b, p. 146) refers to 
this strategy as the “tyranny of (potential) capital mobility” where workers and 
communities are engaged in restructuring processes in an effort to retain competitive and 
productive local economies. This type of bargaining is possible because capital is 
perceived to be more mobile than labour or communities; the spectre of flight creates 
opportunities for capital (Piven, 1995; Warf, 2008). Herod (2001) and Prudham (1998) 
find that multinational companies are able to use this - real or perceived - threat to 
leverage communities, labour, and governments to obtain concessions by playing them 
against one another.
An important finding from my research was that at the local-level company 
discourse focused on the importance of fostering an appropriate atmosphere for industry. 
Company discourse depicted changes in relationships at the local scale as being driven by 
global issues. This strategy is often employed to portray the company as being powerless 
over decisions, which serves to relinquish them from taking responsibility for their 
consequences (Dunk, 2002; Stoddart, 2007). In a study of restructuring on the north 
Coast, Rajala (2006) found that companies associated failing mills with inordinate 
demands from communities, usually in the form of taxation. Company discourse framed 
local factors, such as community attitude and approach to industry, as being on par with 
regional and global factors such as commodity prices, timber costs and availability, 
international markets, and an appreciating Canadian dollar. For instance, New Skeena 
CEO Daniel Veniez blamed the failure of the company on the “self-destructive and self- 
important bright lights of local government” in Terrace (quoted in Rajala, p. 232).
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Companies’ discourse with labour also changed. Management increasingly called 
for union officials and mill workers to raise productivity. Local managers would compare 
the productivity of local mills to others within the company, the province, and the world 
(Hayter & Barnes, 1997). As the President of PPWC Local 18 in Mackenzie stated, 
“more often than not meetings were used to tell us how bad things were and how we 
would have to tighten our belts at a time when there were record profits at our site” 
(Kipke, 1994, p. 4). Workers indicated they began to feel pushed to become or remain 
‘top quartile’ producers. Phelps and Waley’s (2004) case study of restructuring at Black 
and Decker found that intracorporate competition is an effective tool for reducing costs 
and increasing productivity.
In Mackenzie, corporate discourse surrounding the state of the industry coupled 
with the structure of the local economy shaped community responses to the current 
economic downturn. Interviewees indicated they needed to adapt, as change in forestry 
was inevitable and necessary. Tenure, forestry policy, labour arrangements, community 
demands, and company practices were portrayed as subject to the needs of capital. When 
workers and communities face threats to the viability of industries they depend upon, and 
they have few options for recourse, they are more likely to accept strategies forwarded by 
local management (Smith, 2001).
Corporate discourse has been a powerful and effective agent for change within 
forestry communities (Rajala, 1993). This strategy was not simply implemented in 
response to the current downturn. Since the 1980s forestry companies in BC have adapted 
to the changing public discourse surrounding forestry (Bridge & McManus, 2000). My 
research found that in the periphery, companies have used discourse to push communities
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to identify, create, and exploit various local characteristics to remain competitive for 
capital. In Quesnel, the municipal council gave West Fraser large tax concessions to 
secure investment in a new sawmill. In Mackenzie, the community worked with 
companies and the province during this recent downturn to address outstanding taxes. 
Municipal council was also called on to lobby the government regarding fiber 
arrangements to make shuttered mills attractive to investors. Canfor decided to reopen the 
mill in 2010 when workers accepted pay cuts (almost 30%), council cut property taxes by 
25% for three years, and the stumpage for spruce was reduced (Ebner, 2010). In Houston, 
council worked to cultivate a ‘pro-business culture’ geared towards industrial forestry. 
This involved addressing the needs of industry as they arose, working with industry to 
ensure bylaws were not overly restrictive, and alleviating demands on industry during 
downturns.
The adoption of a neoliberal policy focus by successive provincial governments 
has served to ‘hollow out’ communities by shifting various responsibilities, including 
economic development, to local governments (Barnes et al., 2000; Bryden & Munro, 
2001; Peck & Tickell, 1994b; Prudham, 2008b). Government has been less willing, or 
able, to play a direct role in local development which has been characterized as an 
offloading of responsibilities (Hanlon et al., 2007; Markey et al., 2008). At the same time 
government required less of companies in terms of their obligations to communities 
(Burda et al., 1998), which can be seen as part of the BC Liberal party’s strategy to create 
prime conditions for business and investment (Munro, 2004). Young & Matthews (2007) 
found these policies could be interpreted as an attempt to free companies from their 
community obligations. Young (2008, p. 30) and Burda et al. (1998, p. 67) purport that
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government policy during this period separated communities and forestry companies to
address industry competitiveness, respectively:
Within a few short years, the notion that the role of government was to promote 
stability and the co-development of rural industry and community has been 
replaced by the idea that distinct and separate corporate resource and community- 
based economies are both possible and desirable — that these must be “liberated” 
from one another so that each may be independently “re-aligned” to the demands 
of broader economic forces.
Throughout British Columbia, forest-dependent communities are held hostage by 
their over-reliance on a single corporate employer who, in turn, is driven by the 
international marketplace to downsize or relocate when supplies run short or rates 
of return fall below the industry average.... more and more communities are 
experiencing the vulnerability that results from this, while the industries turn to 
the province for more timber, more financial assistance, and fewer controls.
Within the study communities, this shift was symbolized by the removal of appurtenance 
clauses. Community members indicated that appurtenance was symbolic of commitment 
by the province and companies to provide for communities (Nelson et al., 2006; 
Prudham, 2008a).
My case study found that companies viewed changes to policy as necessary to 
ensure efficient operations. A unique finding was that companies have adopted the stance 
that community issues are now ‘beyond their purview’. However, analysis indicated that 
companies are still involved in community governance, via their influence over planning 
initiatives, local taxation, and service provision. Companies are indirectly involved in 
issues that have the potential to impact profitability or disrupt local operations. However, 
companies are less willing to assist communities with issues that impact community 
welfare (Beckley & Reimer, 1999; Lyson, 2006).
Furthermore, despite claiming that they should not have a formal role in 
community governance, companies pressured communities to work to address issues of
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profitability. This meant reduced expenditures, curtailed production, and pressuring 
contractors to lower costs and modify contracts. Within Mackenzie, companies closed 
operations and diverted capital and fiber to other operations until the market recovered. 
Bowles et al. (2002) reported similar findings in their case study of corporate 
concentration in the Prince George TSA. Research conducted by Zietsma and Vertinsky
(2001) and Raizada (1998) found that company involvement in voluntary programs or 
initiatives is subject to profitability. These studies found that, beginning in the late 1990s, 
Canfor retreated from various company-led environmental practices when faced with 
declining profitability. Companies were found to engage in voluntarily initiatives until 
“there were ... conflicting demands for scarce capital” (Raizada, 1998, p. 252).
Analysis indicated that there has not been a marked shift towards product 
differentiation or market diversification within local mills. Throughout this period local 
operations remained focused on the production of dimension lumber and pulp. In terms of 
solid wood sectors, the availability of beetle killed wood, growth of the US housing 
market, and an appreciating Canadian dollar entrenched the strategy of high volume 
production (Woodbridge and Associates, 2009). Mill managers indicated that the current 
economic downturn has refocused company efforts on the production of core products in 
which they are globally comparative low cost producers. There has been a tendency for 
companies to follow the trusted strategy of investing in technology to reduce production 
costs. In terms of markets, the Interior has continued to rely heavily upon the United 
States. The quotas established in the 1996 softwood lumber agreement allowed Interior 
mills to continue exporting lumber to the American market, an option that was not so
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available to Coastal mills. John Allan, president of the COFI, (quoted in Hamilton, 2009; 
para. 4) stated that:
The Interior industry, which makes up the bulk of the province's forestry sector, 
has been built around delivering two-by-fours to the U.S. housing construction 
market and despite new initiatives such as bio-energy and new markets in Asia, 
we are going to have to depend on that (U.S.) market for years to come.
Recent rationalization and consolidation trends within the region, specifically the 
growth of Canfor and West Fraser, have impacted communities in different ways. In 
Quesnel, consolidation has served to make the community heavily reliant upon one 
employer. Contractors indicated that this is undesirable as they have little recourse if 
issues arise with West Fraser. For Houston and Quesnel, an advantage of consolidation 
was to create a buffer as local supermills were amongst the most efficient operations 
within the companies. However, Mackenzie was adversely impacted as lower 
productivity and declining profitability prompted companies to close mills to conserve 
capital. Less beetle killed wood meant that forests within the region could also be 
reserved for future production. This is consistent with trends throughout the region where 
rationalization has led to the closing of small, inefficient mills in close proximity to large 
mills and the diversion of fiber to newer efficient mills (Nelson etal., 2006).
From the community perspective, corporate consolidation was seen as 
contributing to a disconnect between corporate decision-makers and communities. These 
decision-makers were perceived as having fewer incentives to designate capital for 
community needs. Indeed, many indicated that they felt corporate decision-makers had 
little idea of the challenges and issues facing individual communities. Research on 
community-company relationships in American textile manufacturing communities also
238
found that corporate consolidation has increased the detachment between communities 
and corporate decision-makers (Collins & Quark, 2006). This reduced the ability of 
communities to engage companies in the social economy.
82.  Why have companies changed their approach to communities over time?
My case study found that community-company relationships changed because 
companies faced a rapidly changing operating environment. Beginning in the 1980s, 
reduced profitability due to increased competition, changing public values, increasing 
volatility in the marketplace, a changing approach of the provincial and federal 
government, and insecurity over the resource base forced companies to reconfigure 
production. As Bourne (2000) notes, dependence and vulnerability are likely to become 
worse due to globalization, the liberalization of trade, increased competition, and a 
changing resource base.
The most visible implications of globalization for communities were changes to 
industry structure. Beginning in the 1980s, local sawmills and pulp mills increasingly 
changed hands. In Mackenzie the community experienced a steady stream of company 
entrances and exits as mills were bought and sold. The results showed that this 
contributed to increased detachment between companies and communities (Wilson,
1998). This stemmed from frustration amongst community members who felt their 
economic fortunes were tied to mills that were geographically isolated from corporate 
decision-makers. Lethinen et al. (2004, p. 18) notes that mergers and acquisitions have a 
very tangible effect on the ‘closeness’ of community-company relationships:
The current reorganization has surfaced in cases where new corporations have
become connected to mills and communities in distant places of which they have
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limited knowledge. From a local viewpoint, historical dependencies between the 
mill and the community might suddenly have been lost as a result of a merger at 
the macro-level, which in turn brought new owners with new practices for dealing 
with employees, unions, local communities, and the environment.
Local forestry companies such as Canfor and West Fraser were also changing as
they became increasingly global in terms of their operations by investing heavily in mills
located in the American south and across the globe. The fortunes of forestry companies
were perceived as being decreasingly linked to the success of individual mills and
communities reducing the necessary relations outside of mills. In Houston and
Mackenzie, significant investment by the original companies in the mills and community
infrastructure gave them a financial interest in the success of the operations and
communities until this investment was recovered. In this respect, paternalism was
desirable because it gave communities power when negotiating relationships. As noted,
globalization and the perceived hyper-mobility of capital has turned the tables on
communities, forcing them to bargain away previously held benefits associated with
industry. Wilson (1998, p. 31) outlines the different positions occupied by companies and
communities when facing risk and uncertainty:
It can be speculated that this transformation in the industry’s approach reflected 
the increasingly disparate perspectives of companies and their workers in an era of 
globalism. That is, the developments underlying the string of company exits and 
entrances ... widened the gap in perspectives between ‘rooted’ workers with 
limited options on one hand, and managers of mobile capital on the other. Forest 
industry workers based in small communities may be excused for reacting more 
desperately to threats ... than do CEOs and company directors who perceive other 
options for the pools of capital under their direction.
During the current economic downturn, communities indicated that they 
increasingly recognized the relationship between global factors and their local
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economies. Many pointed out that work has become increasingly temporary and unstable.
In Mackenzie, residents were dismayed that profitable local mills did not ensure
continued employment. This strategy is not unique to the study communities or forestry,
it is true of capitalism. Fixed investment is subject to devaluation over time. Capital is
always looking for opportunities to capture future surplus value in other places (Mitchell,
2005). The resource town literature is replete with examples of companies diverting
capital generated from a local mill to other operations outside of the community or region
(Bates, 2006; Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983; Hayter, 2000b; Leach & Winson, 1999). Over
time these mills often become obsolete and are sold and restructured or closed.
Companies may also shutdown profitable mills to divert capital to operations with even
lower costs (Krogman & Beckley, 2002).
This study also found that accelerated change in forestry companies’ business
environment contributed to changes in community-company relationships. Declining
profitability forced companies to focus on the local and global processes impacting
markets and production. The results indicate companies responded to declining
profitability by allocating less time and money to communities. Apsey (2006, pp. 99-101)
describes how the changing business environment forced companies to refocus their
efforts on addressing encroachment by global competition:
In today’s hypercompetitive, market-driven, globalized world economy of the 
twenty-first century, it’s hard to recapture the atmosphere of the BC lumber 
industry in the post-war boom years. In the fifties, there were no marketing 
departments at wood products companies; there were sales people, to be sure, but 
their primary task was to “allocate production.” Demand was so great, and supply 
so comparatively limited, in those days that the problem was to see that customers 
got their share of two-by-fours, floor joists, and pulp and paper.
By the 1970s, other producers had come into the field and the superheated 
markets were fading to moderately warm. Sales departments had to go out and
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sell. ... It was a time when everyone sensed the world was changing... the pace of 
change was accelerating and its scope was widening...
Another driver of change in community-company relationships was uncertainty 
regarding the future of the local resource base. Past management practices have forced 
companies to expand logging operations farther away from mills to secure adequate 
timber supplies (Marchak, 1995). Currently the MPB outbreak is threatening the stability 
of local economies, as the availability, quality, and cost of fiber will be adversely 
impacted. The outbreak has significant implications for the future timber supply and the 
ability of industry to return to business-as-usual (Patriquin et al., 2007).
Investment by companies in supermills throughout the region was a response to 
AAC uplifts associated with salvaging economic value from beetle killed wood. This has 
created a small number of highly efficient sawmilling centres throughout the northern 
Interior. In Quesnel, the community experienced a temporary boom driven by the 
availability of large amounts of cheap timber (Nelson, 2007). This is nothing new for the 
community; Marchak (1991) found that a pine beetle outbreak in the 1980s was also 
responsible for ramping up production. The sustainability of supermills in Houston and 
Quesnel was questioned as mill capacities exceed local timber supplies. The results 
indicate that companies with smaller mills would likely be forced to shut down 
operations or import fiber.
It is expected that a period of rationalization will occur within the sawmill 
industry after significant reductions in the wood supply related to the pine beetle 
outbreak. A report by Woodbridge and Associates (2009) predicts the sawmill sector will 
become smaller and leaner in the future. It is likely that trends associated with
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restructuring will intensify as industry adapts to the impacts of the pine beetle. For 
forestry-dependent communities, continued rationalization of the industry will likely 
contribute to increasing uneven development throughout the region as smaller mills are 
closed. Rationalization is also expected to contribute to increased dependence upon fewer 
forestry companies. From the company perspective this is undesirable, as they will be 
increasingly called upon for support and participation within communities and local 
businesses will have fewer choices regarding contracts, less work, and increased 
competition from external suppliers.
This research found that government discourse regarding the future of the 
region’s economy has encouraged the maintenance of resource industries. While 
economic diversification is touted as a preferable local economic development strategy, 
new opportunities within resource sectors are actively promoted. Analysis indicated that 
government continues to envision the northern Interior as productive space, dominated by 
staples extraction. Sustained focus on future bioenergy projects and new mining 
opportunities encourage continued reliance on resource development. With regards to 
forestry, government discourse has encouraged continued economic specialization. The 
promise of new Chinese markets for dimension lumber and pulp have encouraged 
communities to remain focused on forestry. In effect, this has discouraged economic 
diversification by curbing the sense of urgency amongst workers and local government 
officials. As such, new opportunities in mining and forestry remain the cornerstones of 
many local economic development plans (Nelsen et al., 2010).
An explanation for the continued focus on resource development from the 
literature is that provincial governments are also ‘addicted’ to resource revenues
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(Clement & Williams, 1997; Gunton, 2003; Markey et al., 2008; Robbins, 1998). My
research found that mixed messages from government touting diversification and
continued specialization, encouraged communities to focus economic development
efforts on new opportunities in resource industries. Analysis further suggests that this is
linked to a history of regional and economic development based on resource extraction
and processing. Similarly, Bridge and McManus (2000), Burda et al. (1998), Black
(1989), and M’Gonigle (1999) assert that the provincial government is resistant to
challenge the prevailing industrial forestry framework because of dependence on
revenues and the close linkage between economic development and resource exploitation,
regardless of their political orientation. Burda et al. (1998, p. 47) indicate that:
Land tenure redistribution, administrative reorganization, and economic 
redirection... are inconceivable within the current structures of the BC state, 
whether ruled by a Social Credit, Liberal, or New Democratic administration.
State authorities are quite simply too deeply implicated in the forest industry -  
economically, administratively, technically, and institutionally -  to conceive of 
alternatives outside the status quo [emphasis added].
Declining resource revenues have reduced the government’s ability to assist forestry 
communities during restructuring (Binkley, 2000). However, this shortfall comes at a 
time when communities are in greatest need of assistance.
There is an inherent tension between company and community expectations 
regarding the nature of relationships. This tension is rooted in a ‘social contract’ linking 
forest utilization to community stability. Communities strongly feel that the forest 
industry has a responsibility to address employment stability and play a role in 
community development. Interviewees in this research stressed that changes to how 
industry operates within communities are not just about the economy; this view is too
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narrow. The roles companies assume have implications for the social and economic well­
being of communities (Gale & Gale, 2006). Despite restructuring and policy changes 
aimed at freeing up capital and encouraging international competitiveness, companies 
remain integral local institutions due to their influence over local economy, rhythm, 
culture, and governance.
Furthermore, companies continue to rely on communities to play important roles 
in production. Indeed, Cox and Mair (1988) highlight that despite companies’ efforts to 
eliminate local dependence, it remains a necessity. The case study communities continue 
to be remote, rural places located adjacent to resources. Local managers and community 
leaders indicated that well serviced communities play an important role in attracting and 
retaining workers to rural and remote places. These results indicated that during 
downturns skilled workers are the first to leave and they are the hardest to attract back. At 
the time of this writing, companies are struggling to recruit skilled labour back to the 
region as lumber prices rebound (Hamilton, 2011). Companies attempted to address this 
in Mackenzie by keeping a core group of skilled labour hired at the mills while laying off 
production workers. At one of the mills, skilled workers were kept on to patrol the empty 
mill as security guards. In the case of the Pope and Talbot pulp mill, skilled workers were 
retained because they were seen as being integral to the salability of the mill.
Analysis indicated there are contradictions between company discourse and 
actions regarding the importance of communities in production. Company discourse 
insists that communities place too many demands on capital, making them unattractive 
places to do business. As such, companies have increased pressure on communities for 
concessions to increase flexibility. However, forestry companies continue to rely on
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communities to fulfil many of their traditional roles. Furthermore, companies continue to 
play important indirect roles in service planning and provision and various community 
policies thought to impact operations, suggesting that contrary to discourse, companies 
and communities continue to rely upon one another.
While industry has been quick to point out that taxation levels between residential 
and industrial users are disproportionate, nothing was said about impacts of their usage 
relative to residential users. Companies also fail to acknowledge that the structure of 
forestry-dependent economies discourages the development of other industries, which 
might have shouldered the cost of providing local services (Freudenburg & Gramling, 
1998; Hessing & Howlett, 1997; Slack etal., 2003; Polese & Shearmur, 2006). Similarly, 
Slack et al. (2003) found that tax assessments on resource-based industries are higher in 
rural remote communities due to the absence of other industrial and commercial 
ratepayers and the high costs of providing services within these communities.
Besides reduced involvement outside of the mill, companies also adopted a 
different approach to communities. Communities characterized this new approach as a 
corporate approach to business. Analysis indicated companies increasingly adopted an 
economic rationale towards community involvement and dealings with local businesses. 
An important finding from my research was that local businesses were particularly 
impacted by this strategy. Certainty and stability were drastically reduced for local retail 
outlets, contractors, and service businesses as forestry companies moved to become lean 
and flexible. While community groups and organizations looked to members for funding 
as corporate donations dried up, local businesses had fewer options. For local businesses, 
the main issue became how to offset the loss of business in a remote, rural setting.
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While industry and government are clearly attempting to generate a fix for the 
crisis within the forestry sector, there is an urgent need to reassess support for 
communities. While this research did not find any evidence that a return to top-down 
paternalism would be beneficial or desired, there was clear evidence that support from 
government and companies is needed in the form of financing, planning, and 
infrastructure. This fits with the rural development and restructuring literatures that 
identify the need to balance company and government support with community 
independence (Teitelbaum et al., 2003; Halseth et al., 2010).
Communities will require support and resources to transition from, or lessen, 
staples dependence. They cannot be left to fend for themselves by industry and 
government. Inadequate support would likely exacerbate relationships and economies of 
dependence, vulnerability, and disparity. As Amin (2005, p. 630) states, “regeneration 
cannot be a localist affair or a matter of local responsibility alone, but has to be part of a 
wider political economy of decentred power and redistributive justice”. This will require 
government, communities, and companies to enter into new relationships based on 
support and reciprocity rather than on dependence and reliance.
My research found that productivism is still engrained within forestry-dependent 
communities and the provincial government. Communities drew upon Fordist 
relationships and practices because they had been successful for decades. Markey et al. 
(2005, p. 54) find “the inertia of past practices and relationships continue” to influence 
local and regional development. This finding differs from MacKinnon and Nelson (2005, 
p. 42) who suggest that BC’s staples mentality has shifted because of economic 
restructuring:
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The deep recession of the 1980s influenced more than just the way staples 
industries do business. It also had an impact on the province’s staples mentality... 
In the Lower Mainland core, and in the periphery, there is now a general 
acknowledgement that staples industries, for a variety of economic and 
environmental reasons, will and should play a less significant role British 
Columbia’s economic future.
This case study found there is no widespread acknowledgement at the 
community-level that forestry should play a smaller role in local economies. Rather, a 
few local leaders, entrepreneurs, and mill managers have championed the need for 
diversification. These voices represented a minority within communities, who struggled 
against local elites and community members favouring continued reliance on industrial 
forestry. This has always been the case. Historically, concern regarding the absence of 
diversification has been limited to industry downturns perceived by many to be 
temporary in nature. A prominent issue facing local governments involves trying to 
sustain focus on issues associated with dependence once crises are temporarily abated.
The resource town literature suggests that communities and regions become 
‘trapped’ or ‘addicted’, implying they cannot overcome the allure of resource industries 
and that development becomes truncated (Freudenburg, 1992). In the study communities, 
this fear appears to be well founded. However, it is important to note that staples 
development does not guarantee the staples trap as governments and communities can 
work to address risks (Gunton, 2003). Governments should focus on diverting rents back 
into the regional economy to stimulate growth. If communities can sustain the sense of 
urgency surrounding this downturn and are supported by companies and governments, 
they have a unique opportunity to implement change. Investment has provided Houston 
and Quesnel with time to address dependence. In Mackenzie, a group of residents with
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strong ties to the community have identified that they have no wish to leave the 
community. As the mills are reopened, council will have the support needed to focus on 
addressing the local economy.
Despite finding that communities have continued to focus on industrial forestry 
and resource development, a few entrepreneurs and strong local leaders exist within each 
community. They suggested that a lack of ideas is not the paramount issue hampering 
growth and change (Hayter, 2000a). Analysis indicated that small businesses faced a 
number of local and structural constraints that were difficult to overcome without support 
from all levels of government. In terms of local conditions, local attitudes regarding 
acceptable wages, the predominance of large industry in local government planning, and 
inadequate infrastructure were key barriers to the establishment and growth of local 
businesses (Halseth & Sullivan, 2002; MacKendrick & Parkins, 2004; Polese & 
Shearmur, 2002; Walter, 1997).
In terms of structural issues, this study revealed that access to fiber or reliance on 
a large forestry company for fiber hindered the development and establishment of 
different forestry and value-added businesses. Individuals interested in starting a business 
indicated that access to fiber was a key impediment in securing financing and starting up 
operations. Managers in secondary manufacturing enterprises largely secured their fiber 
by utilizing free wood wastes from large industrial mills. They indicated that this made it 
difficult to plan for the future because allocation was contingent upon the price and 
availability of fiber.
Finally, communities hold fast to the idea that local timber should support local 
communities. This ideal was rooted in the Sloan Commission and the adoption of
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sustained yield (Prudham, 2007). This local institution is as powerful as any other when 
envisaging the social responsibilities of the forestry sector within BC. My study found 
that communities actively resist the needs of capital insofar as they go against providing 
benefit to their community. Companies agreed in principle that timber should benefit the 
people of BC because it was their timber. However, companies adopted a narrower 
definition of benefit than communities; usually limited to employment. Industry felt 
addressing competitiveness would ensure the continuance of forestry jobs in some form, 
which in turn, would benefit the province.
In many ways the landscape of the northern Interior was specifically configured to 
support large-scale resource extraction by successive rounds of investment and activity. 
A constellation of resource-dependent communities was built to house large workforces 
and the dedicated transportation, power, and municipal infrastructures built for primary 
manufacturing are a legacy of this economic development vision. Harvey (1978) asserts 
that capital works to create a landscape, or built environment, that supports accumulation. 
However, this ‘spatial fix’ is only ever temporary and as a result the landscape must be 
destroyed and rebuilt with each crisis (Barnes, 2005; Schoenberger, 2004). As Harvey 
(1978, p. 124) states, “capital builds a physical landscape appropriate to its own condition 
at a particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of a crisis, 
at a subsequent point in time”. The built landscape and institutions have important 
implications for the regional economy of the northern Interior into the future.
For communities, upgrading of aging transportation, power, and communications 
infrastructure will be but one post-Fordist requirement. During the development of the 
region under Fordism, companies moved north to exploit vast, untapped forestry
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resources. As such, growth or creation of communities was associated with their location
relative to timber stands and mineral deposits. However, the distance from other resource
communities, transportation corridors, and urban centres poses obstacles to developing
knowledge-based or service economies (Slack et al., 2003). Also, during Fordism
companies were able to bear the costs associated with vast distances because of
favourable commodity prices and high global demand. Large multinational corporations
pursuing economies of scale were able to overcome expansive distances. In a study of
restructuring in rural BC, Young (2006a) found that small firms in isolated rural
communities did not possess the capital or influence necessary to forge stable networks
and movements across vast spaces.
Communities are facing new opportunities as corporations and government have
expanded their responsibilities. However, the bounties associated with these new
opportunities remain elusive as old power imbalances and approaches to planning, land
use, and regulation persist (Hutton, 2002; Young, 2006a). Interviewees advocating
diversification and economic change indicated that communities have to stop equating
regional and community development with productivism. As Burda and M’Gonigle
(1996, p. 51) assert, communities will need to adopt a transformative approach to local
economic development that involves looking beyond forestry:
Forestry-oriented CED strategies in British Columbia have largely failed... a 
community suffering from the effects of resource depletion has little to gain by 
adopting a strategy aimed at continuing, or accelerating, unsustainable rates of 
resource utilization by building even bigger [forestry] facilities.
The new economy in rural BC will likely involve a combination of new and traditional 
industries. Hutton (2002) and Halseth et al. (2010) suggest that regional development will
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involve finding the ‘appropriate mix’ of resource industries and diversification efforts. 
The competitive advantages that fostered the rapid development of industrial forestry in 
the region remain. This research suggests that transition to a new economy will be 
difficult and painful, as the vestiges of Fordism (i.e. institutions, infrastructure, and 
culture) remain prominent. Given the challenges that are faced by rural communities 
today, this poses important questions that must be addressed by community, company, 
and government actors.
Regarding the need for a different approach to regional development, 
communities have recognized the need for diversification of local forestry sectors, but 
this has not resulted in action. This has occurred in part because communities have 
longstanding experience with the forestry sector and are amidst a built landscape 
dedicated to industrial forestry (Barnes & Hutton, 2009). In this respect, communities 
have developed expertise in resource industries, as they are located on the front lines of 
production. Diversification is another matter altogether. As Gertler (2003) points out, a 
region’s institutions, infrastructure, and culture can be an asset or a liability to change. 
Further, many of the ideas for diversification come from other places (Mackenzie, 1987). 
For instance, many economic development plans have focused on developing tourist 
sectors, amenities and, value-added business. While these options may be desirable and 
viable, they need to be configured and implemented in a way that harnesses the unique 
aspects of place and fit into a coordinated regional vision.
New industries and continued restructuring of the forestry sector will require a 
new type of workforce. The literature suggests that this workforce will be highly 
educated and sought after. The creative economy literature suggests this labour force will
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have different demands regarding amenities, lifestyle, and quality-of-life (Florida, 2002).
Evidence shows that the new economy has bypassed many places because of its demands
for these specific amenities and specialized labour forces (Glasmeier, 2000). These
requirements would seem to present an important barrier to isolated resource-dependent
communities (Joshi et al., 2000). For instance, Slack et al. (2003) find that isolation and
limited employment opportunities make resource-dependent communities less attractive
to highly educated individuals. Longstanding outmigration of young people has
reinforced lower levels of educational attainment amongst remaining residents. As such,
the new economy will require an investment by communities and regions in training and
education (Gertler et al., 2000).
Polese & Shearmur (2006) also identify a number of issues linked with being
remote that contribute to higher costs and reduced access to services required by
knowledge-based industries. Increased transportation costs have been found to curb the
development of new industries and limit service delivery. It has also been found that
great distance between entrepreneurs, suppliers, and customers limits face-to-face
interaction, which hinders innovation (Drayse, 2010; Gertler et al., 2000). Finally, it may
not be possible to substitute for local labour shortages with commuters in many resource
towns; some communities are more peripheral than others. This issue was raised
throughout the research where both distance and weather conditions limited the viability
of commuting into, or out of, communities. As Bourne (2000, p. 95) states:
Nor does it appear likely that the ‘new’ information or knowledge economy will 
solve many, if any, of the problems of the periphery, at least not for most 
peripheries. Technological innovations and the communications explosion, for 
example, do not seem to have reduced the locational disadvantages facing most 
peripheries, even when the ‘friction of distance’ costs for information distribution 
are significantly reduced. In fact, these same trends may well have contributed to
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a further concentration of wealth and power in the metropolitan areas of the core 
regions.
Resource dependence undermined communities’ efforts to attract investment and 
a different type of workforce. Diversification was also increasingly difficult as forestry 
was viewed as a sunset industry. As such, entrepreneurs were unwilling to invest capital 
in communities because they were perceived to be risky places. A stark example of this 
was during the current economic downturn, Mackenzie was recognized internationally as 
a ‘dying’ town (Faiola, 2008). Local government officials felt this compounded 
longstanding barriers to attracting and retaining businesses and workers. As Bluestone 
and Harrison (1982) found, prolonged economic hardship also makes communities 
unattractive places for investment of any kind.
It is important to note that the physical environment does not determine 
communities’ futures; rather it creates circumstances unique to resource towns in BC’s 
hinterland. Communities, companies, and the provincial government will have to tailor 
efforts to account for local peculiarities. For instance, the study communities possessed a 
number of resources including natural amenities, resource endowments, small town life, 
and commitment to place. However, many communities in the Interior will need to find 
different ways to utilize these assets to successfully respond to restructuring (Halseth et 
al., 2010). Further, community members have strong attachments to the community, each 
other, and the land (England & Brown, 2003; Mackenzie, 1987). Many indicated that 
both small town and northern life tied them to the region. Attachment to place in the 
midst of restructuring was an important form of local resistance to the whims and 
demands of the global economy (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Norcliffe, 2005). As
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community members remain within communities, despite the vagaries associated with the 
future of the forestry sector, old assumptions about the local economy are slowly being 
challenged. Furthermore, the small town way of life, northern lifestyles and culture are 
assets that can be utilized as building-blocks for regional development (Everitt & Gill, 
1993; Markey et al., 2006).
The unique characteristics of the region and forestry-dependent communities 
highlight the need for both provincial and federal governments to assist the development 
and implementation of a regional strategy for economic development. Government will 
need to address cuts to services that have accumulated since the 1980s recession and 
implement a new system of allocating funding to rural and remote settlements (Hanlon & 
Halseth, 2005; Reed, 2003b). Greater attention to the peculiarities of place is required to 
provide effective services in the northern Interior (Hanlon et al., 2007). Establishing 
funding levels based on population may suffice in southern locales where rural 
settlements are close to service centres (Hessing & Howlett, 1997). However, in the 
northern Interior, communities are often separated from services by hundreds of 
kilometres. It is also important to note that drive times can be significantly lengthened in 
winter. Investment in communities will help attract and retain human and financial 
capital within the region.
It is important to note that while some communities will experience decline, this 
does not mean they will necessarily disappear (Polese & Shearmur, 2006). Decline, like 
growth, is neither good nor bad, but carries with it new challenges associated with the 
provision of services, decreased municipal revenue, demands on human capital, and 
clashes with established institutions. The post-Fordism literature indicates that local
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expectations and goals need to be recalibrated for current realities. Communities must 
work to envision a future with a realistic economy and population base. Some 
communities will experience a drop in population and employment levels relative to 
those experienced during Fordism. As such, the responsibility of local development 
initiatives and officers should not necessarily focus on maintaining the status quo, as this 
may hinder change efforts (Wilson, 2004). Maintaining a population base, labour force, 
and tax base similar to those held during Fordism will not be possible in many cases. 
Instead, communities need to determine what type of future is both possible and desirable 
and work towards self-reliance (Ambard et al., 2005).
The rural and local economic development literatures have found that since the 
1980s regional development policy has encouraged communities to compete rather than 
cooperate with one another for funding and jobs (Cox & Mair, 1988; Kelly & Ilbery, 
1995; Warf, 2008). Research suggests that new knowledge economies will require 
regional cooperation and collaboration (Gertler, 2005; Markey et al., 2006; 
Schoenberger, 1999; Vodden, 2010) and that state policies play an integral role in 
shaping regional development (Gertler et al., 2000). Communities that do not have strong 
local leadership that is willing to cooperate and promote a coherent plan for development 
are unlikely to succeed in the new economy.
There is still the need for a strong vision of regional development from the 
province, supported by strategic investment. Provincial governments since the 1950s 
have reduced support for things like infrastructure throughout the region while continuing 
to rely on resource revenues (Halseth, 2010; Markey et al., 2008; Stefanick, 2001). New 
development initiatives require adequate and appropriate infrastructure to succeed
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(Halseth et al., 2010; Reed, 2003b) coupled with support for locally owned businesses
and entrepreneurship (Varghese et al., 2006). Community services are also required to
encourage investment in diversification and to retain a healthy, productive population
(Bourne, 2000; Markey, 2010; Ostry & Davis, 2009; Sommers & Birss, 1991).
Commenting on the continued need for strong state intervention in forestry-dependent
regions, Joshi et al. (2000, p. 315) find:
In all likelihood, the pulp and paper industry, and the forests upon which it 
depends, will continue to be the backbone of rural Alabama’s economy. With 
adequate environmental protection and appropriate economic and social policy, 
especially improved investments in human capital, the forest could provide the 
foundation for the sustainable development of rural Alabama and much of the 
South.
My study showed that investment by the forestry sector has created temporary 
shelter within the region. Some communities have experienced erosion of long-term 
stability because investment has been made in other places, while others have gained 
temporary stability (Beckley & Krogman, 2002; Lier, 2007). Disparities between 
communities within the periphery are likely to widen, as investment is concentrated in a 
few places (Bourne, 2000; Dicken, 1994). This research found that investment has 
created opportunities for some communities to address diversification. Supermills have 
given local businesses, workers, and government time to address pressing issues because 
they are not engaged in economic triage like Mackenzie. Investment was also found to 
give Houston and Quesnel a greater ability to negotiate community-company 
relationships. However, this is likely to decline over time as restructuring intensifies 
within the region and companies redirect financial capital to other regions.
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8 3 . Conclusion
This thesis explored how and why community-company relationships have 
changed over time. This research was motivated by changes to the foundations of rural 
economies that left many rural residents and places facing uncertain futures. Analysis 
revealed that community-company relationships have changed over time. These data 
outline different eras of relationships including: institutionalized paternalism that 
coincided with Fordism, and retrenchment of company involvement beginning with the 
recessions in the 1980s and 1990s.
Changes to companies’ operating environment, the resource base, and formal 
requirements outlined in policy explain changes to relationships. Communities have 
struggled as a result of changing relationships and resisted retrenchment and withdrawal 
with varying degrees of success. While changes where negotiated, they had to contend 
with local histories of investment, resistance, and the resource base, as well as an 
increasingly asymmetrical power balance.
My research found that changes to relationships are beginning to challenge many 
of the old assumptions associated with community stability and resource-dependence. 
Dissenting voices are growing in numbers with each successive downturn. The old 
assumption that the survival of local industry will assure the survival of the community is 
losing credence. As communities evaluate the most recent economic downturn, it is clear 
that relationships are not reciprocal. More individuals are championing the idea that 
communities need to move beyond dependence on industrial forestry. Time will tell 
whether communities can sustain this vision for meaningful change into the future.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the contributions and relevance of the 
key findings of my research. I start by addressing the importance of studying the 
changing relationships between companies and communities by outlining my personal 
motivations for undertaking this thesis. I then review how the findings from each research 
question have contributed to theory. I also elaborate how these contributions are relevant 
to rural and regional development policy and practice. Some of the limitations of the 
research methodology are addressed to frame how these findings should be used. Future 
research projects emerging from the findings and from the recent economic recession will 
also be examined.
9.1. Personal motivation and importance of the research topic
My interest in this research topic comes from a lifelong interest in rural 
restructuring. Being bom and raised in a rural community in southwestern Manitoba, I 
spent much of my life unwittingly observing rural restructuring. My childhood was spent 
around the table listening to family members discuss trends and concepts such as rural 
depopulation and youth outmigration, fluctuating commodity prices, international trade 
disputes, transportation subsidies, uneven development, and regional development policy. 
The physical landscape I lived in was dotted with abandoned farmhouses and towns that
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were little more than place names on a map, isolated community halls and curling rinks, 
and cairns dedicated one room schools; all relics of a different era of rural life. 
Agricultural restructuring drastically changed the nature of production and the 
demography of the prairies to the point where it was hard to imagine that 30 years earlier 
there would have been a family every half-mile.
The changes confronting rural life were almost always framed as being driven by 
whims of global capital and capitalists far beyond the farm gate. This is perhaps what 
drew me to the writings of Harold Innis and rural and economic geography in the first 
place. For me, the economy has never really an abstract entity, but a very real factor in 
shaping the lives and places surrounding me. Geography provided methods and 
theoretical lenses well suited to understanding structures and changes occurring at the 
local level by examining the interplay between locally and globally embedded 
institutions. Further, economic and rural geography unseated the assumption that the 
development trajectory and future of rural places are ‘locked-in’ or determined. While 
there are a number of forces beyond the control of rural communities, there are 
opportunities to institute meaningful change and resistance. Unseating the sense of 
fatalism and determinism surrounding rural restructuring through a better understanding 
of instructions and structures will assist communities, policy makers, and corporate actors 
forge a different path for rural places.
I chose to study forestry-dependent communities because they provided the 
unique opportunity to examine how abstract concepts like globalization, neoliberalism, 
resource cycles, and economic crises were enacted in different places. Resource 
peripheries are unique because changes have sudden and visible implications due to high
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degrees of specialization and vulnerability. The study communities offered a clear 
example of this. The most vivid example of how resource economies are unique was that 
long before people were talking about a recession in the rest of the province, forestry- 
dependent communities were experiencing layoffs, mill shutdowns and curtailments, and 
economic hardship.
I also chose to examine changing community-company relationships in the 
periphery because the relationships between capital and community are inherently 
different from other places; concepts like globalization, restructuring, and neo-liberalism 
are not abstract in resource towns. Resource-dependent communities, by their very 
nature, are different than other places. Companies are often the largest and most 
important local institution as they dominate employment, tax rolls, power structures, 
infrastructure use, and resources. Companies are also connected to a number of global 
systems. How they mediate changes in these systems dictates the rhythm and pace of life 
within communities. As such, how companies decide to engage and interact with these 
communities matters a great deal to geographers and social scientists and to residents of 
BC’s Interior.
92. Research questions and findings
My first research question examined what types of relationships companies have 
adopted when engaging communities. Companies and communities had varied opinions 
over what relationships should encompass. The community visions of these relationships 
are still grounded in Fordist institutions, practices, and approaches that expected 
companies to be involved in various social and economic aspects of community life
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outside of production. This vision is rooted in the belief that companies have 
responsibilities outside of production because they are using a public resource and 
because these activities require the presence of large and skilled labour forces in remote 
places. Forestry companies remain fundamentally different from other types of 
businesses because they are key local institutions, especially within remote forestry- 
dependent communities. In each community, the notion that ‘the business, of business, is 
business’ does not match the historic or contemporary positions that forestry companies 
occupy. Further, the limitations of communities imposed by the unique structure of local 
economies limit the resources communities have on hand to undertake entrepreneurial 
governance. As such, relationships should involve an element of reciprocity given the 
reliance that companies and communities have on one another.
Companies take a narrower view. Company perspectives envision relationships as 
being primarily rooted in ensuring profits and employment within local mills. 
Involvement outside of these factors is seen as being contingent upon profitability. 
Evidence suggests that this has always been the case in forestry-dependent communities. 
However, changes to industry structure that have largely replaced local entrepreneurs 
with large multi-national forestry companies, coupled with restructuring of forestry 
policy, have redefined the minimum involvement required of companies. Companies 
have used the rhetoric of globalization and the realities of economic restructuring as a 
justification for retrenchment. Policy changes, such as the elimination of appurtenancy 
requirements, have signalled for companies that government supports the new flexible 
relationships within the periphery.
262
Tensions between these views were magnified during the 2008-2010 recession. 
Companies pulled back from roles and responsibilities within communities at a time 
when they were needed the most. For the case study communities, this is a new reality. 
Communities in the Interior are only recently experiencing the drastic economic 
restructuring impacts that have been occurring on the Coast since the 1980s. For 
communities, restructuring efforts have worked in different ways to create flexible 
communities (Barnes et al., 2001). I argue that in the Interior the implications of this type 
of flexibility were not completely visible until the most recent recession. Most notably, 
the findings suggest that companies and government increasingly regard communities as 
a hindrance, rather than necessary component to, profitability.
Relationships have changed as companies and governments withdrew from 
previously held responsibilities. Companies played a smaller role in community 
functioning, reduced support for programs and organizations, reduced communication, 
and pressured communities to consider how they could contribute to increasing 
profitability. Companies also changed the amount and type of business they did locally. 
Rationalization programs have eroded local services and placed increased strain on local 
contractors and businesses. The changing roles and responsibilities of local management 
often symbolized changing relationships and flexibility as the actions and attitudes of 
local managers often embody ‘the company’. As such, the changing responsibilities, 
skill-sets, and tenures of local managers have played an important role in eroding 
community trust, social capital, and human capital. This is perhaps why the loss of 
donations, initiatives, and reduced involvement of local management have been so 
contested in resource towns; the limited avenues for exerting control over local issues and
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priorities available to community members are disappearing. The recent recession was a 
painful reminder to many communities that extra-local issues play a strong role in their 
future, regardless of the strength of local mills. Despite these changes industry and 
government have yet to address deep-seated structural issues associated with staple 
production that underpins the sustained crises in the provincial forestry sector.
Communities have responded to these changes in a number of ways. Houston and 
Quesnel were temporarily able to resist some of these changes only because of the 
importance of local mills. While the assumption is that restructuring has empowered 
community leaders and organizations to create a local vision of development, in reality it 
has meant ‘doing more with less’. Communities have responded to the calls from industry 
and government for flexibility by adopting the ‘entrepreneurial’ approach to local 
development to accommodate industry and capital in hopes of securing a reprieve from 
job losses and plant closures. In practice this has meant different groups and 
organizations have taken on many of the risks and responsibilities to remain globally 
competitive.
The responses of municipal and provincial governments and labour fit with 
Freudenburg’s (1992) ‘addictive’ economies. Efforts have focused on the retention of 
industry by lowering the local costs of production and relaxing standards and regulations 
(Hanink, 2000). It would appear that the decline and disappearance of many resource 
towns throughout the Interior is inescapable, barring a drastic shift by all of the actors 
involved.
The second research question addressed the processes driving change in 
relationships. Changes to how companies engaged communities at the local level were
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influenced by a combination of globalization of the forestry sector, consolidation of the 
Interior forestry sector, corporate restructuring, and changing forestry policy. Several 
factors unique to the region influenced unique responses to restructuring, including (1) 
the state of the local resource base and the MPB outbreak, (2) pockets of investment to 
capitalize on the availability of cheap wood, (3) high levels of technological 
sophistication and economies of scale within many mills, (4) distance from markets and 
the remoteness of most settlements, and (5) the willingness of communities to make 
accommodations for productivity.
Despite facing different forms of restructuring relative to the Coast since the 
1980s, the results for many Interior communities have not been different. Although many 
mills continued producing lumber and pulp much as they had during Fordism, labour 
shedding, market volatility, mill obsolescence, and economic dependence were present 
throughout the region. The case study communities indicate that many of these hardships 
have either been delayed or deployed at a slower pace than on the Coast.
9 3 . Policy recommendations
This research examined changing community-company relationships in the 
forestry sector to determine the nature and impact of restructuring at the local level. The 
findings show that for the study communities, past relationships with government and 
companies have shaped their abilities to respond to current challenges. This case study 
has highlighted the importance of place and history when examining how the 
intermingling of global and local forces results in unique outcomes.
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My findings have highlighted a number of important factors and contributions to 
the literature, theory, and policy. The post-war landscape of the northern Interior was 
developed because government had a long-term vision for the region and they committed 
resources to developing infrastructure. However, it is important to note that change has 
been a constant in the economies of the northern Interior. Government, companies, and 
communities were able to transform the region’s economy and landscape following 
World War II to establish a structured coherence. Post-Fordism will require establishing a 
strategic vision and coordinating a large number of communities, companies, 
organizations, and groups (Amin, 1998; Jessop, 1993).
However, policy cannot be developed and prescribed from outside of the region. 
The Interior needs a coherent vision for the future coupled with investment in appropriate 
infrastructures (Hutton, 2002, p. 21; Markey et al., 2008). This investment and vision 
need to be reconciled with uneven development across the region. Different capacities, 
circumstances, and resources limit the efficacy of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to regional 
development (Boschma & Martin, 2010; Martin, 2006). The Interior cannot be treated as 
a static, homogeneous region. It is highly varied in terms of demographics, infrastructure, 
resources, and local capacities. Policy should be flexible and reflect these differences 
(Halseth et al., 2004). For example, this research found that in the Interior there was a 
temporary reprieve from restructuring (until recently) that stopped communities from 
addressing local development. Most communities and companies did not take cues from 
the restructuring on the Coast to instigate change. Again, during the most recent 
recession, energies were focused on supporting forestry companies rather than on
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critically assessing local development. These types of discussions need to happen well in 
advance of mill shutdowns when local councils are involved in economic triage.
This suggests that communities need support and resources in order to be 
successful, otherwise traditional inequalities that underpin the province’s rural periphery 
will continue towards polarization. The province should coordinate services and policies 
along with local governments. For communities, the established ‘booster’ approach 
where municipal councils rush to attract and retain capital by undercutting other places 
needs to be re-evaluated. This approach has not allowed communities to retain the full 
economic and social benefits from industry. Due to the small size of most communities in 
the region, cooperation to attract and retain entrepreneurs appears to be a potential 
solution. This is not happening as many are still focused on the ‘old economy’ and its 
associated forms of local economic development (Mayer, 1994; Sommers & Birss, 1991). 
They need to recognize that the economy has changed and so too should their focus 
(Albert, 2007).
The case of Mackenzie illustrates the limitations of ‘bottom-up’ local 
development approaches and the need for greater government involvement in planning. It 
is unlikely that forestry-dependent communities will ever be able to adequately address 
long-term development issues. By their very nature resource towns are always dealing 
with short-term crises. Even the best efforts by the municipal council in Mackenzie were 
pushed to the side to deal with the crisis gripping the community. Once the mills were re­
opened efforts shifted to issues of labour shortages and service provision. Closures also 
drew down local leadership pools and the human capital that will take a long time to
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replenish. All of these issues hinder the ability of communities to sustain the types of 
long-term local development projects needed to change local economies.
This is related to successive provincial governments viewing the Interior as 
productive space which funds provincial coffers. In order for regional economies to 
overcome ‘lock-in’ there needs to be diversification or an enhancement of the existing 
economy (Martin & Sunley, 2006). Indeed, political approaches to regions are as 
important in shaping development as history (Agnew, 2000). Regional economies are not 
permanent and development potentials are not defined. Government needs to rethink 
current discourses and restructuring strategies and adopt a transformative vision of a 
more post-productivist economy that involves moving beyond promoting more of the 
same and encourages institutional renewal (Burda & M’Gonigle, 1996). Economic 
development policy needs to address existing, deep-seated structural issues alongside 
short-term crises (Glasmeier, 2000). This should involve identifying obstacles to renewal, 
encouraging linkages within and beyond the region, and attracting new entrepreneurs 
(Boschma & Martin, 2010). Enthusiasm surrounding rebounding lumber markets and 
new mining developments needs to be parlayed into widespread change, otherwise the 
next economic crisis in forestry is assured.
Regional development plans need to be informed by a clear understanding of 
geography and history. A place-based approach to regional economic development that 
recognizes regional variability is needed (Hutton, 2002). The ‘new economy’ will be 
limited in its applicability within much of the Interior, as many successful efforts and 
projects have occurred in urban centres that exhibit economies of agglomeration (Britton, 
1996). Policy should be aimed at assessing and utilizing different local capacities and
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resources in conjunction with one another towards a common goal. As the recent 
recession illustrated, there is a need at the community-level to be engaged in long-term, 
ongoing economic development planning.
As this study illustrated, communities in the north are not short of ideas or 
commitment. However, communities do not possess the power or resources necessary to 
identify and capitalize on emerging opportunities to institute real change. The resources 
of any one municipal council are unlikely to be sufficient for the task at hand. Fostering 
learning capacities to capitalize on innovation opportunities is an established need in the 
Interior. Governments and companies need to be mindful of this fact and reconfigure 
levels of engagement, as they are key actors within the region (Lane, 1988; Patriquin et 
al., 2009). Regional collaboration and cooperation would likely contribute to establishing 
goals and strategies congruent with the region’s resources.
It is not enough for academics and policy makers to recognize that forestry and 
community well-being are closely linked. Issues of dependence, vulnerability, and 
truncated development are still prominent within the study communities. Further, the 
notion that the wealth of firms and regions are linked is flawed (Amin, 1998). These 
issues are as neglected today as they were in the 1950s. The assumptions that 
entrepreneurial cultures will develop, and that maturity will be reached in forestry- 
dependent communities do not hold. Policy should foster local capacities by providing 
funding and opportunities to develop leadership. A history of corporate paternalism and 
government managerialism has contributed to restricting the development of local 
entrepreneurial cultures throughout the region.
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My research also found that the current approach by forestry companies and the 
provincial government is not adequate for assisting communities through restructuring. 
Forestry companies should play a role in regional economic development, as they are 
major stakeholders in the process. As major employers and users of the resource base, 
companies have a vested interest in planning for long-term development of the region. 
Indeed, this research indicates that local and regional development is well within their 
purview. Likewise, the provincial government needs to re-evaluate its approach to 
‘entrepreneurialism’. The ‘hands-off’ approach to local development, off-loading of 
services, and funding mechanisms are not suited to many small places, particularly 
isolated resource-dependent economies. This has only resulted in perpetuating a 
governance structure that concentrates decision-making power in the hands of local elites 
which blocks innovation, the growth of local entrepreneurs, and institutional reform and 
renewal. Further, while the provincial government has selectively transferred some 
responsibilities, communities still largely lack the power to implement change. The 
provincial government is clearly still an important actor. This research indicates that 
some forestry-dependent communities need assistance in formulating local development 
strategies as the allure of productivism is strong.
Infrastructure investments are needed in many communities throughout the 
region. Much of the existing infrastructures are relics of Fordism. Investment needs to 
support the possibility of establishing conditions for the ‘new economy’. Investment in 
infrastructure and human capital for information technologies, value-added, and service 
industries needs to be planned and supported. It is in the best interest of companies and 
government to support initiatives that contribute to stable communities. They have made
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substantial investments in the region and it continues to be a valuable source of natural 
wealth. To allow communities to degrade and weaken not only neglects those 
investments, but it perpetuates dependence and curbs future development possibilities.
9.4. Limitations and future research
This research was an in-depth, qualitative case study and, therefore, 
generalizations to other settings should be approached with caution (Wilson, 2004). The 
case study method allowed me to conduct a detailed analysis of how various global forces 
combined with the peculiarities of place to shape the relationships between companies 
and communities. Indeed, this research focused on how the peculiarities of the region and 
the different communities influenced these external broad forces. Therefore, when 
speaking of generalization I am referring to the context, time, and place to which the 
relationships are transferrable (Mayring, 2007). As such, the results of this research are 
particularly relevant to the context of forestry-dependent communities within BC’s 
Interior and are unlikely to be generalisable to different contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
Also, I do not expect the concrete events occurring within forestry-dependent 
communities in BC’s Interior to be generalisable to other contexts. Rather, the structures 
and forces influencing and shaping these events will likely be found elsewhere (Sayer & 
Morgan, 1985).
Regarding data collection, I chose to interview local individuals because I was 
interested in the nature of ‘local-embeddedness’ and the role that local institutions played 
in shaping relationships with companies in order to better understand the community 
implications of economic restructuring (Markusen, 1994). Therefore, in terms of
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company decision-making my analysis focused on local managers and their
interpretations of company motivations. As Nelson et al. (2009p. 363) indicate, local
managers are well positioned to speak to corporate motivations and decision-making:
As [local] managers are in charge of carrying out operations on a daily basis (and 
indeed their job security is ultimately linked to how well they perform), we 
anticipated that they would be well qualified to not only identify the salient 
measures important to senior decision-makers at the firm, but also to provide a 
relative ranking of these measures.
But it should be noted that local managers have limited access to corporate decision­
makers or strategies and must act according to the pressures and constraints of their jobs. 
Future research could elaborate on the findings from this study by exploring how 
corporate managers view necessary and contingent relations with communities. This 
would compliment the findings related to company motivations related to local manager 
autonomy, investment decisions, community relations, and corporate policies.
The trends and changes identified in this study should also be monitored into the 
future to determine whether interest in economic diversification and community can be 
sustained. We are in the midst of important changes within the Interior. As many 
communities face devastating mill closures for the first time, it is important to document 
how restructuring is shaped by various factors such as company structure, community 
size, remoteness, resource availability, local capacities and resources, and local 
infrastructures and how these factors shape community responses. Comparing these 
strategies to what has occurred on the Coast will provide researchers, policy makers, and 
communities with a more nuanced understanding of regional differences and possible 
responses. Continued longitudinal research on these topics will better inform the ongoing 
community implications of policy reform and restructuring (Wilson, 2004).
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It is also important to note that during data collection, communities were in the 
midst of a severe recession. This had different implications for the research that allowed 
for unique insight into the research topic. First, economic diversification took on a sense 
of urgency amongst community leaders. Second, the availability of key-informants was 
somewhat restricted, particularly in Mackenzie, where many mill workers, managers, and 
several service providers had left town in search of employment. As such I had to quickly 
adopt several strategies for obtaining interviews in the field and accounting for bias 
during analysis of the data. In the end, I feel that the recession offered a unique 
opportunity to assess community-company relationships under stress and the full extent 
to which communities have become ‘flexible’ under current government and company 
policies/practices.
The conclusions from this thesis highlight a number of future research projects. 
This research project is one ‘piece’ to better understanding the unique nature of 
restructuring within the Interior. The research was motivated by the desire to better 
understand the trend towards ‘flexible communities’ within the forestry sector. These 
findings indicated that restructuring was different than on the Coast. Future projects 
should examine how flexible production has been pursued within the region, more 
specifically: “Are firms in the Interior adopting flexible mass production or flexible 
specialization techniques?” and “What form are flexible labour arrangements within the 
region taking?” While this research addresses aspects of these questions, further research 
is warranted. Much of what is known about the Interior forestry sector following 
restructuring is contained in industry publications. Further study is required to determine 
how the region fits within the rural and economic restructuring literature. This research
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would complement the large body of research examining restructuring on the Coast. 
Examining the similarities and differences between the two regions would be useful in 
formulating locally specific policy measures and provide a more nuanced understanding 
of restructuring in the province.
A promising line of future inquiry would be to build upon these findings by 
‘scaling-up’ the results through a series of quantitative studies of local development 
responses to the most recent recession. This recession was the largest economic downturn 
for the region since the Second World War. This study found that this recession was 
viewed as a turning point in some communities while others may be able to maintain 
industrial forestry into the future. Research should examine whether communities that 
faced drastic mill closures like Mackenzie can sustain diversification efforts as local mills 
ramp-up production. For other communities that are home to large, state of the art mills, 
like those Houston and Quesnel, “Will communities use the time and resources available 
from the local forestry sector to engage in proactive local economic diversification 
measures?” and “Was this recession really different with regards to highlighting the 
diminished ability o f forestry to support the economic base o f rural places, or will the 
staples trap prevail? ”
In conclusion, this dissertation argues that the relationships between companies 
and communities are an important aspect of life within resource-dependent communities. 
A close examination of the study communities finds that unique local characteristics, 
histories, and geographies combined with global institutions and processes to shape 
community-company relationships. Due to the rapid nature of change within the forestry 
sector, and the diverse circumstances faced by communities, devising a set of best
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practices for companies and governments would be difficult and have limited 
applicability. However, given the continued importance of resources to the province’s 
economy, and the recovery of commodity markets, it is clear that communities cannot be 
left to fend for themselves as they were in the 2008-10 recession. Doing so will only 
continue to degrade human capital and infrastructures throughout the region. Residents of 
northern BC are committed to the region and their communities and are not short on ideas 
for change. Communities, companies, and government need to work together to re-focus 
regional development in a way that addresses economic and environmental realities while 
supporting development in the periphery.
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Key informant interview consent form
Community-Company Relationships 
Interview Consent Form
Purpose -  The purpose o f  this project is to evaluate community-company relationships in forestry 
communities in northern BC. The research is being conducted by A lex Martin, a graduate student 
from UNBC in the Natural Resources and Environmental Studies Program. The project will involve 
an analysis o f  historical data, focus groups, and interviews. This consent is only for the interview 
activity.
How Respondents Were Chosen - Interview participants were selected from publicly available lists. 
They were selected for their potential to provide information about issues relevant to the past, present, 
and future o f  the local forestry sector. Participants will be speaking on their personal experience with 
these issues, not as representatives o f any company or organization.
Anonymity And Confidentiality -  The names o f participants will not be used in any reporting, nor 
will any information be published which may be used to identify individuals. A ll information shared 
in this interview will be held within strict confidence by the researcher. All records will be kept in a 
locked research room at UNBC and accessible only to the researcher and his supervisor. The 
information w ill be kept until the final project report is complete (maximum o f 7 years). After this 
time, all material and information related to the interview will be destroyed.
Potential Risks And Benefits - This project has been assessed by the UNBC Research Ethics Board. I 
do not consider there to be any risks to participation. I hope that by participating you will have a 
chance to provide input into issues relevant to the local forestry sector.
Voluntary Participation - Your participation in the interview is entirely voluntary and, as such, you 
may chose not to participate. If you participate, you may choose not to answer any questions that 
make you uncomfortable, and you have the right to end your participation in the interview at any time 
and have all the information you provided withdrawn from the study.
Research Results - In case o f  any questions that may arise from this research, please feel free to 
contact Dr. Greg Halseth (250-960-5826; halseth@unbc.ca) or Alex Martin (250-960-5299; 
amartinl@unbc.ca) in the Geography Program at UNBC. A  draft summary o f your interview will be 
sent to you for verification. A final project report will also be made available to each participant.
Complaints - Any complaints about this project should be directed to the Office o f Research, UNBC  
(250) 960-5820 <reb@unbc.ca>.
I consent to having this interview recorded □  Yes □  No
I have read the above description of the study and I understand the conditions of my 
participation. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in this study.
Name (Please Print) Signature Date
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Key informant interview question guide
Sectio n  A: O pen in g  Qu e st io n s
A1. How long you have lived in Houston or the area?
A2.What involvement do/did you have with the forestry sector?
S ection  B: B a c k g r o u n d  & C o n tex t
B 1. How would you describe Houston to someone who knows nothing about it? 
B2. What is Houston like as a place to live? Work? Visit? Conduct Business?
S ectio n  C: Lo c a l  Fo r estr y  Sector  In  T he  Pa st
C l. How would you describe the forestry sector in Houston when you first came 
here?
C2. What were some of the key events that happened in the local forestry sector in 
the past? How did these events impact forestry workers, the community, and the 
companies?
C3. How were forestry companies involved in Houston over this period of time?
D id  those events effect past com m unity-com pany relations?
C4. How did those events affect the way that the community interacted with the 
forestry companies?
S e c t io n  D: T h e  L o c a l  F o r e s t r y  S e c t o r  T o d a y
D1. What are some of the current things about Houston, or the surrounding region, 
that make it a unique place for forestry companies to operate?
D2. How would you describe the current community-company relationships in 
Houston?
S ection  E: D riv er s  of  C h a n g e
El.How have community-company relations changed in Houston over time?
E2.Thinking back to the key events you identified earlier in the interview, can you 
relate them to changes in community-company relationships?
E3.How have different community-company relationships impacted Houston? The 
forestry companies? Forestry workers and their families?
Sectio n  F: C o n c l u d in g  Q u e st io n s
F I . Is there anything important not covered by the preceding questions that you would 
like to comment on?
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Focus group consent form
Community-Company Relationships 
Focus Group Consent Form
Purpose -  The purpose o f  this project is to evaluate com m unity-com pany relationships in 
forestry com m unities in northern BC. The research is being conducted by A lex  Martin, a graduate 
student from U N B C  in the Natural R esources and Environmental Studies Program. The project 
w ill involve an analysis o f  historical data, focus groups, and interviews. This consent is only for 
the focus group activity.
How Respondents Were Chosen - The focus group participants were selected from publicly  
available lists. The focus group participants were selected for their potential to provide 
information about issues relevant to the past, present, and future o f  the local forestry sector. 
Participants w ill be speaking on their personal experience with these issues, not as representatives 
o f  any com pany or organization.
Anonvmitv And Confidentiality -  The names o f  participants w ill not be used in any reporting, 
nor w ill any information be published w hich may be used to identify individuals. The nature o f  
focus group discussions means that w e w ill be sharing information am ongst everyone present. 
H ow ever, all information shared in this focus group w ill be held within strict confidence by the 
researchers. A ll records w ill be kept in a locked research room at U N B C  and accessib le only to 
the research team . The information w ill be kept until the final project report is com plete 
(m axim um  o f 7 years). After this tim e, all material and information related to the focus group 
w ill be destroyed.
Potential Risks And Benefits - This project has been assessed by the U N B C  Research Ethics 
Board. I do not consider there to be any risks to participation. I hope that by participating you  
w ill have a chance to provide input into issues relevant to the local forestry sector.
Voluntary Participation - Your participation in the focus group is entirely voluntary and, as 
such, you may chose not to participate. If you participate, you may choose not to answer any 
questions that make you uncomfortable, and you have the right to end your participation in the 
focus group at any tim e and have all the information you provided withdrawn from the study.
Research Results - In case o f  any questions that may arise from this research, p lease feel free to 
contact Dr. Greg Halseth (250-960-5826; halseth@ unbc.ca) or A lex  Martin (250-960-5299;  
am artinl@ unbc.ca) in the Geography Program at U N B C . A  draft thematic summary report o f  the 
focus group findings w ill be distributed to all focus group participants. A  final project report w ill 
also be m ade available to each participant.
Complaints - A ny com plaints about this project should be directed to the O ffice o f  Research, 
U N B C  (250) 960-5820  < reb@ unbc.ca> .
I have read the above description of the study and I understand the conditions of my 
participation. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in this study.
Name (Please Print) Signature Date
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Focus group question guide
Sectio n  A: Open in g  Q u e st io n s
A1. Going around the table, could you please state:
■ Your name;
■ How long you have lived in [community name] or the area
S ectio n  B: B a c k g r o u n d  & Co n tex t
B1 .How would you describe [community name] to someone who knows nothing 
about it?
B2.What is [community name] like as a place to live? Work? Visit? Conduct 
Business?
B3.What are [community name]s’ greatest strengths? Weaknesses?
S ectio n  C: Lo c a l  Fo r estr y  Sector
Cl .How would you describe the forestry sector in [community name]?
C2.What are some of the key issues facing the forestry sector in [community name]? 
C3.What changes have you witnessed in the local or regional forestry sector during 
your time in [community name]? What events triggered these changes?
C4.How have these changes impacted [community name]? Forestry companies? 
Forestry workers and their families?
S e c t io n  D: F o r e s t r y  C om p a n ies
D1. What are the key forestry companies within [community name]?
■ How long have they been operating within [community name]?
■ Approximately how many employees work for each company?
D2. Is there anything about [community name] or the surrounding region that makes 
it a unique place for forestry companies to operate?
D3. How have community-company relations changed in [community name] over 
time?
S ectio n  E: C o n c l u d in g  Q u e st io n s
El .Is there anything important not covered by the preceding questions that you 
would like to comment on?
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Appendix B -  Supplemental and historical data on forestry sector and 
study communities
This appendix provides background data related to the study communities and 
the provincial forestry sector. These data provide empirical detail for some of the trends 
identified in Chapter 3. These data were also included to address future accessibility 
concerns, especially in cases where figures and tables were only available on web-based 
pages or reports. This appendix includes:
1. Sawmill number and average capacity from 1950 to 1974 (Pearse, 1976),
2. Lumber production by region from 1946 to 1974 (F.L.C. Reed & Associates, 
1975),
3. Lumber shipments by region from 1987 to 2003 (CFPA, 2010),
4. Measures of dominant income sources, dependence on forestry and wood 
processing, regional economic diversity, and forestry sector vulnerability for local 
areas in 2006 (Home, 2009b), and
5. Population counts for the case study communities from 1931 to 2006 (BC Stats, 
2008).
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The number and average capacity of sawmills in British Columbia: 1950-1974
3000
Avg. Capacity
2500
§ 2000
is 1500
1000
500
Number of mills
1950 1955 1965 1970 19741960
Year
Source: Pearse, 1976
BC lumber production by region: 1946-1974 (million board feet)
Lumber Production by Region
Year Coast Interior Total
1946 1683 486 2169
1947 2040 667 2707
1948 2123 815 2938
1949 2172 779 2951
1950 2512 997 3509
1951 2520 1204 3724
1952 2276 1421 3697
1953 2572 1474 4046
1954 2684 1695 4379
1955 2756 2158 4914
1956 2454 2281 4735
1957 2352 2060 4412
1958 2565 2284 4849
1959 2346 2603 4949
1960 2850 2455 5305
1961 2956 2664 5620
1962 3020 2984 6004
1963 3396 3338 6734
1964 3492 3603 7095
1965 3649 3800 7449
1966 3680 3639 7319
1967 3913 3197 7110
1968 4144 3667 7811
1969 3911 3785 7696
1970 3790 3867 7657
1971 4185 4752 8937
1972 4027 5479 9506
1973 4367 5944 10311
1974 3450 5350 8800
Source: F.L.C. Reed and Associates, 1975
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BC lumber shipments by market: 1987-2003 (million board feet) *nCMco
COAST ! ------—- —~r“------ '---- - f ....— - .....
Country | 19*7 19*8 19*9 > 1990 ! 1991 1992 1993 1*94 1995 199* 1997 ......1.999...... ... ...... *999...... 2001 2002 ! 2003...
Jaoan I 1,077.60 1.106 90 1228 40' 1.212 50 1,305 00 1.355.10 1.5672® 1.602 60 1.671 70 1,710.50 1.460.80 1070.8 1.1528 1 237,5 95811 857 5! 7793
Europa I  594.3 794 706.8] 7593! 559.7 468.7 219,1 230.5 169.2 160,8 171.2 140.1 1478 160.8 112.3 135.1! 155.4
Othff ! 304.7 4386. 483.2] 358.5] 278 3. 236.4 2 7 4 S 242 9 223.8 2164 153.7 194.0 236.2 206.5 270.4; ..... 3156
U .S. j  y i 3 i o 2,518 70 2,163 20 1.974.50! 1.693  30 1,663.00
K-
1,795.00! 1.904.10 1.860 90 1,6*2.50 1.89320 1Z8180 1,807 8 1j.779.Q0 1,778 50 1j563.10! 1,424 0
Total Vol. i 4,5*0.00 4.658.20* 4,5*3. *0i 4,305.* 3.836.3 3,7232 3,*77.7 4,011.6 3264.7 3.787.6 3341JB 3,146.4 3,302.5 3.413.5 3,055.4 2,626.10! 2674.3
Total Vaiua t  Wiltons Cdn ] $3 497 $3435 $2 704 S 2 952 $ 3179 $2 702 1 2 ,4 9 2 " $2,023
Value/Mfbm- Cdn j ] $923 $970 $860 $894 $931 $884 $882 ! $756
I ; !
I | ............<
IN TERIOR I .....
Country T  196^ 19M 1 9 tt 19*0 ! 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ! 1996 n 1997 199* 1999 2000 2001 2002 ! 2003
Jaoan j 244.6 3459 441.5’ 4566! 5994 607.7 704 1 643.8 748.6 905 7 6694 504.7 642 5 6666 619.6 857 9! 667.6
Eurooa 466.8 464 3 9 1 .2 ! 423 6! 317.8 251.7 871 80.5 57.8 27.9 27.2 17.7 17 3 15.9 12.4 12.7! 15.9
Othar | 47.2 69 3 41.5; 86.3! 130.7 176.2 136 99.4 122.5 78.7 107.8 70.1 825 952 82.6 122 1 182.5
U.S. f "  6.594 60 6.413.40 ...8.554.00] 5.302.30] 5.442 90 6.511.20 7.004.10 7.336.00 r T 4 8 7 i 0 7.332.00 7.170.00 6.961.40 6,851,30 ~ ~ T « 9 W ... 7.446 80 n jj|77 .flR i. 8.834 90
Total Vtd 1  7.353.40 7.312.50 r 7,429.201 626*.*! 6,490.80 7.546.80 7.93140 8,139.60 8,396.80 8.344.30 7.974.40 7,553.90 7.593.60 7.50740! 8.161.40 9.1*9.70! 9,700.90
Total Valua t  billions Cdn ! ; $ 4.400 $4,589 $ 3.933 $ 4,532 S3.886 $4,002 $3,993 ! $3,388
VatusTMfbm-Cdn j ; $ 527 $ 608 $ 521 S 597 $518 $490 $435 ! $349
? ;
H  r
BC Tot. Vol. 11,94320 12,169.50 12.019.80; 10.574,30! 10,326 70 11.269.60 11.808.90 12.15090 12.36120 12,131.90 11.516.00 19.700 30 10.896.10 10.929.00 11.216.80 11.995.80! 12.375 2C
C oast % 38! 40 38! 41] 37 33 33 33 32 .. 31 31 29 30 31 27 ........_...2*. 22
lntarior% 60
----
SO 63 67 67 L  67 88 69 69 71 70 69 73 76! 78
j ;
.. ..................... .....................!.................. 1 T
Canada Housing Starts i 
Unrtad Staiaa Housing Star 
Jaoan  Total Houaina Starts • milion ft i* 1 707r
156200
1.014
1.37
168.300____ u .
1 403
155.400
1288
1.486
154.100
1.457
1.57
110.933
1.354
1.47
124.713
1.477
147.040j 137,439 
1.47*1" 1.618, 
" 1 3 6 j q i T l 9 *
149.968 
1 663 
1.215
154.600
1.59
1.230
162.700
1.174
204.857]
_ _ j u m
1.151!
218.400
____ 195
1 16
Japan  Zairal (poatSbaam l Housing s tarts 642,102 545.366 580,800 603,670 619,100 554,690 619,020 496.020 ! 447.290 457,130 446360 418.400 401.029! 418.426
Jaoan  2X4 Mousing S tarts ....... 51.093! 45.437 52.933 64.037 r  f i M h 93.963 75,884 79.114 77.235 78.988! 81.502
Source: CFPA, 2010
Dominant basic income sources by local area: 2006
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Dependence on forestry and wood processing by local area: 2006
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Regional economic diversity by local area: 2006
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Forestry sector vulnerability by local area: 2006
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Population of Houston, Mackenzie, Quesnel: 1931-2006
Name 1931 1941 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Houston - - - - 699 699 2,232 2,673 3,921 3,905 3,628 3,934 3,577 3,163
Mackenzie - - - - - - 2,332 5,338 5,890 5,542 5,796 5,997 5,206 4,539
Quesnel 446 653 1,587 4,384 4,673 5,725 6,252 7,637 8,240 8,358 8,179 8,468 10,044 9,326
Source: BC Stats, 2008
